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Abstract 
This paper discusses two additional decision approaches beyond the traditional 
multi-attribute theory (the “matrix” approach where people weigh the pros and cons of a 
decision).  The prospective story approach involves mentally simulating stories of what 
life would be like in the future should one take particular options.  The prospective option 
repair approach involves planning specific and concrete actions one can personally take 
to ameliorate the downsides of particular options.   
The two studies described in this paper tested the prevalence, self-persuasion, 
implementation, other-persuasion, and process costs and benefits of the matrix, repair, 
and story approaches by pitting the approaches against control (natural or unelaborated) 
approaches in a two-option decision task and eliciting responses from decision makers 
and audiences.  We also tested for mediation of any effects by certain personal 
characteristics—subjective numeracy, narrative transportability, and actively open-
minded thinking.   
Self-reports by decider participants indicated that almost all of them 
spontaneously used some variant of decision matrices, most used some variant of 
prospective stories, and almost three-quarters used option repairs.  Prospective narratives 
aided all the different persuasion aspects of decision processes—self-persuasion, 
justification, and influence—regardless of people’s narrative transportability, though at 
the cost of longer completion time and less enjoyment compared to other approaches.  
Prospective option repairs increased deciders’ implementation intentions, generation of 
new ideas (as self-reported by deciders), and perceived competence by audience 
participants.  The traditional matrix approach, in contrast, aided only self-persuasion, but 
only for high subjective numeracy deciders.  Decider participants tended to be one-sided 
in their option repairs/stories (they repaired or storied only their eventually-chosen 
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options) although two-sidedness (repairing or storying all options) was more persuasive 
to audience participants. 
The studies validated prospective option repairs and stories as alternative 
descriptions for people’s decision processes.  The decision implementation and 
persuasion functions of these approaches help explain why many people use these 
approaches spontaneously, and suggest them as decision aids to would-be decision 
makers, advisors, and persuaders who do not.  The time and effort needed to generate 
repairs and stories for all options are worthwhile for people concerned about persuasion 
and choice implementation.
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Chapter 1 
 
The Multi-Attribute Decision Problem, Questions, and 
Dissertation Overview 
A long-standing area of interest in decision scholarship has been how people 
make choices involving multiple options, which differ in their attributes on various 
dimensions.  Such choices are described as multi-attribute decision problems.  In this 
dissertation, we limit ourselves to the “simple” case where all the attributes are known 
and guaranteed—that is, there is no “uncertainty.”  For instance, a person might be trying 
to decide which of three cars to buy—Car A, Car B, and Car C—based upon the color, 
price, and gas mileage.  There is no “uncertainty” if all three cars’ colors, prices, and gas 
mileages are fixed and readily obtainable by the decider, e.g., displayed on the ads for the 
cars.  Car A is red, costs $18,000, and gives 30 miles per gallon.  Car C gives 29 mpg, 
costs $22,000, and is gray.  Car B costs $20,000, is green, and gives 32mpg.  Color, price, 
and mileage are the dimensions of the decision problem, while red, $22,000, 30mpg, etc. 
are the specific attributes, or features, of the options at hand (Cars A, B, and C).  Even 
with no uncertainty involved, such choices can be difficult when they require giving up 
pros that the person desires and/or accepting cons that the person dislikes. 
The scientific aim of psychological research is to understand psychological 
processes, which involves “description” and “explanation.”  Description involves 
understanding what people actually do, while explanation involves understanding why 
people do what they do.  The practical aim of research involves prescription, or finding 
ways to improve psychological processes for people.  Applied to multi-attribute decision 
making, then, we are concerned with describing how people actually make multi-attribute 
decisions, why they do it that way, and what can be done to improve that decision 
process.   
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Traditional multi-attribute theory assumes that people make decisions by 
weighing the pros and cons using numbers and rules.  That is, it is as though they create 
mental tables (“matrices”) of option features and dimensions, quantify their valuations of 
those features and dimensions, and applying numerical rules to select winning options.  
But there are description, explanation, and prescription problems with the matrix 
approach, especially as illustrated by the spreading of alternatives phenomena, in which 
evaluations of various aspects of the decision matrix shift to favor the leading option 
throughout the decision process even without new information being added. 
Inspired by observations of people’s decision processes in past research, this 
paper ties together decision, persuasion, narrative therapy, action planning, negotiation, 
business, and legal literature to propose two additional decision approaches largely 
unconsidered by past decision scholars.  The prospective story approach involves 
mentally simulating stories of what life would be like in the future should one take 
particular options.  The prospective option repair approach involves planning specific and 
concrete actions one can personally take to ameliorate the downsides of particular 
options.  The two approaches provide alternative descriptions, explanations, and 
prescriptions to the traditionally studied matrix approach for people’s decision making 
and persuasion processes.   
There are many reasons why the approaches should appeal to decision makers and 
persuaders, including their usefulness for spreading alternatives, resolving cardinal 
decision issues, decision self-persuasion, other-persuasion, and decision implementation.  
Verifying these benefits would provide potential explanations for why at least some 
decision makers use the approaches.  Process costs and benefits of the approaches 
themselves, like process time, enjoyment, and perceived helpfulness, would also help 
explain why people do or do not use the approaches.  Finding benefits of the approaches 
would also provide prescriptions for would-be decision makers, justifiers, and persuaders 
who have not thought of using these approaches before.  The studies described in this 
paper tested the prevalence, self-persuasion, implementation, other-persuasion, and 
process costs and benefits of the matrix, repair, and story approaches.  We subdivided the 
repair and story approaches into one-sided and two-sided variants, to see whether (a) 
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people tend to be one-sided or two-sided in their decision processes and (b) whether one-
sidedness or two-sidedness is better as an other-persuasion strategy.   
To achieve these aims, Studies 1 and 2 pitted several variants of the approaches of 
interest—matrix, one-sided repair, two-sided repair, and story—against control (natural 
or unelaborated) approaches, and compared their effects on decision makers and 
audiences.  We also tested whether the effects of the matrix, story, and one-sided/two-
sided approaches were mediated by certain personal characteristics— subjective 
numeracy, narrative transportability, and actively open-minded thinking, respectively.  
Study 1 elicited reactions from decision makers, while Study 2 elicited reactions from 
decision audiences.  The studies randomly assigned participants to use (Study 1) or view 
(Study 2) one of the decision approach variants.  The participants then completed 
questionnaires about the choices made, approaches used, and personal characteristics.  
The stories and repairs generated by participants in Study 1 were vetted and used to craft 
the stimuli for Study 2. 
Self-reports by decider participants indicated that almost all of them 
spontaneously used some variant of decision matrices, most used some variant of 
prospective stories, and almost three-quarters used option repairs.  Prospective narratives 
took the longest time to complete and were enjoyed the least.  None of the treatment 
approaches were rated as being more helpful than using whatever approach one wanted to 
use, although the option repair approaches were rated as inspiring more fresh ideas.  
However, prospective narratives and option repairs did aid decision implementation and 
persuasion.  Prospective narratives aided all the different persuasion aspects of decision 
processes—self-persuasion, justification, and influence—regardless of people’s narrative 
transportability.  Prospective option repairs increased deciders’ implementation intentions 
and perceived competence by audience participants.  Decision matrices, in contrast, aided 
only self-persuasion, and even then only for high subjective numeracy people.  Ironically, 
decider participants tended to be one-sided even though it turned out that two-sidedness 
was more persuasive to audience participants. 
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These studies validated prospective option repairs and stories as viable 
competitors and complements to the traditionally studied decision matrices as 
descriptions, explanations, and prescriptions for multi-attribute decision processes.  The 
decision implementation and persuasion functions contributed by those approaches help 
explain why many people use those approaches spontaneously, and recommend these 
approaches to those who do not.  It may be worth the extra time and effort spent 
generating repairs and stories for all the options, even if only for other-persuasion 
purposes.  Hence prospective option repairs and stories are worthy of further study and 
consideration for decision theorists’, makers’, and would-be persuaders’ repertoires. 
Chapter 2 reviews the traditional research on multi-attribute decision problems 
and how well it has addressed the description, explanation, and prescription questions 
Chapter 3 defines and explains the two previously unexplored decision approaches—
prospective option repairs and prospective narratives.  Chapter 4 discusses the potential 
roles of the approaches in addressing the broad description, explanation, and prescription 
questions, and specifies four sets of specific empirical questions to test some of those 
roles.  Chapters 5 and 7 describe and discuss the procedures, analyses, and results of 
Studies 1 and 2, respectively.  Chapter 7 describes how the responses generated from 
Study 1 were filtered and vetted to create the stimuli for Study 2, and discusses 
observations we made on the stories written by participants.  Chapter 8 wraps up the 
paper with a summary of all results, the descriptive, explanatory, and prescriptive 
implications of the results, and future directions, including an extension of the studies to 
long-term outcomes. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Past Theories and Research 
2.1 Traditional Multi-Attribute Decision Theory of the 60s and 70s 
Traditionally, scholars have assumed that people solve multi-attribute decisions 
by mentally organizing the information in the equivalent of a table format, evaluating it, 
and then applying various decision rules to select one option among the ones in the table 
(Von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986).  In this table form, called a decision matrix, rows 
represent the dimensions of interest to the decider, columns represent the options under 
consideration, and cells indicate the feature of the corresponding option on the 
corresponding dimension.  Broadly speaking, traditional theory poses five steps for 
solving multi-attribute decision problems (Von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986).  The first 
step is to organize the relevant information in a matrix form (see e.g., Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1.  A Decision Matrix of the Attributes of 3 Car Options on the Dimensions of Color, Price 
and Mileage 
  Options 
  Car A Car B Car C 
Dimensions 
Color Red Green Gray 
Price $18,000 $20,000 $22,000 
Mileage 30 mpg 32 mpg 29 mpg 
 
 Step 2 involves quantifying the “value” that each attribute has for the decider 
(called “attribute values”).  In the car scenario, for instance, to what degree does the 
decider prefer the color red for a car?  To what degree does she prefer green?   Gray?  
Step 3 involves quantifying the relative importance of the dimensions to each other 
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(called “importance weights”).  For instance, how important to the decider is the color of 
the car, relative to the price?  Relative to the gas mileage?  Steps 4 and 5 involve 
applying one or more decision rules to the above information until one option emerges as 
the one to be chosen. 
 In the past, decision theorists have taken Step 1—representing information in a 
decision matrix—as a given.  The bulk of research in the 60s and 70s focused on Steps 2-
4.  Steps 2 and 3 have traditionally been viewed as issues of valuation “measurement.”  
The assumption is that values and weights are real and fixed entities in people’s minds 
that can be assessed.  Methods that have been proposed for addressing the measurement 
issue include ratings, magnitude estimation, ranking, and point allocation (Belton & 
Stewart, 2002; Malczewski, 1999; Stevens, 1975; Von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986).   
As for Steps 4 and 5, an obvious solution would be to pick the option that is at 
least as good as all of the other options on every dimension, and superior to all others on 
at least one dimension.  This rule-of-thumb is known as the “dominance rule” (cf. Lee, 
1971), as one chooses the option that “dominates” the other options.  Unfortunately, it is 
often the case that no such “dominant” option exists among the set of options under 
consideration.  This situation is referred to as non-dominance.  For instance, Car A and 
Car B might be superior to Car C on all three dimensions; however, Car A is better than 
Car B in price, but worse in mileage.  To give another example, Car A might have the 
best color, Car B might have the best price, but Car C might have the best mileage.   
Decision theorists in the 60s and 70s established two broad categories of decision 
rules for resolving such non-dominance situations—non-compensatory and 
compensatory.  Non-compensatory rules treat dimensions separately from one another.  
Thus, a car that is perfect on all dimensions but one might still be eliminated simply 
because of its deficiency in that one dimension.  Non-compensatory schemes like the 
conjunctive and disjunctive rules (Coombs & Kao, 1955; Dawes, 1964a, 1964b) classify 
options as “acceptable” or “unacceptable” based upon whether they meet the minimum 
criteria for all or any, respectively, of the dimensions.  In contrast, schemes like 
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elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972) or lexicographic (axiomatized by Fishburn, 1974) 
dictate a certain order by which dimensions are used to eliminate options. 
Compensatory rules, in contrast, require the decider to (a) combine his valuations 
of all the attributes for each option into a single number representing his overall valuation 
of that option (Step 4), and (b) choose the option with the highest overall valuation (Step 
5).  The most popular variant of Step 4 is the summation of the weighted values, called a 
“weighted additive value function.”  Put another way, it is simply the dot product of the 
set of values and the set of weights across dimensions: 
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙 = � 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑑 × 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑑
𝑑∈𝐷𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
The weighted additive value function is the basis of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory 
(MAUT) (Edwards, 1971; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976), one of the more popular 
compensatory schemes.  As an example, consider the sample decision matrix again, this 
time with a particular car buyer’s importance weights and values listed next to the 
corresponding dimensions and attributes (Table 2.2):   
Table 2.2.  The 3-Car Decision Matrix with Numerical Values, Weights, and Overall Appraisals 
  Options 
Dimension  Car A Car B Car C 
 Importance 
Weights 
Attributes Values Attributes Values Attributes Values 
Color 1 Red +5 Green +3 Gray -2 
Price 2 $18,000 -1 $20,000 -2 $22,000 -5 
Mileage 3 30 mpg 0 32 mpg +1 29 mpg 0 
Overall Option 
Appraisal 
 3  2  -12 
 
The numbers roughly indicate that he considers car color to be less important than price, 
which in turn is less important than gas mileage.  Amongst the colors red, green, and 
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gray, he highly desires red, somewhat likes green, and mildly dislikes gray.  Amongst the 
three prices, he dislikes $18,000 slightly, $20,000 a bit more, and $22,000 extremely.  
Amongst the three mileages, he slightly likes 32 miles per gallon, but is indifferent to 
either 29 mpg or 30 mpg.  Computing the dot product of the weights and values for each 
option yields overall option appraisal scores of 3, 2, and -12 for Cars A, B, and C, 
respectively.  This car buyer should therefore choose Car A, as it has the highest value to 
him, based upon his valuations of the car’s attributes and the three dimensions. 
Such compensatory rules allow tradeoffs between dimensions.  An option’s 
strengths in certain dimensions can “compensate” for its weaknesses in other dimensions.  
For instance, a car that has the least desirable color may still be chosen if the gas mileage 
and price are good enough.  Colloquially, this type of approach is what people mean 
when they speak of “weighing the pros and cons” to make a decision.  For brevity’s sake, 
we henceforth refer to this type of approach as the “matrix” approach.   
2.2 Descriptive, Explanatory, and Prescriptive Value of Traditional 
Theory 
How well has the previous research on non-compensatory and compensatory rules 
addressed the description, explanation, and prescription questions?  Not sufficiently, we 
believe. 
2.2.1 Description 
Descriptively, traditional decision theories assume that something like the 
decision matrix is how people mentally represent their choices.  Regarding the valuation 
measurement issue, they assume that attributes values and dimension importance weights 
can be measured, implying that they are fixed for a given individual.  Regarding the non-
dominance issue, they assume that people apply decision rules to the decision matrix in 
order to pick a winning option, the most popular of which include making tradeoffs.   
These assumptions are problematic for multiple reasons.  First, proposed methods 
for values and weights measurement and integration have limited applicability.  Their use 
requires certain mathematical conditions to be met (Anderson, 1996, pp. 342-343).  The 
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values and weights must be on linear scales. In certain methods, weights must be on ratio 
scales (have known zeros).  In order to be integrated, people’s values across dimensions 
must be of the same scale.  Second, the evidence regarding which decision rules are more 
descriptive has been mixed.  Different research communities have different ways of 
assessing the application of the rules (for a review, see Svenson, 1979).  The different 
ways tend to give contradictory results (e.g., Billings & Marcus, 1983).   
Finally, studies have shown that people often find numerical—and especially 
compensatory—schemes too complex and time-consuming.  Information in real life is 
often not easily quantified, and many people are math-averse.  People come up with 
alternative ways to compare the value of products just to avoid doing formal arithmetic 
(Lave, Murtaugh, & de la Roche, 1984).  Non-compensatory schemes may be less 
thorough than compensatory ones, but they are preferred by people because they are 
easier to use (for a review, see Kottemann & Davis, 1991).  Think aloud studies have 
shown that real-time decision making does not follow the systematic methods laid out by 
compensatory schemes (Klein, 2003).  After reading descriptions of various decision 
making approaches, most of the graduate students studied by Means (1983) said that they 
would not use multi-attribute utility theory models in making real-life decisions due to 
their difficulty and time to use (Means, Salas, Crandall, & Jacobs, 1993).   
2.2.2 Explanation 
The “explanation” question has been addressed to a limited extent by traditional 
theorists.  For the most part, they assume that people are rational decision makers, and 
simply use whatever decision rule is optimal in a given situation.  Some have tried to 
resolve the discrepancies across studies testing the rules’ descriptive validity by asserting 
that the decision rules used by people differ by personal traits, states, and situation 
(Payne, 1982; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).  These factors include education and 
emotions (Araña & León, 2009), cognitive load (Swait & Adamowicz, 2001), 
presentation of information, decision problem complexity, and similarity between options 
(Payne, 1982; Payne et al., 1993).  A decision maker might choose to use a non-
compensatory over a compensatory scheme if she is short on time and energy.   
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2.2.3 Prescription 
 If descriptively it is assumed that decision matrices are the mental representations 
of people’s choices, then it follows that the prescription for improving decision making is 
to help people construct and improve their use of the decision matrix.  So scholars have 
developed textbooks and computerized “decision aids” that prescribe how to construct 
such a matrix, how to properly locate each option along the dimensions, and how to 
appraise the attributes, assign importance weights, and integrate them (e.g., Belton & 
Stewart, 2002; Figueira, Greco, & Ehrgott, 2005; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976).  Methods like 
ratings, rankings, and point allocation are not just descriptions of how people assign 
values and weights, but prescriptions for how they should assign values and weights.  
Hence schemes like MAUT are both descriptive and prescriptive.   
There has been insufficient coverage of the prescription issue regarding both 
decision rule use and valuation measurement.  Theoretical reasons have been proposed 
for why using formal decision schemes should be optimal (e.g., Keeney & Raiffa, 1976), 
but conducting empirical studies to verify that is difficult for logistic reasons (see J. 
Frank Yates, 1990).  Even if such schemes are optimal for the “rational decision maker,” 
they may still be tossed aside by decision makers outside the lab due to their complexity 
and time consumption (Kottemann & Davis, 1991).  Nor do they increase self-reported 
satisfaction with the generated solution (Narasimhan & Vickery, 1988).   
Decision scholars have also insufficiently addressed the prescription issue with 
respect to measuring values and weights.  There are two measurement-related issues—the 
choice of measurement method and labile values.  First, as discussed previously, there are 
many ways to measure individual values and weights, and each has its advantages and 
disadvantages (e.g., N. H. Anderson, 1996; Malczewski, 1999).  Unfortunately, different 
measurement methods (e.g., ratings versus magnitude estimation) can yield drastically 
different results (N. H. Anderson, 1996).  Yet decision aid texts merely point out the 
flaws of each method and ultimately leave the final choices up to the user (e.g., Belton & 
Stewart, 2002; Figueira et al., 2005; Von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986).   
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Second, even if values and weights can be “measured” accurately, the valuations 
are not consistent across time and situations.  The decision aids mentioned above 
implicitly assume that there are “ground truths” in people’s valuations and weights—that 
they are fixed and merely need to be “measured.”  This assumption harkens back to 
measurement theory, which tries to measure these valuations via the same methods used 
for physical entities.  However, studies on “constructed preferences” in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 1995; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988; Tversky, 
Slovic, & Kahneman, 1990) showed that valuations are subjective and often generated on 
the fly.  They are “labile” and shifting (Fischoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1979; Slovic, 
1995).  For instance, a person may prefer sad music when he is in a sad mood, but happy 
music when he is in a happy one.  In other words, sometimes there is no single “ground 
truth” to be discovered.  These issues with measurements call into question just how 
useful the valuations obtained at any one time for a person really are.   
2.3 The Spreading of Alternatives Phenomenon and More Recent 
Theories 
The descriptive, explanation, and prescriptive validity of the multi-attribute 
decision rules and methods studied in the 60s and 70s are already questionable given the 
instability of attribute values and dimension importance weights across situations and 
time.  Even more problematic for those theories, it has been found that values and 
weights can shift not just randomly, but in systematic and predictable ways.  They can 
shift to support whichever option the decider happens to be leaning toward at a given 
time.  This systematic shift toward a favored option was what sparked our research into 
how people make difficult decisions.   
2.3.1 The spreading of alternatives phenomena 
“Biased predecision processing” (coined by Brownstein, 2003) refers to any 
phenomena in which decision makers alter parts of their mental decision matrix to favor a 
particular option before making their choice.  Possible alterations include: 
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1. “spreading of alternatives”—shifts in overall appraisals of the options themselves 
such that the difference in overall appraisal between the favored option and other 
options is increased (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Mann, Janis, & Chaplin, 1969) 
2. “distortion of information”—shifts in appraisals of the extent to which attributes 
favor the options (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Russo, Carlson, & Meloy, 2006; 
Russo, Medvec, & Meloy, 1996; Russo, Meloy, & Medvec, 1998; Russo, Meloy, 
& Wilks, 2000) 
3. “distortion of probability”—shifts in people’s judgments of the attributes’ 
likelihoods of happening (DeKay, Patino-Echeverri, & Fischbeck, 2009; DeKay, 
Stone, & Miller, 2010) 
4. and “coherence shifts” (coined by D. Simon, Pham, Le, & Holyoak, 2001)—shifts 
in appraisals of those attributes (values) and the dimension importance weights 
(D. Simon, Krawczyk, Bleicher, & Holyoak, 2008; D. Simon, Krawczyk, & 
Holyoak, 2004; D. Simon et al., 2001).   
Take our three-car scenario as an example.  Suppose that a decider originally 
specified the values, weights, and overall option appraisals displayed in Table 2.2.  The 
dimensions that are in Car A’s favor are color and price.  Since Car A has the highest 
overall appraisal, it becomes his favored option, also called the leading option or the 
leader.  If spreading of alternatives occurs, the overall option appraisals would shift so 
that Car A’s appraisals are monotonically higher than before, while the appraisals of Cars 
B and C’s are lower than before—e.g., 5, 0, and -14.  In other words, the difference in 
appraisal between the leader and the other options would increase, or “spread” over time.   
If coherence shifts occur, the values for Car A would monotonically increase—
e.g., to +6, +1, and +1—while those for Cars B and C might decrease—e.g., to +2, -4, -1, 
and -3, -7, and -1, respectively.  The importance weights for those dimensions that favor 
Car A—color and price—might monotonically increase, e.g., to 3 and 2, while the weight 
for the dimension that disfavors it—mileage—might decrease, e.g., to 1.  
If distortion of information occurs, the decider’s combined ratings of how 
strongly each attribute favors Car A over the other two cars would increase over time.  
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Suppose the first piece of information the decider received at the beginning of the 
decision process happened to be the price of Car B.  When asked how strongly that price 
favors one car over another, the decider might say +1 on a scale of +4 (Strongly favors 
Car A) to -4 (Strongly favors Car B).  By the end of the decision process, however, new 
pieces of information the decider receives would be given stronger ratings in favor of Car 
A.  For instance, when presented with Car A’s price and asked how strongly it favors one 
car over another, the decider might say +4. 
Finally, if distortion of probability occurs, the very attributes themselves might be 
altered in the mind of the decider so that they favor Car A.  Taking the mileage 
dimension, for example, the decider might conveniently misremember Car A as having 
32 mpg mileage and Car B as having 30 mpg instead of the other way around.  If 
distortion of probability occurs, the decider’s judged likelihoods of attributes that favor 
Car A would increase, while those for attributes that disfavor Car A would decrease.  For 
instance, regarding the mileage, he might argue to himself that “those mileage numbers 
are only estimates anyway; there may be errors in the way they are measured” or “I don’t 
carry much in my car; I’m likely to get better mileage than what’s advertised.”   
The spreading of alternatives and related phenomena are often framed as 
“consistency seeking.”  This is because people are changing their mental representations 
of decision problems (cognitions) to be consistent with whichever option they favor or 
choose (behavioral tendency). 
2.3.2 Explanations of spreading of alternatives 
The Russo et al., and DeKay camps, which studied distortion of information and 
distortion of probability, respectively, offered little in terms of explanations for the 
phenomena they study.  As for the Simon et al. camp, they did find that predecisional 
coherence shifting only lasts about 15 minutes, suggesting that shifting serves mainly to 
build confidence in the favored alternative (2008).  Simon et al. (2008) also explain 
coherence shift as part of the human brain’s natural tendency to make cognitions 
consistent (in this case, to make one’s values and importance weights consistent with 
one’s anticipated choice).  They believe that consistency-seeking is hardwired into the 
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brain via its neural network (D. Simon et al., 2008), but have not conducted behavioral 
studies regarding this. 
The search for dominance structure (SDS) theory (Montgomery & Svenson, 1976; 
Montgomery, et al., 1983; Montgomery & Willen, 1999) and the differentiation and 
consolidation (DiffCon) theory (Svenson, 1992, 2003; Svenson & Hill, 1997) were both 
“understanding”-oriented theories.  They sought to describe and explain the spreading of 
alternatives phenomenon, by positing specific stages, mechanisms, and drivers of 
decision processing.  They both viewed the phenomenon not only as normal, but as a 
fundamental part of the decision process.  Both theories imply that rather than being a 
fast-and-frugal method for decision making, biased predecision processing is an effortful 
process that takes time and energy.  SDS theory asserts that a decision process’s primary 
purpose is to determine an option that dominates over all others (dominance rule).  
DiffCon, in contrast, asserts that the primary purpose is to (a) sufficiently differentiate 
options from one another predecision, and then (b) consolidate them and bolster the 
chosen option postdecision.  These are fundamental decision “needs” that are driven by 
people’s compulsion to be consistent, as well as to minimize the amount of energy 
wasted on continual decision reversals and consequent changes in implementation plans 
(Svenson, 2003).  There are two drivers of consistency-seeking.  One is the brain’s 
automatic and natural tendency to find “gestalt” and be coherent, as Simon et al. say.  
The other is to reduce cognitive dissonance and its resulting negative emotional arousal 
(see e.g.,Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Harmon-Jones, 2000). 
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Chapter 3 
 
Definitions and Illustrations of the Prospective Repairs and 
Narratives Decision Approaches 
As discussed in the previous section, traditional theories on decision matrices are 
still lacking in their description, explanation, and prescription of multi-attribute decision 
making, especially given the spreading of alternatives and related phenomena.  
Unlooked-for observations made in our previous study suggested two alternative 
approaches to multi-attribute decisions—prospective narratives and option repairs.  In 
this chapter, we define and illustrate these approaches. 
In a previous study (Chen & Yates, in progress), we attempted to address the 
Explanation question of why decision makers shift their attribute and dimension 
valuations to cohere with their favored options by positing that coherence aids self-
persuasion, decision implementation, and other-persuasion.  To test this, we asked 
participants to choose between two job offers and justify their choices via video to other 
participants.  
While studying those justification videos, we observed that some participants 
made use of what we call prospective mental simulation and repairs.  Specifically, the 
wording of some participants’ explanations suggested that they had mentally simulated 
what their future lives would be like with the options.  For instance, one described the 
noisiness and unfriendly atmosphere that would result from working in a cubicle with 
coworkers who always stay in their cubicles for lunch.  Some participants even went a 
step further.  They brought up the downsides of their chosen options, and proposed 
concrete actions that they would take to minimize those downsides once they 
implemented those options.  For instance, one explained that the noisiness of the cubicle 
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would not bother her, because she would wear earphones and listen to her iPod at work, 
thus blocking out the noise.  Henceforth, we refer to such tactics as option repair. 
3.1 The Prospective Repairs Approach to Decision Making 
We define option repairs as concrete and specific personal actions a decision maker 
can take to deal with, improve upon, or otherwise minimize the negative consequences of 
an option’s downsides.  For example, suppose that Tom wants to buy a house.  He really 
prefers House A to House B, but House A is much older than House B and Tom is afraid 
that it has many hidden physical flaws.  He can “repair” House A and erase its downside 
relative to House B by planning to order and pay for an inspection of it before buying it. 
We view repairs as a form of prospective problem solving that involves prospective 
mental simulation.  This is because people are mentally simulating the future, anticipating 
problems that might arise with options, and planning actions they can take to solve those 
problems.   In a way, participants who make such “repairs” to an option essentially erase 
from their decision mental representation those pesky downsides of that option.  They, in 
a sense, alter the very decision problem they were originally given, by creating options 
that are even better than the options they were originally given.  The creation of new 
options is one way in which the option repair approach differs from the matrix tradeoff 
approach.  Emphasis is moved from making tradeoffs between existing options, to 
construct new and better options. 
Another departure from traditional decision theory is that the option repair 
approach recommends that one be concerned not so much about which option is currently 
the dominant one, but about which option can be most easily improved to become the 
dominant one.  Instead of comparing options as they currently are, people would compare 
options as they will be after fixing them up.  Instead of holding out for an option that is 
already dominant—an ideal that may never appear—the repair approach would suggest 
picking the option that is most easily fixable to become dominant.  As an example, 
suppose a person is looking to buy a house and values location and eco-friendliness 
equally.  Everything else being equal (including price), it would be better to pick a house 
with low eco-friendliness than one in a bad neighborhood.  This is because a house’s eco-
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friendliness can be improved with some work, whereas its location cannot.  Even if the 
difference in eco-friendliness between the two houses is more important to the person 
than the difference in location, those values and dimension weights no longer matter once 
those differences between the options have been erased. 
The idea of anticipatory problem solving has been touched on to a small extent by 
stress coping, business, and negotiation literatures.  Proactive coping is about anticipating 
future stressors and coming up with ways to deal with them.  This can involve mental 
simulation and planning actions (C. A. Anderson, 1983; Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997), 
which in turn aids problem solving (Taylor & Schneider, 1989).  The coping literature 
does not relate anticipatory problem solving to decision processes, however. 
SWOT analysis in business management has been the only literature that actually 
recommends anticipatory problem solving mainly for the purpose of addressing decision 
problems.  It involves identifying the internal strengths and weaknesses of an 
organization as well as external opportunities and threats with respect to achieving a 
specified objective (Bracker, 1980).  One of the recommended steps involves thinking of 
actions to take to address weaknesses and threats.   
Negotiation experts recommend thinking of actions that one or more parties can 
take to improve upon existing options both before and during negotiations (e.g., R. Fisher 
& Ury, 1981; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987; Thompson, 2001).  They discuss finding 
ways to “expand the pie” being negotiated over.  In fact, the phrase “problem solving” 
has been used to describe this integrative style of negotiation (as opposed to 
“compromise” or “competition” styles).  However, the motivations behind option 
improvement are not so much to facilitate decisions involving non-dominance, but to 
either (a) maximize one’s outcome, regardless of the option chosen or (b) entice other 
parties toward the option one wants them to take (e.g., other-oriented decision influence).  
Suppose that Tom, our prospective house buyer, has as his BATNA (Best Alternative To 
a Negotiated Agreement) his current apartment, which he can always stay in if he does 
not buy a house.  One of the reasons that House A is attractive is that it has air 
conditioning, which his apartment does not.  He can “repair” his BATNA by planning to 
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buy an air conditioner if he ends up staying with it.  That would put him in a better 
bargaining position with House A’s seller. 
In fact, one can even request an option repair from another party.  Recall that 
Tom was planning to “repair” House A as an option by having it inspected before he buys 
it.  Instead of taking action himself, he can instead ask the seller to order and pay for the 
inspection.  On the flip side, the party on the other side of the table can try to influence 
Tom’s choice by initiating the option repair.  For instance, the House A seller can ask 
Tom what it is that makes Tom hesitate about buying it.  Upon learning of Tom’s concern 
about its physical flaws, the seller would offer to pay for the inspection and thus allay 
Tom’s concern.   
3.2 The Prospective Narratives Approach to Decision Making 
Problem solving, mental simulation, and coherence are all elements of narratives 
(Mar, 2004; Mar & Oatley, 2008; Pennington & Hastie, 1993; Rideout, 2008; E. Smith & 
Hancox, 2001).  Knowing the persuasive (Appel & Richter, 2007; Escalas, Moore, & 
Britton, 2004; Green, Strange, & Brock, 2002; Prentice & Gerrig, 1999) and emotional 
health-improving (King, 2001; McAdams, 2001; Pennebaker, 2000; Pennebaker & 
Seagal, 1999) properties of narratives as well as people’s tendency to generate narratives 
about themselves (Clark & Mishler, 1992; Mishler, Clark, Ingelinger, & Simon, 1989; 
Riessman, 1993), we surmise that prospective narratives can be yet another approach for 
decision making, one that often incorporates option repairs and complements decision 
matrices.  
Mental simulation has been defined as a “cognitive construction of hypothetical 
scenarios or imitative mental representation of some event or series of events” (Taylor & 
Schneider, 1989).  Stories that are played in the mind can thus be viewed as forms of 
mental simulation (Mar & Oatley, 2008).  Specific definitions of stories vary widely both 
within and across disciplines (see e.g., Kaplan, 1986; Klein, 1999; Mar, 2004; Schank & 
Berman, 2002).  Putting all the definitions together, however, we can broadly define 
stories or narratives as sequences of interrelated events, dialogues, goals, actions, and 
personal reactions centered on a protagonist, with supporting characters.  They 
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incorporate causality, emotions, imagery, predictions of events, problem solving.  They 
usually have some sort of moral, theme, or lesson built in, the basis of which is whether 
the protagonist ends up happy or unhappy in the end.  Figure 3.1 summarizes the 
concepts of mental simulations, stories, and repairs and the relationships among them.   
 
Figure 3.1.  Distinguishing among simulations vs. stories vs. repair 
 The prospective narratives approach we posit for decision making would work as 
follows.  The decision maker takes an option and creates a mental simulation of what her 
future life would be like with that option.  She populates the story with people in her life 
and potential people she might meet later in life.  She simulates their and her own 
interactions and reactions to events and to one another.  She envisions actions she and 
they might take as a result of the option.  She might engage in problem solving (option 
repair) if she foresees any problems and interpersonal conflicts that come up and plans 
how to resolve them.  In a decision situation, the “lesson” of the story would be a 
summation of the features and whether the option makes the decider ultimately happy or 
Mental Simulations 
o imagined sensory 
experience = 
vividness, 
emotions 
o predictions of 
outcome & 
utilities (Klein, 
1999) 
 
Stories (Scripts) 
o protagonist (decision maker) 
o taking perspective of protagonist 
o temporal sequence 
o actions in sequence 
o causation (actions/events/outcomes 
affect later) 
     
   
Repair weakness of an option 
o problem-solving 
o protagonist solves problem 
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unhappy.  The decider generates such stories for all the options.  She chooses the option 
in which she, the protagonist, has the happiest ending or life.  The decider, in essence, 
plays the triple role of author (the creator of the story), protagonist (the central character 
of the story), and audience (the evaluator of the stories).  
Take the car scenario as an example.  The decider creates a story of his future life 
should he purchase Car A.  He imagines cruising down the road in a car with a color he is 
proud of (mental imagery, action).  He imagines boasting to his family and friends of the 
great bargain he received for the car, and their impressed reactions (interpersonal 
interactions and dialogues).  He feels the pleasure and pride he would have for the car 
(emotions).  He might also simulate the downsides of Car A.  The low price could 
indicate inferior quality (inference); he sees himself standing on a highway shoulder next 
to the car that has broken down due to the inferior quality (causality).  He pictures a cop 
pulling him over (interpersonal conflict), who assumes he is reckless and risk-seeking 
because of the car’s color (causality) and gives him a ticket (action).   
The decider might also make “option repairs” by planning what he could do to 
avoid or ameliorate the problems caused by the downsides of Car A.  He could plan to 
purchase roadside assistance with some of the money he would save on the car price.  He 
could plan to have the car repainted to avoid looking too reckless.  Finally, the decider 
weighs the entire story and determines how happy his life would end up with Car A.  The 
story might have a theme or moral such as “Fun Ride for a Great Bargain” (happy 
ending) or “Cheap Junk Not Worth the Trouble” (unhappy ending).  Once he has done 
this for all three cars, he chooses the car with the happiest projected future life.     
Notice that the problem solving involved in stories and option repairs addresses a 
different kind of problem than the reasoning problems typically studied by cognitive 
psychologists.  The former kind consists of negative events and other consequences that 
result from implementing decisions, whereas the latter kind involves cognitive and 
physical puzzles, games, and other challenges. 
In the following section, we discuss the possible functions of the option repair and 
story approaches—namely, their descriptive, explanatory, and prescriptive significance.  
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See Appendix A for definitions, elaboration, and discussions of “self-persuasion,” “other-
persuasion,” and “implementation.” 
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Chapter 4 
 
Empirical Questions and Significance 
This section discusses the potential descriptive, explanatory, and prescriptive 
value of the prospective repairs and narrative approaches, as well as corresponding 
empirical questions we sought to test. 
4.1 Description and Question Set 1 (Q1)—Prevalence 
Recall the broad description question:  How do people make multi-attribute 
decisions in non-dominance situations?  As discussed in the beginning of Chapter 3, in an 
earlier study on coherence and multi-attribute decisions (Chen & Yates, in progress), we 
observed that some participants justified their decisions by simulating their future lives or 
mentioning repairs they would make to their choice’s downsides.  We therefore posit that 
prospective narratives and option repairs are approaches that some people use to make 
multi-attribute decisions with non-dominance.  Pertinent empirical questions include ones 
like these:  How often do people tend to adopt these approaches of their own accord?  
What forms do these approaches assume when people use them?  Under what conditions 
do people use these approaches? 
As discussed in section 2.2.1, the matrix approach traditionally touted by decision 
scholars does not fully address the question of how people make multi-attribute 
decisions.  Among other things, people often find it too complicated and time-consuming 
to use.  In contrast, despite being largely ignored by experimental psychologists, decision 
making using prospective narratives has often been observed in real-world domains, 
including medicine (Greenhalgh, 1999), intelligence analysis (Clauser, 2008, p. 170), 
transnational security (e.g., the 2011 DARPA workshop titled “Stories, neuroscience and 
experimental technologies (STORyNET): Analysis and decomposition of narratives in 
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security contexts, 2011”), politics (e.g., L. D. Smith, 1989), and law.  (There have been 
judges on policy-affecting cases who mentioned in their opinions that they rejected 
certain options because they had envisioned the negative consequences for future 
generations arising from those options.)  Moreover, we know that people tend to 
spontaneously generate stories for making judgments about the past (e.g., Krieger, 1981; 
Pennington, 1981; Pennington & Hastie, 1988, 1993).  In fact, people appear to have a 
tendency to create stories about virtually anything, especially themselves (McAdams, 
2001).  In the clinical setting, patients tend to describe their circumstances in the form of 
stories (Riessman, 1993, pp. 56-57), and become upset when they are not allowed to by 
clinicians (Clark & Mishler, 1992; Mishler et al., 1989).  Studies have found that people 
will ascribe intentionality even to mere basic shapes that are moving (for a review, see 
Mar & Macrae, 2006).   
There has been even less mention and testing of prospective option repairs as an 
approach that decision makers spontaneously use.  The only mention came from the SDS 
(Montgomery & Willen, 1999) and DiffCon (Svenson, 1992, 2003; Svenson & Hill, 
1997) theorists.  Both camps have broached the idea of minimizing the downsides of an 
option by repairing it (called “de-emphasizing” by the former camp and “problem 
restructuring” by the latter).  Svenson and Hill (1997, p. 219) even suggested that “[in 
problem restructuring] the set of given decision alternatives is not accepted as such [sic] 
but new options created in the situation.”  This idea was inspired by the problem solving 
literature on functional fixedness and insight (Svenson, 2010).  But the specifics of 
making repairs was not elaborated upon, and empirical testing has yet to be done 
(Svenson, 2010).   
Therefore, one important descriptive question we asked dealt with the prevalence 
of the approaches: 
Q1:Prevalence—What is the prevalence of the use of decision matrices, 
prospective option repairing, and prospective storying among decision 
makers? 
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Q1a: Do people spontaneously use decision matrices, prospective narratives 
and/or option repairs when making multi-attribute decisions?  What 
percentage of them do so? 
In our earlier study (Chen & Yates, in progress), we only observed the use of 
mental simulation and repairs by some of the participants.  Thus it is plausible that 
prospective narratives and repairs are only two of a variety of approaches that people can 
choose to use for decision making.  We hypothesize that different individuals may find 
different approaches more useful for them than others.  For instance, people who are apt 
with and enjoy numbers may be more likely to use the decision matrix approach.  People 
who like telling or writing stories or tend to become absorbed in narratives may be more 
likely to use the stories approach.  People who have a lot of real-life experience, practical 
intelligence, fluid intelligence, or problem solving skills may be more likely to do option 
repair. 
Q1b: Is the use of prospective narratives, repairs, and matrices mediated by 
certain personal characteristics of the deciders?  
We also noticed that people who justified their decisions using repairs only 
mentioned them for their chosen option.  It could be that they deliberately neglected 
mentioning repairs for the rejected option because that would weaken their decision 
justifications to themselves or others.  On the other hand, they may really only have 
bothered to repair their favored options during their decision processes.  Some 
psychological theorists (e.g., Klein, 1996; Koehler, 1991) talk about how people consider 
options sequentially in order of how appealing they are, and end their decision processes 
as soon as they find a sufficiently satisfactory one.  This ending of decision processes as 
soon as a “good enough” option is found is called “satisficing” (H. A. Simon, 1982).  
Verifying such confirmatory hypothesis testing in our studies has theoretical significance 
because it would provide support for the notion that people employ narratives and repairs 
only for the purpose of persuading themselves to commit to an option, as opposed to 
trying to improve their decision outcomes.  So a description sub-question is: 
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Q1c: If people do use prospective repairs or stories, do they generate them for 
all options, or only for the option they eventually choose?  Is this 
mediated by certain personal characteristics?  
Suppose we find that some people do use the approaches, while other people do 
not.  Explanatory-wise, we would want to know why people who spontaneously use the 
approaches do so.  Prescription-wise, we would want to know whether the approaches 
have benefits that make them worth recommending to decision makers, justifiers, and 
persuaders. 
4.2 Explanation 
Recall the broad explanation question:  Why do people make multi-attribute 
decisions in the ways that they do?  What explains the use of prospective repairs or 
narratives by some people as found by Chen and Yates (in progress)?  This section 
reviews a variety of decision concerns that are important to people.  We believe that 
prospective repairs and stories help to address these concerns, and thus providing at least 
a partial explanation of why people use these approaches for decision making.  Concerns 
that we believe prospective option repairs and stories address.  First, repairs address 
people’s biggest concern about decision making—i.e., bad outcomes, and can help them 
spread alternatives.  Second, prospective repairs and narratives help resolve some of the 
cardinal decision issues proposed by Yates (2003).  Third, they aid decision self- and 
other-oriented persuasion.   
4.2.1 Minimizing bad outcomes and spreading alternatives via repairs 
A past study that asked participants to describe what they considered to be “good” 
versus “bad” decisions (J. F. Yates, Veinott, & Patalano, 2003) showed that people’s 
biggest fear about decision making is the obtainment of poor outcomes.  Option repair as 
an approach should be attractive to people because it can be used to improve their 
decision outcomes.  Suppose Mary plans some actions she can take to improve one or 
more of her options at hand.  She then picks an option from the “improved” pool of 
options.  If she picks an option that has been “repaired” and does end up implementing 
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the repairs, her outcome would be better, or at least no worse, than if she hadn’t made the 
mental repairs. 
Why not simply pick the best option first, then take action to improve it after 
implementing the choice?  In mathematical terms, option repair and option selection 
using the dominance rule are not commutative functions:  Assuming that planned actions 
do end up being implemented, it would be better to repair options, then pick one, as 
opposed to pick an option, then repair it.  This is true when—to give a two-option 
example—Option A is superior to Option B before any improvements, but inferior to 
Option B after improvements.  Repairing options first before picking one would induce a 
person to choose improved-Option A, while picking an option before repairing it would 
induce him to choose improved Option B, which is worse than improved Option A.   
�
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡( 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝐴),𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝐵) ) =  𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝐴)
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟( 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐴,𝐵) ) = 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝐵)  
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝐴) > 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝐵) 
 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡( 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝐴),𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝐵) ) > 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟( 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐴, 𝐵) ) 
One-sided option repair (that is, repairing only one’s favored option or chosen 
option) also allows people to spread alternatives.  Making “repairs” to one’s favored 
option seemed to us a clever way to “have one’s cake and eat it, too”—at least, in the 
mind of the decider. First, the repair tactic allows decision makers to maintain 
consistency between their values, and the features of the options they choose.  Repairs 
alter the chosen option’s features as construed by deciders from what they do not like into 
whatever they do like.  Second, a decider can avoid emotional costs (see Botti & Hsee, 
2010) associated with being forced to make tradeoffs.  Instead of accepting the downsides 
of an option, decision makers can simply remove them.  Instead of giving up the upsides 
of a rejected option, decision makers can try to “repair” the chosen option so as to give it 
those very upsides.   
Third, by creating removing the downsides of options and turning them into 
dominating options, prospective repairs resolve non-dominance situations, thereby 
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serving as alternative mechanisms by which spreading of alternatives can be achieved.  
Theoretically, it is possible to repair all options such that they are equally dominant.  That 
would be no problem, as theoretically one can then just flip a random coin in order to 
pick an option.  Past scholars discussing the spreading of alternatives and related 
phenomena (for a review, see Brownstein, 2003) for the most part assumed that what is 
happening is the changing merely of attitudes toward fixed option features and weights.  
The way that spreading of alternatives and related phenomena have been described in the 
past, for the most part, made them sound irrational or maladaptive—note the use of 
adjectives with negative connotations even in many of the phrases used to refer to the 
phenomena—i.e., “distortion of information [emphasis added],” “distortion of probability 
[emphasis added],” “biased predecision processing [emphasis added].”.   
In contrast, our prospective repairs theory suggests that some people actually alter 
their construal of the very features themselves, in ways that improve those features in 
their minds.  The resultant options in their minds end up being actually better than the 
ones originally posed by the decision problems.  They in essence apply the old maxim:  
“If you don’t like something the way it is, change (fix) it”—or at least they plan to.   It 
could be that people are merely trying to spread alternatives for the reasons given by 
Svenson (e.g., Svenson, 2003), and plan actions that they never implement.  But suppose 
people really do end up making at least some of the repairs they propose for the chosen 
option.  In that case, an increase in their evaluation of the repaired option would be 
logical, as the altered option inside their minds is actually better than the original option.  
A caveat is that this repairs explanation only works for explaining increases in the 
favored option’s evaluation, not for explaining decreases in the disfavored options’.  
4.2.2 Resolution of cardinal decision issues 
We argue that prospective mental simulation, option repairs, and narratives help 
decision makers resolve seven of the ten cardinal decision issues as delineated by Yates 
(2003)—options, possibilities and judgments, values, tradeoffs, acceptability, and 
implementation.  “Possibilities” refer to the various consequences that can occur due to 
taking the decision options.  “Judgments” refer to the likelihood of those consequences 
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happening.  “Acceptability” is essentially other-oriented justification; it refers to getting 
other people to agree to the decision.   
The ways in which the traditionally studied decision approaches, along with 
mental simulation, repairs, and narratives, affect the seven cardinal decision issues are 
charted in Table 4.1.   
Table 4.1.  Several Decision Tools and the Cardinal Decision Issues They Likely Affect in Deciders’ 
Minds 
 Decision Tools 
 Traditional 
schemes 
Mental 
Simulation 
Repairs 
(Problem 
Solving) 
Narratives (beyond what 
mental simulation and repair 
already provide) 
Options   *By improving 
upon existing 
options 
 
Possibilities & 
Judgment 
 Plausible based 
on Anderson & 
Godfrey (1987) 
 Some evidence.   
Think-aloud protocols (Olson, 
1983). 
Sanfey and Hastie (1998) 
Value Via 
measurement 
methods. 
Needs testing 
Evidence from 
Shiv & Huber, 
2000) 
 *Via affect (Oatley, 2002; for 
a review, see Crano & Prislin, 
2006). 
Tradeoffs Via 
compensatory 
rules. 
Needs testing 
 *Removes need 
to make 
tradeoffs in the 
first place. 
 
Implementation ** *Via action 
planning 
**Via action 
planning 
**Evidence from 
Krishnamurthy & Sujan 
(1999) 
Acceptability 
(Other-Oriented 
Justification) 
Proposed by 
Gardiner & 
Edwards (1975). 
**Needs testing 
*Via imagery 
(Escalas, 
2004).   
*Needs testing. 
**Needs 
testing 
**Narrative persuasion 
theories. 
* Proposed by us, but as yet untested.  ** Tested in our studies. 
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Traditional non-compensatory and compensatory decision schemes focus only on the 
“values,” “tradeoffs,” and “acceptability” issues.  As described in section 2.1 above, 
Steps 2 and 3 of the traditional schemes address the values issue via “measurement” 
methods.  Compensatory rules originated to help decision makers deal with the tradeoffs 
issue, as laid out in Step 4.  Gardiner and Edwards (1975) also proposed that laying out 
the entire decision problem in a matrix format helps communicate the decision to other 
people.  As discussed in section 2.2, however, there has been little empirical evidence to 
support the use of the traditional decision approaches for helping with the three issues.  
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical studies have been conducted to test the 
usefulness of compensatory schemes for the tradeoffs and acceptability issues either. 
4.2.2.1 Prospective mental simulation and the cardinal decision issues 
Mental simulation of options and their features touch on the possibilities, 
judgments, values, implementation, and acceptability issues.  Mental simulation affects 
people’s predictions about the future (see Svenson, 2003; Taylor & Schneider, 1989).  
Though this has yet to be tested, it is plausible that mental simulation leads decision 
makers to think of possibilities they would not have otherwise considered.  However, we 
suspect that depth may be emphasized at the expense of breadth.  That is, mentally 
simulating a particular scenario leads a person to think of Possibility A, which then 
makes him think of Possibility B which would result from A, which in turn leads him to 
think of Possibility C which would result from B.  But he invests so much effort in 
Possibility A and its resultant possibilities that he neglects to consider alternative 
possibilities to Possibility A.  In tree/graph language, mental simulation encourages 
people to explore far along a particular branch, but at the expense of exploring sister 
branches.  Studies showing this tendency to fixate on one scenario at the expense of 
alternative scenarios after envisioning it was discussed by Koehler (1991). 
Taylor and Schneider (1989) contended that mental simulation influences 
people’s judged likelihood of events.  Anderson & Godfrey’s (1987) study provided 
evidence for the “simulation heuristic” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) whereby people 
judged the likelihood of an event based upon how easy it is to picture that event mentally.  
Mental simulation is used by decision makers to address the values issue.  Shiv and 
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Huber (2000) found that, when asked to predict the future utilities of options for them, 
people engage in mental simulation.  Numerous studies (C. A. Anderson, 1983; Taylor & 
Pham, 1996; Ten Eyck, Labansat, Gresky, Dansereau, & Lord, 2006; for a review, see 
Osburn & Mumford, 2006) have implicated mental simulation as a contributor to action 
planning and implementation.  Finally, imagery has been shown to be persuasive to 
people (Escalas, 2004), so mental simulation should aid decision acceptability.   
4.2.2.2 Prospective option repairs and the cardinal decision issues 
Problem solving via option repairs helps address the options, tradeoffs, 
implementation, and acceptability issues.  By taking existing options and “repairing” 
their downsides, repairs introduce new, improved “options” to the consideration set.  
Repairs improve upon a decision matrix.  Instead of merely accepting the features and 
downsides of options as they are, people recognize that those can be altered.  This makes 
sense, explanation-wise and prescriptively, as in real life people do find ways to deal with 
problems after they commit to an option.  People who plan the actions before making the 
decision are basically anticipating this reality. 
As was discussed earlier, if they are able to remove the downsides of their chosen 
options, people can avoid making painful tradeoffs that require accepting some 
undesirable features while sacrificing some desirable ones.  In essence, option repairs 
convert a multi-attribute decision problem’s focus from a tradeoffs cardinal decision 
issue to an options one.  Making tradeoffs have high emotional costs (Botti & Hsee, 
2010), so it makes sense that people would want to avoid doing so if possible. 
Because repairs involve planning specific actions people can personally take to 
deal with negative consequences of their decisions, repairs should help with 
implementation as well.  Making specific plans has been shown to improve action 
implementation (for a review, see Gollwitzer, 1999).  Finally, although the idea has not 
yet been tested, showing that one has already considered and found ways to resolve 
potential problems with the chosen option should aid other-oriented persuasion as well.  
One reason this should work is that it shows that one was competent and thoughtful 
during the decision process.  It also shows off one’s reasoning and problem solving skills.  
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In addition, an audience should feel reassured, knowing that there are ways to deal with 
potential problems with the choice.   
4.2.2.3 Prospective narratives and the cardinal decision issues 
Narratives contribute to the resolution of many of the cardinal decision issues 
beyond what mental simulation and repairs already do.  Regarding the possibilities 
cardinal issue, think-aloud protocols (Olson, 1983) have shown that stories invoke 
prediction-making on the part of readers, in contrast to retrospection when reading other 
kinds of writing.  Stories also affect judgments, for better or for worse.  Sanfey and 
Hastie’s (1998) subjects relied more upon presented information and made more accurate 
judgments of marathon runners’ completion times when that information was presented 
in the form of short stories, as opposed to tables of numbers or bar graphs.  Stories 
appeared to help people remember the information better.  In addition, narratives evoke 
emotions in the reader (Oatley, 2002; for a review, see Crano & Prislin, 2006), and 
emotions affect judgment, albeit not always in a positive way (Denesraj & Epstein, 1994; 
Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Sunstein, 2003). 
By incorporating emotions, prospective narratives should also affect the values 
cardinal issue.  Since the protagonists of the created stories are the deciders themselves, 
the protagonists’ emotional reactions to the story events can be used to predict the 
decider’s emotional reactions to those events in reality.  We theorize that creating 
prospective narratives during decision making serves to strengthen implementation 
intentions as well.  There is evidence that ads that induce prospective thinking about the 
self increase product purchase intentions (Krishnamurthy & Sujan, 1999).   
Finally, narratives that are created during decision making should be useful for 
communicating and persuading others about a choice.  People tend to think of narratives 
as entertainment, not persuasion devices (Green & Brock, 2000).  This tendency reduces 
psychological reactance against traditional forms of persuasion.  Numerous non-
psychologists in the past have touted the communicative and persuasive virtues of stories, 
including scholars in law (e.g., Bennett & Feldman, 1981; Spence, 2005), social 
movement (Strange, 2002), screenwriting (McKee, 1998), business (Maxwell & 
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Dickman, 2007; Simmons, 2006), policy (Kaplan, 1986), even science (Czarniawska-
Joerges, 2004; W. R. Fisher, 1994; Krieger, 1981).  At last, psychologists have become 
involved since the last decade, leading to the fairly new “narrative persuasion” field (see 
e.g., Appel & Richter, 2007; Escalas, Moore, & Britton, 2004; Green, Strange, & Brock, 
2002; Prentice & Gerrig, 1999).  
A key point apparent from Table 4.1 is that the decision schemes advocated by 
traditional theory only address three cardinal decision issues—values, tradeoffs, and 
possibly acceptability—whereas mental simulation, problem solving, and narratives 
address not only those issues, but four additional ones as well—options, possibilities, 
judgment, and implementation.  The usefulness of the approaches in addressing cardinal 
decision issues could serve as explanations for why people use such approaches when 
making decisions.  Besides the seven cardinal issues discussed, we theorize that the 
various decision tools can be used to address self-persuasion as well.  The factors that 
make the tools compelling for other-persuasion purposes should make them work for 
self-persuasion purposes, too.  With respect to the narratives approach, for example, 
narrative therapy literature suggests that self-narratives are helpful—some say even 
necessary—for good mental health (King, 2001; Pennebaker, 2000; Pennebaker & 
Seagal, 1999). 
Clearly, many of the decision making benefits of prospective option repairs and 
stories we proposed in the passages above still require empirical verification.  The studies 
described in this dissertation focused in particular on testing the self-persuasion, 
implementation intention, and other-persuasion effects of the decision approaches of 
interest.  In Chen and Yates (in progress), we posited that people seek coherence in their 
decisions because it helps them persuade themselves to commit to and implement those 
decisions, as well as persuade others to respect them and their decisions.  We found that 
private coherence did predict self-persuasion, implementation, and anticipated other-
persuasion, and that self-persuasion completely mediated the effects on the other two 
dependent variables.  For the current work, we propose that prospective mental 
simulation, option repairs, and narratives have those same effects for decision makers.  
Verifying this would provide possible explanations for why at least some people use 
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these approaches spontaneously.  Successful decision self-persuasion, implementation, 
and other-persuasion provide important functions for people (see Appendix A); so people 
may very well be driven by those considerations in their decision processes. 
4.2.3 Question Set 2 (Q2)—Self-Persuasion and Implementation Effects 
Q2:Self-Persuasion and Implementation Effects—Would making decisions on the 
basis of matrices, repairs, or narratives serve self-persuasion or decision 
implementation purposes? 
Q2a: Which form(s) of presenting decision explanations are (more) effective 
for increasing self-persuasion, implementation intention, and anticipated 
other-persuasion—matrices, prospective repairs, or prospective 
narratives?  
Once again, we were interested in finding out whether particular personal 
characteristics have mediating effects or not.  For instance, affinity for numbers may 
affect the impact of using the matrix approach on self-persuasion, implementation 
intention, and/or anticipated other-persuasion, while affinity for story-writing may affect 
the impact of the narratives approach. 
Q2b: Is the impact of the approaches on decision self-persuasion, 
implementation intention, and anticipated other-persuasion mediated by 
certain personal characteristics of the deciders?  
A caveat about repairs and stories is that they may not be realistic.  Regardless of 
how persuasive people find they are or how willing they are to take actions to turn them 
into reality they could do more harm than good in the long run if they do not actually 
occur.  A person may fantasize about having the car repainted to a desired color, but she 
could be doing it just to persuade herself to commit to the decision.  Once she obtains the 
car, she may very well not bother to repaint it, as that would still take a lot of effort and 
money to do.  As for stories, Tom the house-buyer may picture all the wonderful people 
he will meet at the neighborhood parties he will throw once he has bought and moved 
into the house with the good location, but many of those wonders—the people and 
parties—may very well end up not coming to fruition. 
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Q2c: Are the repairs that people come up with unrealistic for them to execute?  
Finally, we were interested in whether repairing particular options makes them 
more likely to be picked by deciders, suggesting that repairs do carry the benefit of 
enhancing options in the eyes of decision makers. 
Q2d: Do people who are instructed to repair only one option end up choosing 
that option more than those who are instructed to repair all or none of the 
options?  Is this mediated by certain personal characteristics?  
4.2.4 Question Set 3 (Q3)—Process Costs and Benefits 
We were also interested in the investment cardinal issue.  As Yates (2003) 
discussed, the potential costs and side benefits of decision processes matter when trying 
to explain or prescribe them.  Studying or prescribing a certain decision approach is 
pointless if people do not and are reluctant to use it.  A decision maker would be more 
reluctant to use a decision process if it has high costs or is unenjoyable, e.g., takes up a 
lot of time and effort.  This has been an issue for the matrix approach traditionally 
prescribed by decision scholars, according to past studies, e.g., Mean, 1983; Means et al., 
1993).   
  A decision maker should be more eager to use a decision process if it has 
ancillary benefits—like being fun to use or appearing to be helpful.  It is plausible that, 
once instructed to use the approaches, decision makers would find them useful and 
appealing for the reasons outlined in the Explanation section 4.2.1.  Even if an approach 
does not actually produce better outcomes than the matrix approach, it is still useful to 
know whether people think it does, because then they might actually use it in their 
everyday lives.  For the above reasons, it is important to compare approaches on their 
time consumption, enjoyability, and perceived usefulness to people.  Even an approach 
takes a lot of time to complete, people may be willing to adopt it nonetheless if they 
perceive it as enjoyable or useful. 
Q3:Process Cost and Benefits—What are the relative process cost and appeal of 
matrix, repair, and story approaches’ to decision makers? 
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Q3a: Does use of the prospective narratives and repairs approaches take 
longer time than the matrix or spontaneous approaches? 
Q3b: Do people who are instructed to use the prospective narratives and 
repairs approaches end up believing them to be as or more useful or 
enjoyable than those who are instructed to use the matrix or spontaneous 
approaches? 
Once again, personal characteristics plausibly have mediating effects.  For 
instance, people who like numbers should find the matrix approach more useful and 
helpful than those who do not, while those who like writing stories should find the 
narratives approach more enjoyable and helpful than those who do not.  People who are 
good at problem solving would find option repairs more enjoyable and helpful than those 
who do not. 
Q3c: Is the enjoyment and perceived helpfulness of approaches mediated by 
certain personal characteristics of the deciders?  
There was a caveat we wished to test regarding repairs and stories in particular.,.  
It was unclear whether repairing/storying both options (a two-sided repair/story 
approach), repairing/storying only the chosen option (a one-sided repair/story approach), 
or both would be considered useful by people.  On the one hand, people may prefer to 
exert effort on and strengthen only their favored option in order to spread alternatives.  
On the other hand, being thorough by strengthening and exerting effort on all of the 
options before choosing between them may enable people to feel more confident about 
their decisions.  They would know that they have done all they could do to explore and 
strengthen all the options before choosing between them.  If it is the case that two-sided 
approaches provide the same amount of benefit as one-sided approaches, then there is no 
point in wasting the extra time repairing/storying all options when merely 
repairing/storying the chosen option would do. 
Q3d: Do people find prospective narratives and repairs more useful when they 
apply the approaches to all options, or just the one they eventually 
choose?  Is this mediated by certain personal characteristics? 
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4.2.5 Question Set 4 (Q4)—Other-Persuasion Effects 
Finally, we were interested testing in whether communicating decisions by 
discussing decision matrices, prospective repairs, or prospective narratives do in fact aid 
decision other-persuasion.  As was already discussed in section 4.2.2 above, there are 
many reasons why repairs and narratives should be compelling to decision audiences.  
Justifying one’s decisions, managing other people’s impressions of oneself as a decision 
maker, and influencing other people’s decisions carry useful benefits (Appendix A.1).  
Explanation-wise, finding other-persuasion benefits would help explain the use of the 
decision approaches by people.  Prescription-wise, it would motivate our 
recommendation of them to people who do not already use the approaches.  Even if 
people do not find such approaches useful for their own decision making, they may prefer 
to think through them anyway, if only to help themselves persuade other people about 
their choices.  Employing specific and concrete procedures for decisions can help one 
organize one’s thoughts and justify them to other people.  We therefore wished to know 
the effects of decision matrices, prospective repairs, and prospective stories, if any, on 
audiences to decisions.   
Personal characteristics—this time among decision audience members—may once 
again mediate any differences between approaches.  For instance, people who like 
numbers may find decision persuasion on the basis of decision matrices more convincing 
than those who do not. 
Q4:Other-Persuasion Effects—Would justifying decisions on the basis of 
matrices, repairs, or narratives serve other-persuasion purposes? 
Q4a: Which form(s) of presenting decision explanations are (more) effective 
for other-oriented justification and influence purposes—matrices, 
prospective repairs, or prospective narratives?  
Q4b: Are differences in effectiveness for the approaches mediated by certain 
personal characteristics of the audience members?  
We are also interested in whether two-sided other-persuasion strategies work 
better than one-sided strategies or vice versa.  One-sided communication strategies 
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(Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949) involve bringing up evidence and arguments 
only for one's own position—that is, focusing on only one side of an issue.  Two-sided 
strategies, in contrast, involve discussing both sides of an issue—that is, bringing up 
evidence and arguments both for and against one's own position in hopes of preemptively 
addressing them.  Proponents of one-sided strategies assert that bringing up weaknesses 
of one's own position merely empowers and emphasizes those weaknesses to the 
audience (Lawson, 1970).  Proponents of two-sided strategies, in contrast, assert that 
bringing up weaknesses oneself (a) enhances one's source credibility and (b) inoculates 
the audience against and minimizes the impact of that evidence and those arguments.  
The latter function is especially important for audience members who are likely to be 
aware of or exposed to the counterevidence, e.g., by the opposition (for reviews of such 
research, see Crowley & Hoyer, 1994; Lloyd-Bostock, 1988).   
The one-sided/two-sided persuasion concept would apply to decision persuasion 
as follows:  someone who wants to be one-sided when justifying or influencing decisions 
would discuss only the strengths of his preferred options and the weaknesses of his 
disliked options.  In contrast, someone who wants to be two-sided would discuss, in 
addition to those, the weaknesses of his preferred options and the strengths of the disliked 
ones.  People may be driven to be one-sided or two-sided in their decision processes in 
anticipation that later on they will need to justify their choices or influence those of other 
people.   
Compensatory decision schemes such as the matrix tradeoff one are clearly two-
sided approaches; they force the user to consider all dimensions and option features by 
assigning numbers to them and computing aggregate scores.  Story approaches, in 
contrast, may be either one-sided or two-sided.  For instance, one could be deliberately 
one-sided by presenting only happy stories for the chosen option and unhappy stories for 
the rejected option, or two-sided by presenting happy stories for both options, then 
explaining why the happy story is more likely to occur for the chosen option and not the 
rejected option.  Another variation involves the features discussed in the stories, as 
opposed to the happiness/unhappiness of the stories’ endings.  One could be deliberately 
one-sided by only discussing features and dimensions favorable to the chosen option, 
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while leaving out those favorable to the rejected option (versus two-sided by giving full 
coverage of all relevant features and dimensions.)  We leave other variations to the 
reader’s imagination.  It is unclear whether one-sided or two-sided story strategies are 
more effective on decision audiences.  Audience members may be so transported by 
option stories that they forget to consider whatever the decider leaves out of the stories, 
as narrative persuasion scholars would say.  Or perhaps high actively open-minded 
thinking individuals will notice neglect and penalize deciders for it. 
The same question exists for the option repair approach.  Repairs are ways to 
strengthen one option over the other.  A one-sided decision justification strategy would 
involve mentioning repairs for only one option, whereas a two-sided one would involve 
mentioning repairs for both options.  On the one hand, a one-sided repair strategy 
increases the difference between the options’ attractiveness, whereas a two-sided strategy 
may increase, decrease, or not affect the difference at all.  Audience members may have a 
hard time generating repairs themselves.  They may thus not notice that the persuasion 
strategy is one-sided, or if they do, they may assume that repairs for the rejected option 
are not feasible for the decider.  On the other hand, an audience may be more impressed 
by someone who has made the effort to be more thorough and unbiased in their decision 
making.   
Q4c:   Is it better to be one-sided or two-sided when repairing/storying options 
for other-oriented justification and influence purposes?  Is this mediated 
by certain personal characteristics?  
4.3 Prescription 
Recall the broad prescription question:  What recommendations can we make for 
people to improve their multi-attribute decision making?  In the previous section, we 
gave reasons for why prospective option repair and narratives should appeal to decision 
makers.  They are potential explanations for why at least some people use those 
approaches.  Our research also has prescriptive significance.  As discussed in the 
Description section 4.1, heretofore no scholars have tested the descriptiveness of the 
prospective narratives and repairs approaches.  It could very well be that only a minority 
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of decision makers use those approaches.  However, the same benefits of repairing and 
storying should also make those approaches appeal to people who do not already use the 
approaches spontaneously.  In fact, the rareness of the approaches in people’s natural 
decision repertoires would make it all the more important for the approaches to be 
promoted by decision scholars.  After all, if the approaches are shown to be enjoyable 
and useful, yet rarely used, then here would be an enormous opportunity to improve 
decision makers, justifiers, and would-be persuaders’ repertoires. 
Improving advice-giving to other people (a form of decision influence) is another 
practical benefit of this research.  Many professions—e.g., health care practitioner, 
lawyer, consultant, Cabinet member--require one to advise other people on their 
decisions.  Being able to construct and describe advisees’ likely future lives with their 
options is as essential as knowing the pros and cons of the options.  Suppose Henry has 
just been told that he has inoperable cancer and must decide whether he wants to try 
chemotherapy or not.  It would seem natural for him to want to know not just the pros 
and cons of taking or not taking chemotherapy, but what his life would be like, both 
under therapy and not.  A criminal defendant trying to decide whether to plead guilty or 
not would want his lawyer to describe what will likely happen in either scenario.  As for 
repairs, decision makers should welcome suggestions for what steps they will be able to 
take to reduce the downsides of their options.  For instance, planning to be a model 
prisoner in order to achieve early parole can help convince a defendant to take a guilty 
plea in lieu of jumping bail.  As for option repair, advice for “managing” the downsides 
of options, such as “managing” the pain from taking chemotherapy, should be much 
appreciated by advisees. 
Although ideas similar to repairs have appeared in past coping, SWOT analysis, 
and negotiation literature (see section 3.1 above), only the SWOT literature has 
prescribed repairs for making and justifying decisions.  The negotiation literature has 
recommended repairs for influencing other parties’ likelihood of committing to one’s 
desired courses of action.  As for prospective narratives , they have yet to be explicitly 
suggested as prescriptions for decision making or justification.  They have been 
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suggested prescriptions for decision influence in the past by marketing researchers 
(Adaval & Wyer, 1998; West, Huber, & Min, 2004).   
4.4 Combining the Approaches 
To sum up, there are implementation, persuasion, and other advantages to 
prospective narratives, mental simulation, and repair that may make them more useful 
and appealing to decision makers than the traditional decision matrix approach.  We 
should point out that we view the former approaches as complementary approaches to the 
matrix approach, not direct competitors.   
Indeed, it could very well be that combining the approaches would be more useful 
for persuasion and other purposes than using any one of them singly.  For instance, a 
decider might construct a decision matrix, take the downsides of each option and make 
repairs to them, make tradeoffs between the options, construct stories simulating and 
predicting their future lives with those options, use those stories to think of new 
downsides and repairs to make, re-evaluate the options, and so on.  Indeed, there is 
empirical evidence that using both narrative and statistical evidence in a message is more 
persuasive than using either type of evidence alone (Allen et al., 2000). 
We propose that personal characteristics could explain this finding. First, personal 
characteristics that mediate the use of narratives, repairs, and matrices are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive.  So there may be individuals who find more than one of the 
approaches appealing.  There are likely to be personal characteristics among audience 
members as well.  Combining the approaches when justifying one’s decision to other 
people is like “hedging one’s bet.”  Different approaches would appeal to different 
members of the audience.   
4.5 More about Theoretical and Practical Significance—Old Hat 
versus New 
In the previous sections, we discussed how this research addresses some of the 
gaps in the multi-attribute decision making literature--namely, that prospective narratives, 
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mental simulation, and repairs could be decision approaches that complement the 
traditionally studied matrix approach in addressing key description, explanation, and 
prescription questions.  Repairs, in particular, allow for the creation of new options—
something that traditional theory does not cover.  Prospective repairs also provide an 
alternative, partial explanation for the spreading of alternatives phenomenon.  Instead of 
merely shifting their attitudes toward option features, as past researchers assumed, 
decision makers may actually be planning improvements to option features, thus 
changing them and improving evaluations of them.  In addition, past researchers have not 
tested personal characteristics to see if they predict which approaches are more influential 
for which individuals.  Personal characteristics may explain why past researchers have 
obtained mixed evidence (see Allen et al., 2000 for a review) as to whether numerical or 
narrative information is more persuasive to people. 
There are three major gaps in other areas of social and cognitive psychology that 
this research would affect by introducing prospective option repairs and stories (see Table 
4.2).   
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Table 4.2.  Proposed New Areas of Study in Psychology  
Row Literature Area Studied by Previous 
Scholars 
Proposed New Area of Study 
1 Multi-attribute 
decision making 
and justification 
Matrix approach Stories and "repair" 
approaches.   
Creation of new options (via 
repairs) 
 Personal characteristics 
2 Explaining 
spreading of 
alternatives effect 
Shifting evaluation of 
features—Change 
attitudes toward features 
Repairing unfavorable 
features—Change features 
themselves 
3 Narratives for 
decision making 
Retrospective stories  Prospective stories  
4 Narrative 
persuasion for 
decision making 
Other-oriented influence  Self-persuasion and other-
oriented justification  
“Repair”/problem solving’s 
effect on impression 
management 
5 Narrative 
persuasion in 
general 
Coherence, causality, 
concreteness, imagery, 
vividness, emotionality, 
transportation, empathy, 
identification with hero, 
audience relevance 
“Repair” (problem 
solving/conflict resolution 
aspect) 
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The third area this research touched on was the intersection between narratives 
and decision making.  We distinguish between “retrospective” (based on past experience) 
and “prospective” (based on projections of future events) narratives and repairs, as 
inspired by past researchers’ distinction between “retrospective” and “prospective” 
mental simulations (Sanna, 1996; Sanna, Small, & Cook, 2004).  An example of a 
retrospective story about a decision option would be “my cousin got rear-ended at night 
once, because his car was hard to see.”  In contrast, a prospective story might be “If I get 
this dark green car, I predict that I will on some night get rear-ended, because dark cars 
are hard to see at night.”  This simulation of the future and the consequences of choices 
are exactly what leaders mean when they talk about having a “vision” for their 
organization.  Past scholars have remarked on retrospective stories as mechanisms for 
decision making and giving advice (Krieger, 1981).  For instance, studies using mock 
jurors have shown that laypeople make legal decisions by constructing stories in their 
minds of how the crimes in question came to occur (Pennington, 1981; Pennington & 
Hastie, 1988, 1993).  Lawyers are exhorted to win cases by (a) constructing stories of 
how the crimes in question occurred so as to favor their party, then (b) convincing their 
audiences that their stories are more accurate representations of the facts than their 
opponents’ (e.g., Spence, 2005).  As was mentioned in section 4.1, however, the use of 
prospective stories has neither been suggested nor tested by decision scholars, despite 
having being observed and noted by scholars in practice domains.   
The fourth area this research touched on was the narrative persuasion field, which 
arose in the last decade or so.  There have been only a handful of studies exploring 
narrative persuasion in the decision context, and those only addressed other-oriented 
influence—the use of narratives to influence people’s decisions (e.g., West et al., 2004).  
We propose that narratives can be used by deciders themselves for self-persuasion and 
other-oriented justification purposes.  This idea was inspired by our observations of 
decision makers’ justifications of their decisions on video (Chen & Yates, in progress), as 
well as narrative therapy literature which indicates that self-narratives are useful for 
promoting mental health (King, 2001; Pennebaker, 2000; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999). 
44 
 
Fifth, this research sought to expand the narrative persuasion literature in general.  
Past researchers have focused on the persuasive nature of other aspects of narratives—
coherence (e.g., Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Pasquier, Rahwan, Dignum, & 
Sonenberg, 2007; Rideout, 2008), causality (e.g., Pennington, 1981; Pennington & 
Hastie, 1988, 1993; Sloman, 1993, 1994), concreteness (Schank & Berman, 2002), 
imagery (e.g., Green et al., 2002), vividness (for a review, see S. M. Smith & Shaffer, 
2000), emotionality (Escalas et al., 2004; Oatley, 2002; for a review, see Crano & Prislin, 
2006), transportation into the narrative world (Green & Brock, 2000; Prentice & Gerrig, 
1999; for a review, see Appel & Richter, 2007), empathy for (Zillmann, 1991) 
identification with the hero (Dal Cin, Zanna, & Fong, 2004; Schank & Berman, 2002), 
and relevance to audience (Schank & Berman, 2002).  There has as yet been no such 
exploration of the persuasiveness of conflict resolution and problem solving in narratives, 
however.  We theorize that being able to anticipate and solve problems with decision 
options aids both self- and other-persuasion.  Anticipating and being able to solve option 
downsides should help assure the decider and other people that those downsides really 
can be removed.  It should make the decider look wise and competent to others when 
justifying his choice as well.  Over time, planning repairs should help develop people’s 
internal locus of control (the amount of control that they believe they have over events 
that affect them; Rotter, 1954), as well as self-efficacy (belief in their own abilities to 
achieve goals; Bandura, 1977).  They may end up choosing not to go through with the 
repairs, but they would at least know that there are things they can do about disliked 
situations. 
4.6 Empirical Questions Recap and Studies Overview 
For easier viewing, the four sets of empirical questions addressed by this 
dissertation are listed here again.  As was discussed above, Q1 has descriptive 
significance, while Q1, Q2, and Q3 each has both explanatory and prescriptive 
significance. 
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Q5: Prevalence—What is the prevalence of the use of decision matrices, 
prospective option repairing, and prospective storying among decision 
makers? 
Q5a: Do people spontaneously use decision matrices, prospective narratives 
and/or option repairs when making multi-attribute decisions?  What 
percentage of them do so? 
Q5b: Is the use of prospective narratives, repairs, and matrices mediated by 
certain personal characteristics of the deciders?  
Q5c: If people do use prospective repairs or stories, do they generate them for 
all options, or only for the option they eventually choose?  Is this 
mediated by certain personal characteristics?  
 
Q6: Self-Persuasion and Implementation Effects—Would making decisions on 
the basis of matrices, repairs, or narratives serve self-persuasion or decision 
implementation purposes? 
Q6a: Which form(s) of presenting decision explanations are (more) effective 
for increasing self-persuasion, implementation intention, and anticipated 
other-persuasion—matrices, prospective repairs, or prospective 
narratives?  
Q6b: Is the impact of the approaches on decision self-persuasion, 
implementation intention, and anticipated other-persuasion mediated by 
certain personal characteristics of the deciders?  
Q6c: Are the repairs that people come up with unrealistic for them to execute?  
Q6d: Do people who are instructed to repair only one option end up choosing 
that option more than those who are instructed to repair all or none of the 
options?  Is this mediated by certain personal characteristics?  
 
Q7:Process Cost and Benefits— What are the relative process cost and appeal of 
matrix, repair, and story approaches’ to decision makers? 
Q7a: Does use of the prospective narratives and repairs approaches take 
longer time than the matrix or spontaneous approaches? 
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Q7b: Do people who are instructed to use the prospective narratives and 
repairs approaches end up believing them to be as or more useful or 
enjoyable than those who are instructed to use the matrix or spontaneous 
approaches? 
Q7c: Is the enjoyment and perceived helpfulness of approaches mediated by 
certain personal characteristics of the deciders?  
Q7d: Do people find prospective narratives and repairs more useful when they 
apply the approaches to all options, or just the one they eventually 
choose?  Is this mediated by certain personal characteristics? 
 
Q8:Other-Persuasion Effects—Would justifying decisions on the basis of 
matrices, repairs, or narratives serve other-persuasion purposes? 
Q8a: Which form(s) of presenting decision explanations are (more) effective 
for other-oriented justification and influence purposes—matrices, 
prospective repairs, or prospective narratives?  
Q8b: Are differences in effectiveness for the approaches mediated by certain 
personal characteristics of the audience members?  
Q8c:   Is it better to be one-sided or two-sided when repairing/storying options 
for other-oriented justification and influence purposes?  Is this mediated 
by certain personal characteristics?  
Study 1 addressed the first, second, and third sets of questions by focusing on 
decision makers.  Study 2 (Chapter 7) addressed the fourth set of questions by focusing 
on decision audiences.  The stories and repairs generated by participants in Study 1 were 
vetted and used to craft the stimuli for Study 2 (Chapter 6). 
As a preview for the reader, our studies operationalized the primary dependent 
variables of interest as follows: 
• Q1 
o Prevalence—percentage of deciders not assigned to use a particular 
approach who later self-report themselves as having used that approach 
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• Q2 
o Self-persuasion—anticipated utility, confidence in decision, etc. 
o Implementation likelihood—percent likelihoods that deciders will 
immediately take action to commit to their choices instead of seeking 
more options or taking more time to decide 
o Process cost and benefits—approach completion time, self-reported 
helpfulness and enjoyability of the approach, the extent to which the 
approach helps deciders think of new ideas 
• Q3 
o Other-oriented justification—audience members’ judgments of deciders’ 
persuasiveness, perceived wisdom of deciders’ choices, etc. 
o Other-oriented influence—audience members’ own choices and opinions 
of the options after reading about deciders’ choices and processes 
 
 
48 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Study 1—Decision Makers 
To recapitulate, we were interested in addressing the broad sets of questions Q1 
(approach prevalence), Q2 (self-persuasion and implementation effects) and Q3 (process 
cost and benefits).  Besides obtaining self-reports on the spontaneous use of particular 
decision approaches, we assigned those approaches to decision makers and compared 
their effects relative to a spontaneous approach.  The approaches were the traditional 
compensatory scheme described in section Chapter 2 (henceforth, “matrix” approach), 
prospective option repair as described in section 3.1 (henceforth, “repairs” approach), and 
prospective narratives as described in section 3.2 (henceforth, “story” approach).  The 
dependent variables of interest included decision self-persuasion, implementation 
intentions, anticipated other-oriented justification, and various approach assessments.  
We were also interested in possible interactions between the decision approaches and 
personal characteristics as measured by certain scales (for details, see section 5.1.7).  
5.1 Procedure  
For this study we recruited 180 participants via the University of Michigan 
Introduction to Psychology Subject Pool, the psychology department’s Paid Subject Pool, 
on-campus flyers, and a campus newspaper advertisement.  The participants completed 
the procedure on computers using MediaLab software and html/JavaScript.  The phases 
subjects completed are charted in Figure 5.1.  Participants completed a two-choice 
decision task, various questionnaires assessing the dependent variables of interest among 
other things, several personal characteristics scales, and a demographics questionnaire 
(details to follow). 
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Condition 
Control/ 
Natural 
Tradeoffs Repair BB RepairBoth StoryBot
 
Give decision & confidence 
Self-persuasion:  utility, anticipated utility, 
   
Anticipated other-persuasion:  predicted 
   
Implementation intention by signing job 
acceptance/rejection letters 
1-sentence summary of the approach.  Present subject’s inputs.  Write out decision 
    
 
Reality check on own decision process 
Self-report on which approaches used 
Repeat 1-sentence summary of approach.  Assess 
approach on helpfulness and enjoyment 
Feature comparisons 
Write S 
 
StoryBB 
Write BB story Rank 
 
Repair BB’s 
 
Repair S’s inferior 
2 job offers, Splendor & BB, after college. 
Demographics 
Personal characteristics 
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Figure 5.1.  Study 1 procedure.  Participants (“deciders”) completed preliminary steps to an assigned 
decision approach, before making a decision using that approach.  They then completed various 
questionnaires and personal characteristics scales.  Steps that were only completed in the matrices, 
repair both options, and story both options conditions are outlined in green, orange, and red, 
respectively. 
5.1.1 Decision approach manipulation and completion 
For this between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
six groups, which differed by the decision approach they would eventually be instructed 
to use: 
1. Control/natural (use whatever approach they wish) 
2. Matrix (a simplified version of the traditional compensatory scheme) 
3. Repair one option only 
4. Repair both options 
5. Story one option only 
6. Story both options 
Eventually, they would have to choose between job offers from two companies, called 
“Bonnie’s Best” and “Splendor.”  (To make the decision non-trivial, the job features were 
assigned so that the two jobs were more or less comparable.)  First, however, participants 
completed the preliminary steps (if any) to their assigned approaches without any 
context.  This was to ensure that participants did not realize that they would be asked to 
make a decision and that they did not start using decision approaches other than the ones 
we planned for them to use.   
For instance, the matrix approach group was presented with pairs of job features, 
and asked to indicate for each pair which feature was superior to the other feature (e.g., 
working in “a noisy cubicle” versus a “private office,” or having an 18-minute versus a 
40-minute commute).  On the next screen, they rank-ordered seven job dimensions (i.e., 
office, commute, salary, etc.) by importance.  The two repair groups also made feature 
comparisons.  However, on the next screen, they were presented with the job features that 
they had previously deemed inferior to the other feature, and told to come up with ways 
to repair those features.  The repair-one-option-only group only made repairs for the 
Bonnie’s Best features (unbeknownst to them) while the repair-both-options group 
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repaired both jobs’ features.  The story groups were led step-by-step through the process 
of creating prospective stories for the option(s) (see Appendix B for details). 
After completing all of the preliminary steps of the approach out of context, 
participants were presented with the actual decision task.  They were told that they must 
choose between two job offers—from companies named Bonnie’s Best and Splendor—
using only the approach that we instruct them to.  They were then presented with a 
summary of their assigned approach, followed by descriptions of the jobs and their own 
responses to the previously-completed steps.  For the matrix condition in particular, 
participants’ feature appraisals and dimension rankings were presented back to them in 
the format of a decision matrix such as the one in Table 5.1 (without the overall 
appraisals): 
Table 5.1.  Screenshot of Decision Matrix Displayed to a “Matrix” Condition Participant 
Dimensions Bonnie’s Best’s Features Splendor’s Features 
The company you 
think is better for this 
particular dimension 
Your rank of the 
importance of this 
dimension relative to the 
other dimensions. 
Location 
Dull, sparsely-populated industrial 
area, with one mediocre cafeteria 
nearby 
Located in fun part of town, next 
to a new mall; many cafes, 
clothing stores, and cinemas 
nearby 
BB 4 
Salary 
$40,800 per year ($800 above the 
average salary of a person at your 
position) 
$39,400 per year ($600 below the 
average salary of a person at your 
position) 
BB 6 
Commute 18-minute each way 40-minute each way BB 1 
Work 
atmosphere 
Employees generally eat alone in 
their cubicles 
Employees generally go out to 
lunch in groups, visiting 
new eateries regularly 
S 3 
Office Cubicle in a noisy area Small, private office S 2 
Vacation 
package 
2 weeks of vacation per year, plus 
fun retreat in San Diego 
2 weeks of vacation per year BB 7 
Rules 
Not many rules, but enforcement 
is strict 
Lots of rules, but enforcement 
seems pretty lax 
BB 5 
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Inside a text box, participants typed in whatever they thought of as they made their 
decisions.  They then indicated their final choices and confidence in those choices. 
5.1.2 Self- and anticipated other-persuasion 
To assess self-persuasion, we asked participants to indicate their confidence in 
their choices, how satisfied they were with those choices, how happy they thought they 
would be in the jobs they chose, and how wise they thought their decisions were.  To 
assess anticipated other-oriented decision justification, participants were told to think of a 
specific person whose opinion means a lot to them and who cares about them—a parent,  
teacher, advisor, friend, etc.—and to write in that person’s name.  They then predicted 
how easy it would be to convince that person that the chosen job offer is the best for 
them. 
5.1.3 Implementation intention 
We assessed participants’ intentions to implement their choices by showing them 
acceptance letters that they would have to sign and mail in to the fictitious companies to 
formally “accept” or “reject” the jobs.  To get people to take this implementation 
intention phase seriously, we emphasized that signing and then retracting job acceptances 
in their particular industry would have serious repercussions on their reputations in that 
industry.  Participants then indicated the percent likelihoods that they would (a) sign and 
accept the first job and decline the second job, (b) sign and accept the second job and 
decline the first job, and (c) think over the matter some more or continue searching.  We 
had employed this same phase in a prior study (Chen & Yates, in progress).  Sixteen 
percent of the participants would not have implemented their choices right away.  On 
average, participants were 23% likely to wait to implement their choices right away.   
5.1.4 Reality check 
Question 3e brought up the concern that some aspects of decision approaches may 
be used merely to convince the self to commit to an option, and are actually not realistic 
for the person to achieve after the choice has been made.  For instance, a person may tell 
himself that he would make a certain repair to his favored option, only to not follow 
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through on it once he has taken that option.  To see what sorts of responses participants 
proposed earlier that were not realistic, we asked participants to perform a simple reality 
check themselves.  We displayed their own responses to the steps of the approaches 
again.  We asked them to review each sentence they wrote, and to note any that on further 
reflection were unrealistic for themselves.   
5.1.5 Approach assessments 
The MediaLab software recorded the amount of time spent completing each stage 
of the experiment.  To see what people themselves thought about the decision approaches 
(Questions 3a-3c), we presented the participants with one-sentence summaries of the 
approaches we instructed them to use.  Among other things, we asked them to rate their 
particular approaches on helpfulness and enjoyment, and to write in what they thought 
were the strengths and weaknesses of those approaches.  The enjoyment and helpfulness 
questions were based off the enjoyment question used in West el al.’s (2004) study, 
which found that people enjoy writing stories about the self as more than either writing 
dialogues or writing stories about other people.   
5.1.6 Approach manipulation check and prevalence (Q1) 
For a simple manipulation check, we listed the one-sentence summaries of our 
tested approaches and asked people to check off the ones they used, as well as write in 
any approaches they used that were not on our list.  If our approach instructions worked, 
the reasoning went, participants should check off the approach that we asked them to use.  
Allowing people to check off approaches in addition to the ones they were assigned 
enabled to us address the Q1 description questions.   
5.1.7 The personal characteristics scales 
We administered personal characteristics scales toward the end of the study.  The 
scales we used in this study were Subjective Numeracy, Narrative Transportability, 
Actively Open-Minded Thinking, for the following reasons: 
 The Subjective Numeracy scale (Fagerlin et al., 2007) measures people's self-
assessed numerical aptitude and preferences.  Individuals who are good with and like 
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numbers may be more easily persuaded by decision approaches that use numbers, such as 
our decision matrices.  We hypothesized that the effectiveness of the matrix approach 
may be mediated by people's aptitude and preference for numbers, as measured by the 
Subjective Numeracy scale. 
The Narrative Transportability scale measures individuals’ tendency to become 
absorbed in narratives when reading them (Dal Cin et al., 2004).  Decision making using 
the story generation approach may thus be more effective for high transportability 
individuals.  How effective the story approach is may be mediated by people's propensity 
to become transported into narratives, as measured by the Narrative Transportability 
scale. 
 The Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale (Stanovich & West, 1997) is linked to 
people's willingness to be open to and actively search for alternative evidence, solutions, 
or interpretations to their existing beliefs.  People who score higher in "cognitive 
disposition measures" such as AOT tend to value objective data processing more than 
low-scorers (for a review, see Mitchell, 2002).  High AOT scorers may thus be more 
compelled by decision approaches in which they shore up all options as opposed to just 
their favored options.  How effective shoring up both options (a two-sided decision 
approach) is relative to shoring up the chosen option only (a one-sided approach) may be 
mediated by people's openness toward and active seeking of evidence against their 
existing beliefs, as measured by the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale. 
5.2 Q1 (Prevalence) Analyses and Results 
Do people spontaneously use prospective option repairs and stories when making 
multi-attribute decisions?  First, we found that 98% of deciders self-reported themselves 
as having used at least one of our approaches of interest.  Of those people, half used only 
one of our approaches.  Half actually used two or more approaches.  This was predicted 
by actively open-minded thinking, t(176) = 2.30, p = .03. 
 Next, we computed the frequency of each of the various types of approaches (see 
Table 5.2) across the conditions.  In an ideal study, to assess descriptive frequencies of 
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the approaches, one should only look at the control subjects.  However, this experiment 
only had 30 control subjects—a low sample size.  To provide further evidence, therefore, 
for each approach we also computed the frequency among all subjects who were not 
assigned to the corresponding condition(s).  For the repaired chosen variable, for 
instance, we computed the percentage of people not in either of the two repair groups, 
who self-reported as having repaired their chosen option. 
Table 5.2.  Percentages of Deciders Who Self-Reported As Having Used Particular Approaches 
 Matrix Repaired  Storied  Other 
Group  BB Chosen Rejected Both 1+ 
options 
 BB Chosen Rejected Both 1+ 
options 
 Gut 
instinct 
Controla 97% 40% 53% 23% 20% 57%  63% 83% 50% 47% 87%  3% 
Matrixb 100% 47% 81% 19% 16% 84%  53% 78% 31% 31% 78%  6% 
Repair BBc  97% 60% 77% 37% 33% 80%  60% 77% 40% 37% 80%  10% 
Repair Bothd 97% 63% 90% 40% 37% 93%  60% 83% 47% 43% 87%  0% 
StoryBBe 96% 54% 69% 38% 35% 73%  73% 85% 54% 50% 88%  4% 
Story Bothf 87% 47% 73% 30% 30% 73%  70% 77% 60% 60% 77%  3% 
n 146 118 118 118 118 118  122 122 122 122 122  178 
All conditions 
other than the 
corresponding 
approach 
95% 47% 69% 27% 25% 72%  65^ 80% 42% 39% 83%  4% 
Notes. The percentages of decider participants who self-reported as having used their assigned approaches as instructed are 
highlighted by boxes. 
an = 30.   bn = 32.  cn = 30.  dn = 30.  dn = 26.  fn = 30.   
Happily, the percentages for the control subjects (the first row) mirrored those 
across the conditions (the last row) fairly well.  This gives some assurance that these 
percentages reflect somewhat the descriptive prevalence of the approaches within a 
general population.  We make the following observations based on the percentages: 
• Pros and cons:  Almost everyone claimed to have weighed the pros and 
cons of the decision without being told to.  Apparently, people do value 
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the ability to compare features side-by-side, even if not precise in 
numerical schemes. 
• Repair:  Fifty-seven percent of the control group and 72% across the 
conditions claimed to have repaired at least one of the options. 
• Story:  Eighty-seven percent of controls and 83% across the conditions 
claimed to have storied at least one of the options. 
• Other approaches:  A small percentage of deciders wrote down that they 
used their gut instincts when making their choices.  
Question 1c asks whether people are one-sided or two-sided when it comes to 
repairing or storying options.  The table suggests that people are one-sided.  The 
percentages of people who repaired or storied their chosen options were at least double 
those of people who repaired or storied their rejected options.   
As for the question of personal characteristics (Q1b), we could not run a 
quantitative test for the matrix/pros-and-cons approach.  Almost all deciders self-reported 
as using the pros-and-cons approach, making the question moot.  In addition, we checked 
for an interaction between actively open-minded thinking with two-sidedness.  To do this, 
we created a used-sidedness variable such that a value of 2 indicated that the decider 
claimed to be two-sided in both repairs and stories, 1 indicated that the decider claimed to 
be two-sided with repairs but one-sided with stories, or vice versa, and 0 indicated neither 
of the above.  We found no interaction between this variable and actively open-minded 
thinking, t(177) = 0.99, p = .32.  
Finally, we noted that on average, people self-reported as having used two of the 
three approach types we studied.  This was especially true for actively open-minded 
thinking individuals, t(177), p = .02.  This suggested that people do combine multiple 
approaches when making decisions.   
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Figure 5.2.  Number of treatment approaches used by deciders, according to self-reports.  Bars 
indicate standardized errors. 
5.3 Approach Manipulation Check 
For the same ceiling effect reason as above, we could not conduct formal 
manipulation checks for the tradeoff and story conditions.  Looking at the demarcated 
percentages in Table 5.2, however, the percentages of repair and story subjects who self-
reported themselves as repairing and storying, respectively, the option(s) we instructed 
them to were lower than one might have hoped.  For instance, the percentage of deciders 
in the repair-both condition who self-reported themselves as having considered repairs 
for both options was only 37%.  It is possible that people’s memories for the approaches 
they used were faulty.  Another potential explanation is that people did not find their own 
generated option repairs/stories realistic or useful for them.  After all, the deciders were 
deliberately not told the true purposes of the repairs and stories until after they generated 
them.  The most likely explanation, however, is that people were one-sided in their 
decision process and stopped the process as soon as they found their leading option to be 
“good enough.”  In other words, they satisficed (à la Klein, 1996; H. A. Simon, 1982).  
This was supported by the fact we already noted in the previous section, that the number 
of deciders who used the repairs and stories for their chosen options far exceeded those 
who used them for their rejected options.  In any case, it appeared that assigning people 
to repair or story particular options did not guarantee that people used repairs or stories 
for those options or only those options in their decision processes. 
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Regarding option repair in particular, we did find that people in those conditions 
were more likely to use repairs than participants in the other conditions (z = 2.14, p = 
.032).  This provided additional support for the notion that people tend not to think of 
doing option repairs unless told to do so. 
5.4 Q2 (Self-Persuasion and Implementation) Analyses and Results 
5.4.1 Dependent variables 
Study 1’s primary purpose was to test the effects of our various treatment 
approaches relative to the control approach on the following sets of dependent variables: 
• Decision persuasion 
o Choice confidence 
o Anticipated satisfaction with chosen option) 
o Decision anticipated other-persuasion (i.e., how easy it will be to 
convince audiences of the goodness of one’s decision) 
• Decision implementation intention (i.e., likelihood of committing to the 
chosen job by sending out acceptance/rejection letters) 
• Approach utility 
o Approach helpfulness 
o Approach enjoyment 
o New ideas (whether new ideas were generated due to the approach 
or not) 
Because they were left-skewed, for all analyses, we applied log and quadratic 
transformations to the dependent variables and the subjective numeracy independent 
variable, respectively, to make them more normal:   
dependent variabletransformed = 1- ln [max(dependent variableoriginal) + 1- variableoriginal] 
subjective numeracytransformed = subjective numeracytransformed original + subjective 
numeracy2 original 
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For all dependent variables, we found and removed any high leverage points—points that 
unduly affected coefficient estimates—that revealed themselves in halfnorm plots 
(Faraway, 2005b).   
5.4.2 Independent variables and tested models 
For the independent variables, we created dummy variables, with values of either 
0 or 1, to represent each of the four treatment conditions.  To test for main effects of the 
assigned approaches on the dependent variables relative to the control approach using 
treatment contrasts, we ran the following model, summarized using the modified Rogers-
Wilkinson notation (Chambers & Hastie, 1992): 
dependent variabledecider  ~ (dummymatrix  + dummyrepairBB + dummyrepairBoth  + 
dummystoryBB  + dummystoryBoth) + completion time 
The total amount of time spent on completing the steps for the instructed approach was 
included as a control variable.  This was to ensure that any differences left between the 
approaches’ effects on the dependent variables were not simply due to the amount of time 
and effort that participants spent on the approaches, as opposed to the actual contents of 
the approaches.  After all, one may feel confident of a decision and decision approach 
simply because one has put more time into them.  In addition, it has been shown that 
writing about their choices increases people’s confidence in those choices (Sieck & 
Yates, 1997). 
In addition, we tested whether particular personal characteristics mediated the 
effects of corresponding decision approaches: 
dependent variabledecider  ~ Subjective Numeracydecider  × dummymatrix 
dependent variabledecider  ~ Narrative Transportabilitydecider  × (dummystoryBB + 
dummystoryBoth)  
dependent variabledecider  ~ Actively Open-Minded Thinkingdecider  × sidedness 
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Sidedness was a dummy variable that represented whether a decision approach was two-
sided, one-sided, or unknown.  Each of the treatment approaches could be classified as 
either two-sided or one-sided.  The matrix approach was classified as two-sided since it 
forced users to consider all dimensions for both options.  We created the sidedness 
dummy variable by summing the dummy variables for the three two-sided conditions: 
sidedness = (dummymatrix  + dummytwo-sided repair  + dummystory), where 
• 1 = two-sided (matrix, repair both, or story both condition) 
• 0 = one-sided (repair BB only or story BB only condition) 
• NA = unknown (control condition) 
  We employed linear regression for all models save the “new ideas” ones.  Since 
the “new ideas” variable was binary, we employed binomial regression when running its 
models.   Due to multicollinearity concerns, we removed non-significant terms from the 
personal characteristics models one-by-one via backward elimination, with p-value = .05 
as our cutoff  (Venables & Ripley, 2002).   
5.4.3 Choice agreement independent variables and decision persuasion 
models 
It makes sense that a given approach would only affect the self-persuasion, 
anticipated persuasion, and implementation intention of a decision if the results of the 
approach happened to be consistent with the chosen option.  For instance, repairing 
Bonnie’s Best should only be positively correlated with decision self-persuasion if the 
person actually chose Bonnie’s Best.  Unfortunately, since we assigned the approaches to 
deciders randomly, there was no guarantee ahead of time whether the approaches would 
match the direction of the deciders’ eventual choice or not.  As for the story conditions, 
we wanted deciders to give the stories endings that were realistic for them; we did not 
control whether those endings were happy for the jobs or not.  Instructing someone to 
write a story about a particular job did not guarantee whether that story would be happy 
or unhappy with respect to that job and hence, whether it favors or disfavors taking that 
job.  Someone in the story Bonnie’s Best only condition would be highly-persuaded 
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about choosing Bonnie’s Best if his story showed Bonnie’s Best in a positive light, but 
would be highly-unpersuaded if his story showed that job in a negative light. 
In order to give the decision approaches fair tests, therefore, it was insufficient to 
include predictors based on what conditions the deciders were assigned to.  We needed to 
include predictors that represented whether the corresponding approach supported the 
final choice or not.  More specifically, a positive value would indicate that the decider 
chose the option supported by the approach, while a negative value would indicate the 
opposite.   
For the decision persuasion models, therefore, we included three additional 
predictor variables, corresponding to each of the three kinds of decision tactics we 
studied:   
• Matrix-choice agreement—For the matrix deciders, we took the overall 
decision matrix score for the chosen option and subtracted the overall score 
for the rejected option; we assigned a value of 0 to the other deciders. 
• Repair-choice agreement—This was a binary variable, with 1 indicating 
that the chosen option was the only option that was repaired, and 0 
otherwise. 
• Story-choice agreement— As will be described in section 6.1.1 below, 
project team members read each story and noted whether it was happy or 
unhappy with respect to the job about which it was written.  For each 
decider, we assigned their stories +1 if they supported the decider’s 
eventual choice (i.e., happy about the chosen job or unhappy about the 
rejected job) and -1 if they were inconsistent (i.e., unhappy about the chosen 
job or happy about the rejected job).  Scores of 0 were assigned if the 
decider was not told to write a story for a given job.  We then summed the 
story scores for each decider. 
Those models then became the following (with the additional terms highlighted in bold): 
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dependent variableaudience ~ (dummymatrix  + dummyone-sided repair  + dummytwo-sided repair  + 
dummystory) + (matrix-choice agreement + repair-choice agreement + story-choice 
agreement ) + completion time 
dependent variabledecider  ~ Subjective Numeracydecider  × (dummymatrix + matrix-
choice agreement) 
dependent variabledecider  ~ Narrative Transportabilitydecider  × [ (dummystoryBB + 
dummystoryBoth) + story-choice agreement] 
The AOT/sidedness model was unaffected and thus the same as listed above. 
The resultant models are displayed in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3.  Effects of Decider Approaches and Personal characteristics on Decider Self-Reports 
(Relative to Control/Spontaneous Approach) 
  Decision self-persuasiond Implementation  Approach assessment 
Variable  Choice 
confidenceb 
Anticipated 
happiness 
Anticipated 
persuasion 
Implementation 
intention 
 Helpfulness Enjoymentc New 
ideas 
  B B B B  B B B 
  
Main effects of approaches (and approach-choice agreement if applicable)e 
          
Intercept  .04*** .40 -.50 -.18***  -.07 .20* -.17*** 
Approach          
Matrix  -.16 -.13 -.09 .17  .11 -.24’  1.04’  
Repair BB only  -.25* -.19 .08 -.02  .07 -.86 1.64** 
Repair both  -.10 -.06 .14 .87*  -.12 -.30* 1.31* 
Story BB only  .11 -.07 .28 .33  -.40* -.79*** 1.27 
Story both  .39* -.20 .04 .69  -.30 -.66** .67 
Approach-choice 
agreement 
         
Matrix score  .03** .03** .02 .06     
Repair  .10 .17 .07 .84’      
Story  .74 .19** .12 .29’      
Completion time  ≈.000 ≈.000 ≈.000 -.002  ≈.000 ≈.000 ≈.000 
 
Personal characteristics effectsf 
Intercept  .19* -.002 — —  — — — 
Subjective numeracy 
(SN) 
 .01* < .01 — —  — — — 
Matrix approach  .02’  -.54* — —  — — — 
SN × Matrix approach  — .03* — —  — — — 
          
Intercept  .30*** — -.08 —  -.04 .06 -.69** 
Narrative 
transportability (NT) 
 -.01 — .09* —  .09** .08* .34* 
Story BB only  -.04 — — —  — -.43*** .82’  
Story both  .38*** — — —  — -.26* — 
NT× Story BB only  .16* — — —  — — — 
NT× Story both  — — — —  — — — 
Story-choice 
agreement 
 — — .02 —     
NT × Story-choice 
agreement 
 — — .12* —     
          
Intercept  .29*** — — —  -.04* — -.81** 
Actively open-minded 
thinking (AOT) 
 — — — —  .18** — .72* 
Sidednessa  .12’  — — —  — — — 
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Notes. n = 178 unless otherwise indicated.  All dependent variables except one were log-transformed to make them 
more normal.  The new ideas dependent variable was binary and therefore left untransformed.  The subjective 
numeracy independent variable was quadratic-transformed to make it more normal.  For ease of reading, listed 
intercepts and non-significant terms are grayed out.  
an = 148 since the control condition was not applicable.  bn = 176.  Two high leverage points were removed.  cn = 177.  
One high leverage point was removed. dApproach-choice agreement variables were included as possible predictors, and 
approach completion time was included as a control variable.   eFull models are presented.  fBackward elimination was 
employed to eliminate non-significant terms (denoted by –).  Rows with all non-significant terms are not displayed.  
‘p < .10.  *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
5.4.4 Effects of approaches on decision self-persuasion and 
implementation 
To aid interpretation, we plot the personal characteristics interactions we found in 
Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3.  Matrix approach-subjective numeracy and story-narrative transportability interactions 
on decision self-persuasion dependent variables.  Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means.  
All interactions were significant, save for the one depicted in the upper left-hand corner.  The matrix 
approach resulted in higher self-anticipated utility than did the control approach, but only for high 
subjective numeracy deciders.  The same positive relationship holds for between the one-sided story 
approach and narrative transportability.  Finally, the extent to which their stories supported their 
choices predicted high narrative transportability deciders’ confidence in their ability to justify their 
choices, but the effect was reversed for low transportability deciders.   
Decision matrix score- and story-choice agreement did predict self-persuasion in 
deciders.  However, personal characteristics mediated the effects of instructing subjects 
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to use those approaches.  Those two approaches resulted in higher self-persuasion than 
the control approach only for deciders high in subjective numeracy and narrative 
transportability, respectively.  Anticipated persuasion was significantly predicted only by 
story-choice agreement, and then only for high narrative transportability deciders.  This 
was consistent with narrative persuasion research which shows that the effects of stories 
are mediated by narrative transportability (Green & Brock, 2000). 
5.4.5 Realism of responses 
The repair (both) approach was the only one that significantly aided decision 
implementation.  This was as we predicted based upon prior research (discussed in 
section 4.2.1) showing that specific and concrete plans aid action implementation.   
Were the responses of the deciders unrealistic for them?  To answer this question 
Q3e, for each decider, two independent coders took the “reality check” responses the 
decider wrote and assigned a realism code of 1 if the decider reported that nothing in his 
or her own responses to the instructed decision approach appeared unrealistic and 0 
otherwise.  The coders agreed on 98% of the cases.  The coders came to a consensus on 
the three cases on which they disagreed.  We summed the dummy variables for the two 
repair approaches and the two story approaches to yield repair condition and story 
condition dummy variables, respectively.  Binomial regressions of the realism variable on 
the three dummy variables—matrix condition, repair condition, and story condition—
showed that none of the instructed approaches resulted in significantly lower self-
reported realism than the control (natural) approach.  The approaches with the largest 
difference in realism from the control approach, prospective story, had a z-value of -1.03, 
p = .30.  This finding helped allay some of the concern that option repairs and stories, 
despite their self-persuasion benefits, may be too unrealistic for us to recommend them as 
decision making approaches.  
66 
 
 
Figure 5.4.  Percentage of deciders who rated all of their responses to their instructed approaches as 
realistic.  Vertical lines depict standard errors of the means.  None of the treatment approaches 
resulted in significantly lower self-reported realism than the control (natural) approach. 
5.4.6 Effect of repairs on choices 
Q2c asked whether people who are instructed to repair only one option end up choosing 
that option more than those who are instructed to repair all or none of the options.  The 
idea is that repairs are supposed to improve options and thereby enhance them in the eyes 
of decision makers; therefore, repairing certain options without repairing others should 
lead more people to choose the repaired options.  To check this, we tested whether being 
assigned to the repair Bonnie’s Best only condition led to higher likelihood of choosing 
Bonnie’s Best.  This did not occur.  Although the direction of the effect was as expected, 
the effect was not significant, z = -1.47, p = .14. 
 We suspected that this could be due to our earlier finding that deciders were 
bothered by the one-sided only approach.  It could be that once they were instructed to 
repair one option, many of them proceeded to apply the repair approach to the other 
option as well when making their choices.  Indeed, we did find significant effects when 
we tested the self-reported actual use of Bonnie’s Best and Splendor repairs.  Deciders 
who self-reported as having repaired Bonnie’s Best were more likely to have chosen it, z 
= -4.75, p < .001, while those who self-reported as having repaired Splendor were more 
likely to have chosen Splendor, z = 6.36, p < .001. 
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5.5 Q3 (Process Cost and Benefits) analyses and results 
Did certain approaches take longer than other approaches to complete?  Indeed so, 
as illustrated in Figure 5.5.  We summed up the amount of time deciders took to complete 
each step of their assigned approaches to yield a total approach completion time variable.  
We log-transformed that variable to make it more normal, then regressed it on the 
approach condition.  The story approaches were especially long to complete—taking an 
average of at least three times as much time as the longest of the other treatment 
approaches.  Pairwise comparisons using Tukey’s HSD method (Miller, 1981; Yandell, 
1997) showed that all pairwise differences between approaches were significant at the .05 
level, save for those between the one-sided and two-sided versions of the repair and story 
approaches.  To summarize, with respect to completion time: 
stories ≫ option repairs ≫ decision matrices ≫ control (natural) approach 
 
Figure 5.5.  Time to complete assigned decision approaches.  Vertical lines depict standard errors of 
the means.  Asterisks indicate the significance of the treatment approaches compared to the control 
approach.  All of the treatment approaches took longer to complete than the control (natural) 
approach—the story approaches especially so.  ‘p < .10.  *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
The repair approaches were the only ones that a significant number of deciders 
indicated as inspiring them to think of things they would not have considered.  In 
contrast, enjoyment did not turn out to be a decision process benefit of using our tested 
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approaches.  The deciders found almost all of the treatment conditions to be less 
enjoyable compared to the control (natural) condition (see Figure 5.6).  Apparently, the 
people either did not care for the effort needed to complete the approach phases, or 
disliked being constrained in their decision processes.   Deciders in the story BB only 
condition actually rated it negatively.  A few of the story condition participants 
mentioned that they in particular do not like writing stories in general, suggesting that 
personal characteristics do play a role in people’s enjoyment of story writing.   
 
Figure 5.6.  Deciders’ enjoyment of assigned decision approaches.  Vertical lines depict standard 
errors of the means.  Asterisks indicate the significance of the treatment approaches compared to the 
control approach.  All of the treatment approaches (with the exception of repair BB only) were rated 
as less enjoyable than the control (natural)  approach.  ‘p < .10.  *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
These results suggest that repairs will be easiest to impart of the three major types 
of approaches, and that stories will be the hardest. 
5.6 Discussion 
Study 1’s major goal was to address Explanation question Q2 by comparing and 
contrasting the effects of various approaches on decision makers in terms of self-
persuasion and implementation intention, as well as Adoptability question Q3 by 
soliciting decision makers’ assessments of the approaches.  It also touched on Description 
question Q1 by having decision makers self-report which of our interested approaches 
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they used without being told to by us.  We pitted five treatment approaches—the 
traditional decision matrix, repair one option only, repair both options (two-sided option 
repair), story one option only, and story both options (two-sided story repair)—and a 
control approach—use whatever approach people want—against one another and 
compared their effects on decision makers.  Decider participants were led step-by-step 
through their assigned approaches and then told to use those approaches to choose 
between two job offers.  They then completed questionnaires about their choices, 
implementation of their choices, decision processes, the approaches, personal 
characteristics, and demographics.  See Table 8.1 in the concluding chapter for a 
graphical summary of the studies’ key results. 
5.6.1 Approach manipulation check 
Despite our asking them to use the instructed approach only when making their 
decisions, people self-reported as having used the other approaches as well.  The bad 
news this conveyed was that despite all our best efforts, it is hard to force decision 
makers to only use approaches that one instructs them to.  To achieve that in Study 1, we 
would have had to force our participants to make a choice within 5 seconds of viewing 
their previous responses.   But doing so would have weakened the experiment's external 
validity for prescription purposes.  The good news from our finding was that the study 
was more ecologically valid than it would have been had people only used the approaches 
we asked them to.  In real life, of course people would use whatever approaches they 
want to use, not just the ones that they are told to use by someone else.  Another silver 
lining of our finding was the fact that people spontaneously used the approaches even 
when we did not ask them to, ironically enabling us to address somewhat the Descriptive 
question Q1. 
5.6.2 Prevalence (Q1) 
Q1:Prevalence—What is the prevalence of the use of decision matrices, 
prospective option repairing, and prospective storying among decision 
makers? 
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Q1a: Do people spontaneously use decision matrices, prospective narratives 
and/or option repairs when making multi-attribute decisions?  What 
percentage of them do so? 
Q1b: Is the use of prospective narratives, repairs, and matrices mediated by 
certain personal characteristics of the deciders?  
Almost all decider participants used at least one of the approaches we were 
interested in.  Participants high in actively open-minded thinking used more than one of 
those approaches, suggesting that they do at least subconsciously realize the benefits of 
combining approaches. 
Decider self-reports also indicated that weighing of pros and cons was a nearly 
universal approach, while prospective storying and prospective option repairs took 
second and third place, respectively.  Calculating the frequency of approaches as self-
reported by decider participants showed that almost all of them employed some form of 
table comparing pros and cons and assigning overall scores to options without being 
asked to by us.  Most (about 80%) self-reported as having used a prospective story 
approach, while 71% self-reported as having used a prospective option repair approach. 
We only found a marginal positive effect of narrative transportation for the story 
approach.  A scale assessing people’s propensity for creating, not just reading stories 
would have been more helpful.  Unfortunately, no such scale existed at the time.  In 
future studies, we would introduce certain personal characteristics scales that might 
predict the use of option repairs for decision making.  The Proactive Coping Inventory 
(Greenglass, Schwarzer, & Taubert, 1999), for instance, should predict the likelihood that 
people will engage in option repair without being prompted to do so.  In addition, 
creativity and problem solving scales should predict the number of repairs that people 
generate.  Support for this comes from the negotiation literature, which showed that 
creativity helps negotiating parties improve their joint gains (Kurtzberg, 1998) and 
suggested ways to encourage “creativity and problem solving.”   
Since virtually all deciders employed matrices, testing for personal characteristics 
in the use of decision matrices was moot.  This last finding seemingly contradicts those of 
71 
 
past studies showing that people did not like compensatory schemes due to their time and 
effort consumption.  From deciders’ comments, we received the impression that people 
do like side-by-side feature comparisons.  We posit that they may just not like the 
complicated schemes used to elicit and integrate numerical values and weights.  The 
decision matrices studied by traditional decision theory and us confound numbers with 
the table format.  Future work should separate the two to see which ones people truly like 
and dislike.  One could, for instance, test the simple method proposed by Ben Franklin in 
1772  (MacCrimmon, 1973) to weigh options’ pros and cons against one another, a 
method which does not require computation. 
Q1c: If people do use prospective repairs or stories, do they generate them for 
all options, or only for the option they eventually choose?  Is this 
mediated by certain personal characteristics?  
The frequency table we created from the data indicated that deciders were more 
one-sided than two-sided.  Most only repaired their eventually chosen option.  There was 
no effect of actively open-minded thinking on this.  There are two possible explanations 
we can think of.  One is that people really do take the quick, and perhaps lazy, way of 
only bothering to simulate and verify whether their favored option is “good enough” and 
feasible, then ending the decision process if so (as discussed by Klein, 1996; Koehler, 
1991).  Another explanation is that stories and repairs are only used by decision makers 
in the service of spreading alternatives and convincing themselves to commit to their 
favored options. 
 This study has some limitations for addressing Q15.2 above.  However, we 
believe that if one were to conduct a think-aloud protocol to answer Q1, one would be 
likely to obtain even stronger results.  For one thing, we had explicitly asked deciders to 
only use the approaches we instructed them to.  If we had encouraged them to use 
whatever approach they wanted, plausibly even more of them would have done so.  For 
another thing, deciders may have forgotten that they  used some of the approaches due to 
faulty memory, thus leading to underestimation of approach prevalence.  
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5.6.3 Self-Persuasion and Implementation Effects (Q2) 
Q2:Self-Persuasion and Implementation Effects—Would making decisions on the 
basis of matrices, repairs, or narratives serve self-persuasion or decision 
implementation purposes? 
Q2a: Which form(s) of presenting decision explanations are (more) effective 
for increasing self-persuasion, implementation intention, and anticipated 
other-persuasion—matrices, prospective repairs, or prospective 
narratives?  
Q2b: Is the impact of the approaches on decision self-persuasion, 
implementation intention, and anticipated other-persuasion mediated by 
certain personal characteristics of the deciders?  
Q2c: Are the repairs that people come up with unrealistic for them to execute?  
Q2d: Do people who are instructed to repair only one option end up choosing 
that option more than those who are instructed to repair all or none of the 
options?  Is this mediated by certain personal characteristics?  
Self-persuasion was significantly better for deciders assigned to the two-sided 
story approach than for those assigned to the control approach.  The matrix approach only 
had a positive effect on high subjective numeracy deciders.  There was a positive 
interaction as well between narrative transportability and story-choice agreement.  
Apparently, narrative persuasion does work for persuading oneself about a decision and 
not just for influencing other people’s choices.   
As for implementation intention, (two-sided) repair was the only approach that 
significantly improved it compared to the control approach  This makes sense, given that 
option repairs are concrete and specific plans for fixing option downsides, and past 
research showed that making specific and concrete plans aid decision implementation.  
Despite concerns brought up by some deciders in their comments, on the whole the 
decider participants did not consider their own responses to their assigned approaches to 
be unrealistic compared to control participants.  This helped allay some of the concern 
about option repairs and stories being mere wishful thinking with little applicability to 
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deciders’ actual lives.  A longitudinal study would be required to verify this (see section 
8.6 below). 
Prescriptions we might give people making decisions based on these results are as 
follows.  People who want to feel good about their choices should generate prospective 
stories about their options.  They should employ the decision matrix approach only if 
they prefer numbers to words.  People who wish to motivate themselves to implement 
their choices in a timely manner should try to come up with ways to deal with or improve 
upon the downsides of the options.   
5.6.4 Process Cost and Benefits (Q3) 
Q3:Process Cost and Benefits—What are the relative process cost and appeal of 
matrix, repair, and story approaches’ to decision makers? 
Q3a: Does use of the prospective narratives and repairs approaches take 
longer time than the matrix or spontaneous approaches? 
Q3b: Do people who are instructed to use the prospective narratives and 
repairs approaches end up believing them to be as or more useful or 
enjoyable than those who are instructed to use the matrix or spontaneous 
approaches? 
Q3c: Is the enjoyment and perceived helpfulness of approaches mediated by 
certain personal characteristics of the deciders?  
There were no effects of either personal characteristics or the number of options 
repaired for any of the dependent variables. Decider participants did not rate the 
treatment approaches as any more helpful than the control approach.  However, self-
reports indicated that the repair approaches did give them ideas they would not have 
thought of otherwise.  Perhaps they were referring to just the very idea of option repair. 
The two story approaches were both the least enjoyable to decider participants 
and the most time-consuming.  This is consistent with many of the deciders’ comments; 
they stated that the story approach does not suit them because of their lack of creativity 
and distaste for writing.  We could confirm this in the future by asking deciders to rate 
the difficulty of the approaches, not just helpfulness and enjoyment.  These findings 
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highlight an important downside of the story generation approach.  Writing stories is 
more of an art than a science.  It takes a lot of practice and there may be a limit as to how 
well a given individual enjoys it and can do it.  Therefore, the story approach may not be 
practically feasible for someone even if it is theoretically optimal.  See section 0 in the 
concluding chapter for further discussion of this issue and how to resolve it.   
The two repair approaches also consumed more time than the matrix approach.  A 
broad implication is that this research on prospective option repairs and stories as 
decision approaches did not find a solution to the “time-consumption” problem that 
plagues traditionally studied decision schemes, as was discussed in section 2.2.1.  These 
approaches should therefore be left for important decisions on which people would be 
willing to spend extra time.   
Q3d: Do people find prospective narratives and repairs more useful when they 
apply the approaches to all options, or just the one they eventually 
choose?  Is this mediated by certain personal characteristics? 
5.6.5 Additional option repair future directions 
Study 1 taught us that option repair is an especially worthy approach to teach 
people for decision purposes.  It is likely to have immediate impact.  People tend not to 
think to do it on their own, and it enables them to think of idea they would not have 
thought of otherwise.  In addition, it increases their likelihood of following through on 
their choices.  Future studies should employ some problem solving and creativity scales 
to see if they predict the quality of repairs generated by deciders.   
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Chapter 6 
 
Construction of Justification Stories, Repairs, Decision 
Matrices, and “Decider” Sketches 
We planned Study 2 to compare and contrast the persuasiveness of prospective 
narratives, option repair, and traditional tradeoff matrices for decision justification and 
influence purposes.  In order to be fair to all the various approaches, we needed for our 
stimuli good representative samples of each of the three types of approaches.  We wished 
to develop four “decider” scenarios to be used in all five persuasion approach 
conditions—two in which Splendor is chosen and two in which Bonnie’s Best is chosen.  
The four scenarios would be identical across conditions, but for the decision justification 
portions.  The scenarios would include autobiographical character sketches of fictional 
“deciders,” to be taken from the protagonist backgrounds written by the deciders from 
Study 1 who wrote the winning stories. 
To create representative samples of prospective stories, repairs, and decision 
matrices to be used in the “decider” scenarios, we used as source material the responses 
generated by the decider subjects from Study 1.  For the story condition, we hired 
panelists to read and rate stories generated by Study 1 deciders and thereby determine the 
most decision-persuasive ones.  We then constructed pairs of stories that favored the 
same decision and sounded like they could be written by a single person.  For the matrix 
condition, we took the pairs of stories generated for the story condition and constructed 
tradeoff matrices, with feature ratings and dimension weights inferred from the stories.  
For the repair conditions, we took repairs generated by Study 1 deciders and eliminated 
redundancies.  We organized the repairs by option, option downside, and specific issue 
solved by the repairs.  Details on the filtering and construction processes follow. 
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6.1 Story Filtering, Assessment, and Pairs Construction 
Our story condition for Study 2 required the use of stories to persuade a decision 
audience that a decider made the right choice in choosing one job offer over the other.  In 
order to persuade audience participants that a given choice between the two job offers is a 
good one, we planned to present them with decision-persuasion story pairs—i.e., one 
story showing the protagonist being clearly happy in his projected future life with his 
chosen job (“happy chosen job story”), followed by a second story showing the 
protagonist being clearly unhappy in his projected future life with his rejected job 
(“unhappy rejected job story”).  We therefore needed four categories of good, “decision-
persuasive” stories--stories about protagonists experiencing the Bonnie’s Best or 
Splendor jobs and being either clearly happy or clearly unhappy with those jobs.   
We sought to find or construct such story pairs from the stories written by decider 
subjects in Study 1.  In phase 1, we filtered out any stories that did not follow our 
instructions to the writers or were not clear on how happy or unhappy the writers were 
with the Bonnie’s Best/Splendor jobs.  We randomly selected 10 out of the remaining 
stories for each of the four categories to move on to the next phase.  In phase 2, for each 
category, we hired 20 panelists to read and assess the stories in that category on their 
decision–persuasiveness.  In phase 3, we formed decision-persuasion story pairs by 
finding pairs of stories from phase 2 that were not only highly rated by panelists, but also 
did not have any glaring inconsistencies with one another. 
6.1.1 Phase 1—story filtering 
In order to meet project time constraints, in phase 1 we applied simple and strict 
algorithms to filter out poor decision-persuasion stories.  Recall that in Study 1 we gave 
decider subjects in the story conditions instructions to write stories that were realistic and 
incorporated the following—protagonist background, supporting characters, events and 
actions, emotions, problem solving, clear ending.  Two project team members 
independently rated all of the stories from Study 1 on the presence or absence of these 
seven characteristics.  Any stories which both team members rated as failed to follow 
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instructions to incorporate a particular characteristic were eliminated from further 
consideration.   
For each Bonne’s Best or Splendor story, the two team members also indicated 
how clearly the protagonists were happy or unhappy in that job as follows—“clearly 
unhappy,” “more unhappy than happy,” “more happy than unhappy,” or “clearly happy.”  
Only stories that both team members agreed were “clearly happy” or “clearly unhappy” 
were kept.  The filtering process left at most 13 stories in each of our four desired 
categories (see Table 6.1).   
Table 6.1.  Four Categories of Stories and Numbers Of Stories After Phase 1 Filtering 
Job Clearly happy Clearly unhappy 
Bonnie’s Best Bin 1:  8 Bin 2:  13 
Splendor Bin 3:  10 Bin 4:  0 
 
For the category that ended up with more than 10 acceptable stories, in phase 2 
we randomly selected 10 of those stories to move on to the story vetting phase 2.  
Unfortunately, none of the stories in the unhappy Splendor category passed muster.  (See 
section 6.5.1 for a discussion of why this may have occurred.)  Thus for that category, we 
skipped phase 2 and constructed stories for that category ourselves in phase 3 (see section 
6.1.4 below). 
6.1.2 Phase 1 filtering observations 
Though we did not perform quantitative analyses on the filtering phase, there 
were several qualitative observations about the stories deciders wrote in Study 1 that 
struck us and are worth mentioning.   
First, despite being told to write about themselves, many deciders’ stories had 
unsympathetic or even cartoonish protagonists.  Many protagonists appeared irrational, 
antisocial, lazy, and/or crude.  One story for instance, stated that the protagonist 
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graduated from Michigan State University and that it was “the biggest mistake of my 
life” (Michigan State University is a major rival of the University of Michigan, where we 
obtained most of our participants).  It then went on to describe the protagonist as a 
“loser” from a “deformed family [with a mother of] the same description,” and “fat and 
ugly.”   
 People say I am a bitch but I just don’t care what they think….My greatest 
obstacle is myself.  And I usually do nothing about it but eat alone and eat a 
lot….Sometimes a whole bucket of chicken is better than the best sex or crack 
cocaine that money can buy.  And since I don’t get the former ever because of my 
herpes and the latter is too expensive, KFC will have to do. 
A second observation was that many deciders wrote in outlandish plotlines or 
endings, despite being told to make their stories realistic.  For instance:  “I tried to look 
for a girl friend [sic] at the bars and even in a church that I started to attend but no luck.  
One day at work in the afternoon, I just went to the men’s bathroom and shot myself.”  
These two observations suggest that people really do tend to think of narratives as forms 
of entertainment.  Despite instructions to write about themselves and with realism, they 
often opted to make their protagonists interesting more than admirable, and their stories 
outlandish and dramatic more than realistic. 
 A third observation was that many stories would be unhappy, showing the 
protagonist to be miserable in the Bonnie’s Best/Splendor job, only to suddenly morph 
into a happy ending when a new, better job magically appears and the person quits the 
original job we assigned them.  We had asked deciders to include some conflicts and 
conflict resolution in the story.  We had expected them to engage in option repairs—that 
is, view the downsides of their assigned jobs as conflicts, and to figure out ways to 
ameliorate those downsides.  Instead, most people viewed the “conflict” as having taken 
a bad option, and the “resolution” to be merely to wait or keep looking for a better 
situation to come along and then abandon the first situation.  Instead of finding ways to 
deal with downsides of an option, people ran away from them and assumed that a better 
option will come along.  They seemed not to have considered the possibility that new 
options might have just as many or even more downsides of their own.   
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This observation taught us two things.  First, in our story selection process, we 
needed to distinguish between happiness of the story overall and happiness with the 
Bonnie’s Best or Splendor job in particular.  A story may have a happy ending, but what 
we were really interested in was how happy or unhappy the person was with the Bonnie’s 
Best or Splendor job itself, not with some other job that the person switched to at the end 
of the story. 
Second, we observed that most people did not engage in either option repairs or 
coherence shifting in their stories.  When forced to take an option that has downsides, 
most people’s natural response was not to address those downsides, but merely to bear 
with them until a better option came along.  Instead of proactively solving problems and 
improving their current situation, most people either sought other options or waited and 
hoped for some magical deus ex machina to appear.  Our research, therefore, would have 
much practical significance, if we can teach people the notion of option repair and they 
end up adopting it.   
6.1.3 Phase 2—story assessment panel 
In phase 2, for each category (except the last one, which had no stories) we hired 
20 panelists to read and evaluate each of the remaining 8-10 stories in that category on 
their job persuasiveness—how good the stories are in persuading readers that the 
protagonist definitely should or should not take the Splendor or Bonnie’s Best job 
described in the story.   
6.1.3.1 Panelist recruitment and assignment 
Paid panelists were recruited via flyers and emails to the University of Michigan’s 
psychology paid subject pool and sociology, English, communication studies, 
comparative literature, political science, and philosophy departments.  The 
announcements stated that hired panelists would “read and evaluate short stories on their 
quality and persuasiveness,” and that the ideal panelist “would enjoy reading and writing 
feedback on stories.”   
For each category, each of the stories left in that category after phase 3 was 
randomly assigned, without replacement, to be processed by 10 panelists.  Each panelist 
80 
 
essentially “specialized” in reading stories from a single one of our four categories.  To 
prevent fatigue, each of the 20 panelists in that category assessed only 4 or 5 stories at a 
time.   
6.1.3.2 Panelist materials and procedure 
At the beginning of the panel, each panelist received, in paper-and-pencil format, 
a page of general instructions and five separate packets.  Each packet consisted of a story 
to be assessed and 18 questions to answer for the story assessment.  Each of the questions 
had a comments section that allowed panelists to write in their justifications of their 
assessments.  See Appendix C for the actual general instructions and questions.  The 
packets were randomized so that the presentation order of the stories was random.   
The general instructions explained the purpose of the planned Study 2 and told the 
participants that they were to assess stories on general quality as stories, job 
persuasiveness, and realism, and not on mechanical errors or writing skills.  The 
participants were told that, despite them being asked to give absolute ratings of the 
stories, the process was to be holistic and so they were encouraged to compare and 
contrast the stories, and to modify their responses to previous questions as needed to 
reflect their increasing experience with the task. 
The packets of questions requested (a) an immediate overall assessment of the 
story’s job persuasiveness; (b) assessment of the story on specific aspects; (c) any other 
factors the panelist thinks are relevant to job persuasiveness and her assessments of the 
story on those factors; and (d) a final overall assessment of job persuasiveness, taking all 
the previous responses into account.  The questions about specific aspects of stories 
elicited the extent to which the story included the following 
• sequence of events 
• protagonist background 
• supporting characters 
• actions to achieve goals 
• causality 
• specificity, concreteness, and vividness 
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• emotionality and perspective-taking 
• conflict and conflict resolution 
• realism 
• coherence 
• ending valence (happy or unhappy) and clarity (how clearly 
happy/unhappy) 
• job argument valence (favor or disfavor the job) and strength (of argument 
for/against the job) 
• mnemonic title (title recalls the story contents) 
• thematic title (title conveys the key theme/lesson of the story) 
• compelling and engaging title 
These questions and their wording were either taken from or inspired by Escalas’s (2004) 
Narrative Structure Thought-Coding Scale.  Escalas’s scale asked only about actions and 
goals, emotions and perspective-taking, transformation, causality, sequence, and 
specificity and concreteness.  We added questions about the other aspects of stories that 
were discussed in section 3.2.  The amount of time to read the general instructions and 
process five stories from scratch typically took panelists between 45 minutes to an-hour-
and-40 minutes. 
6.1.3.3 Panel analyses 
The ending valence and ending clarity assessments were multiplied, to yield a 
single ending happiness/unhappiness variable.  The job argument valence and strength 
assessments were combined in the same way into a single job persuasiveness variable.  
The three title assessments were averaged to yield a single title quality variable.  We also 
tested story length as an additional predictor, in case people tend to be easily impressed 
by stories that seem on the surface like a lot of effort had been put into them.  All of the 
variables for the specific questions, with the exception of job persuasiveness and story 
length, were averaged to yield a combined story quality variable. 
We had asked panelists to note their initial overall assessment of the stories, just 
in case there were other factors relating to job persuasiveness that we had not thought of.  
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We wanted them to note their initial impressions of the stories before they read and could 
be influenced by our own questions addressing what we thought would be job-persuasive.  
As it turned out, final overall assessments were highly significantly predicted by initial 
overall assessments assessment (r = 0.50, p < 0.001).  Nor did the “any other factors” 
question yield any ideas from panelists that we had not already considered.  This meant 
that we probably did not miss any major factors in determining job-persuasiveness, and 
that our questions did manage to cover the most pertinent factors.  Henceforth, in the rest 
of the analyses, we used only the final overall assessment variable. 
The final overall assessment, job persuasiveness, and story quality variables were 
to be used to rank order the stories for phase 3 story-pair construction (see section 6.1.4 
below).  In the meantime, we were curious as to which specific story aspects predicted 
job persuasiveness and final overall assessments.  For both variables, we ran mixed-
effects regression models (Faraway, 2005a) that took into account individual variations 
among panelists, by including the panelists as a random effect.  We applied backward 
elimination to both regression models.  Job persuasiveness was predicted by 
specificity/concreteness/vividness, emotionality/perspective-taking, conflict resolution, 
realism, and story ending.   
Final overall assessment was predicted by only emotionality/perspective-taking, 
story ending, and specificity/concreteness/vividness.  If we included job persuasiveness 
as a predictor in the final overall assessment model, however, only job persuasiveness 
and emotionality/perspective-taking were left.  In other words, job persuasiveness could 
replace story ending and specificity/concreteness/vividness as predictors.  The fact that 
job persuasiveness predicted final overall assessment was good news.  It meant that 
panelists did pay attention to our instructions about the purpose of the panel; that is, when 
making their overall assessments, they focused more on how happy/unhappy the 
protagonists were with the Bonnie’s Best/Splendor jobs, and less on how happy/unhappy 
the stories turned out at the end. 
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6.1.4 Phase 3—Story pairs construction 
Constructing our desired four decision-persuasion story pairs was a challenge 
because we needed pairs of stories that not only (a) strongly favored one job over the 
other, but (b) sounded like they were written by the same person, even though in truth the 
stories were written independently by different people.  The stories written independently 
by different decider subjects often differed in gender, personality, and values.  It would 
not do, for instance, to have the first story praise the friendly atmosphere at Bonnie’s 
Best, only to have the second story praise the lack of socializing and distraction at 
Splendor.   
For each category, we sorted the stories from the panel by final overall 
assessment, job argument strength, and story quality in descending order.  We picked out 
the top three stories from each category and tried to match them up.  To create two 
versions of the choosing-Splendor scenario, we found stories from Bin 3 (“happy 
Splendor”) and that matched ones from Bin 2 (“unhappy Bonnie’s Best”) relatively well.   
Since phase 1 did not yield any stories in Bin 4 (“unhappy Splendor”), we could 
not simply find stories from Study 1 to match the top stories from Bin 1 (“happy 
Bonnie’s Best”).  Instead, we asked a male alumnus to complete the Study 1 story-writing 
task about the Splendor job; the only difference from a regular decider subject was that 
we asked this alumnus to make his story as persuasive as he could against Splendor.  That 
story happened to more or less match one of the top Bin 1 stories.  Those two stories then 
became our third needed story pair.  The fourth story pair was created by taking another 
top story in Bin 1 and rewriting the alumnus’s story to match it in gender and other 
characteristics.   
6.2 Tradeoff Matrix Construction 
To keep the contest between decision persuasion approaches fair, we constructed 
tradeoff matrices to correspond to the pairs of stories to be used in the story condition.  
For each of the four pairs of stories constructed as described in section 6.1 above, we 
created decision matrices and filled in feature ratings and dimension importance weights 
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as roughly indicated by the stories.  Since the stories only gave a general sense of the 
degree to which the authors found the job features desirable or undesirable and the 
dimensions important or unimportant, we employed simpler rating and weighting scales 
than is usual for decision matrices.  We employed a range of -2 (highly undesirable) to 2 
(highly desirable) for the feature ratings, and a range of 1 (least important) to 7 (most 
important) for the dimension weights (see e.g., Figure 6.1).  Even with these low-
magnitude scales, the differences between the aggregated scores for the matrices for the 
two jobs were strikingly large (they ranged between 18 and 65).  This suggests that our 
constructed story pairs really do tend to strongly favor one job over the other (as we 
would hope for decision-persuasive stories).   
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My rank of the 
importance of this 
dimension relative to 
the other dimensions 
(7= most important) 
Dimensions Features I 
Heard/Learned About 
Bonnie’s Best’s 
My rating 
of this 
Bonnie’s 
Best feature 
Features I 
Heard/Learned About 
Splendor 
My rating 
of this 
Splendor 
feature 
4 Location Dull, sparsely-populated 
industrial area, with one 
mediocre cafeteria 
nearby 
0 Located in fun part of 
town, next to a new mall; 
many cafes, clothing 
stores, and cinemas 
nearby 
-1 
6 Salary $40,800 per year ($800 
above the average salary 
of a person at your 
position) 
2 $39,400 per year ($600 
below the average salary 
of a person at your 
position) 
-2 
7 Commute 18-minute each way 2 40-minute each way -2 
1 Work 
atmosphere 
Employees generally eat 
alone in their cubicles 
0 Employees generally go 
out to lunch in groups, 
visiting new eateries 
regularly 
0 
3 Office Cubicle in a noisy area -1 Small, private office 0 
5 Vacation 
package 
2 weeks of vacation per 
year, plus fun retreat in 
San Diego 
2 2 weeks of vacation per 
year 
0 
2 Rules Not many rules, but 
enforcement is strict 
2 Lots of rules, but 
enforcement seems pretty 
lax 
1 
O verall Scores:   37  -28 
Figure 6.1.  One of Four Decision Matrices Constructed for the Matrix Condition in Study 2. 
 
6.3 Repair Filtering and Construction 
For Study 2, we planned to test as our repair decision persuasion approaches the 
union of all reasonable option repairs suggested by Study 1 deciders, with the idea that 
“more is better.”  Therefore, the repairs to be used in Study 2 would not differ across 
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scenarios.  We planned to filter the repairs generated by Study 1 decider subjects and 
consolidate them, so that they could be presented to Study 2 participants as decision 
justifications.  Recall that we define option repairs as “concrete and specific personal 
actions a decision maker can take to deal with, improve upon, or otherwise minimize the 
negative consequences of an option’s downsides.”  We first took the responses generated 
by the deciders and eliminated statements that did not fit the definition of repair—e.g., 
were irrelevant, abstract or non-specific, actions to be taken by employers instead of the 
employees themselves, etc.  Second, we sorted all of the repairs by option, option 
downside feature, and issue purportedly resolved by the repairs.  Finally, we removed 
redundant repairs.   
Thus, for each option, we essentially created unions of all the repairs generated by 
deciders, sorted by the option’s negative features and specific issue solved by those 
repairs.  For instance, two of the concerns Study 1 participants had about “employees 
typically eat[ing] lunch alone in their cubicles” were boredom during lunch and social 
isolation.  We listed the repairs “bring a book or magazines to entertain myself on my 
lunch hour” and “listen to music while I eat and enjoy the quiet time” under “ways to 
deal with any concerns I may have about being bored,” and listed the repairs “have 
weekly lunch meetings outside the office to help create a friendly, open feel” and “try to 
find someone and get to know them better” under “ways to deal with any concerns I may 
have about social isolation” like so: 
•  [Option]  Splendor 
o [Feature]  “employees typically eat lunch alone in their cubicles” 
 [Concern]  “ways to deal with any concerns I may have about 
boredom during lunch”  
•  [Repair] “bring a book or magazines to entertain myself on 
my lunch hour” 
• [Repair]  “listen to music while I eat and enjoy the quiet time” 
 
 “ways to deal with any concerns I may have about social isolation”  
• [Repair]  “have weekly lunch meetings outside the office to 
help create a friendly, open feel” 
• [Repair]  “try to find someone and get to know them better” 
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6.4 “Decider” Sketches 
In order to give the control condition a fair chance against its competitors in Study 
2, we would need to present some personal information about the “deciders” for all 
conditions.  This way, the control audience participants would have something to work 
with when evaluating their deciders’ “approach” and choices.  To create the brief, 
autobiographical sketch for each of our four decision scenarios, we took and combined 
the protagonist backgrounds written by the authors of the stories in the four story pairs 
we constructed earlier—e.g.: 
When I went off to college, I had done well in high school--in the 25th percentile of my class--and 
graduated with a GPA of 3.2. I went to an in-state public university and had a great time in college.  
I am an outgoing person who loves to meet new people and work in teams. I enjoy going out on 
weekends with friends from work and from college and we usually have a great time talking, 
dancing, and laughing. I grew up in the suburbs and went to college in a college town so wouldn't 
mind living in a big city for a change of pace.  I also have a boyfriend that I live with. 
 
6.5 Story Filtering and Assessment Discussion 
Though the main purpose of the story assessment panel was to select the most 
job-persuasive stories for use in Study 2, the panelists’ comments and our own reading of 
the stories (recall section 6.1.2 above) gave us some additional ideas about prospective 
narratives and problem solving to explore in future research. 
6.5.1 Lack of unhappy Splendor stories 
Why was it difficult for us to find decent clearly unhappy Splendor stories from 
Study 1, but not so difficult to find decent unhappy Bonnie’s Best stories?  In Study 1, we 
did not impose on deciders any requirement to make their stories happy or unhappy; it 
was completely their choice as to how much their protagonists ended up liking or 
disliking the jobs.  We posit that something about Splendor’s downsides made them hard 
to envision and write good stories around.  Notice that Splendor’s downsides tended to be 
numerical (salary, commute time, and the extent of the vacation package), whereas 
Bonnie’s Best’s downsides were more immediate and visceral (cubicle with noisiness, 
eating alone, dull industrial area, bad food). 
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These observations yielded a new proposition for future research:  the use and 
usefulness of particular decision approaches depends not only upon the audience, but 
upon the modality of the option features to be communicated.   It makes sense that 
visceral features are better appreciated in story form, whereas abstract features like 
money, time, and other numbers are better appreciated via side-by-side comparisons and 
mathematical formulae, such as those provided by compensatory decision approaches.  
Verifying this would contribute to our understanding of the conditions under which 
compensatory schemes versus narratives are or should be used by would-be decision 
makers and persuaders. 
6.5.2 Unsympathetic protagonists 
As discussed earlier, both we and even some of our story panelists noticed the 
unsympathetic natures of many protagonists in the stories.  The Study 1 participants who 
wrote those first-person stories did not appear to care about self-presentation or 
impression management.  As it turned out, this may have hurt those stories’ 
persuasiveness.  Panelists who noticed the unsympathetic natures of protagonists 
complained about those protagonists in their comments on the persuasiveness of the 
stories.  It was as though being unsympathetic as a human being made the protagonist’s 
conclusions within a story less persuasive to the reader.  This observation is both 
interesting and disturbing, because a person’s actual decision making competence should 
not depend upon his likeability.  An implication for decision prescription is that 
impression management is important when justifying decisions, even when one’s 
competence or likeability has nothing to do with which option is most suited for oneself.  
This implication is consistent with persuasion research showing that likability can affect a 
person’s persuasiveness (McGuire, 1985).   
 Why did at least some of the participants not bother with self-presentation or 
impression management?  For some of the participants, it could be that they did not 
follow our instructions and focused on making their stories entertaining and their 
protagonists fictional instead of true to themselves.  For other participants, it could just be 
that they felt comfortable being honest about their foibles to the experimenter.  After all, 
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the participants were not forewarned that their stories will be used in a decision task later 
on, or that their stories would be involved in a contest to see which ones were most job-
persuasive.   
6.5.3 Running away from options instead of repairing them 
We noticed that, in general, story writers ended up giving themselves a happy 
ending, regardless of how happy or unhappy they actually were with the jobs.  It was as 
though they felt they had to end their stories on positive notes.  Interestingly, however, 
the happy endings did not result from them either changing their attitudes toward the job 
features or repairing the given jobs.  Instead, the protagonists would switch to new, better 
jobs would suddenly materialize at the end of the stories.  In other words, rather than 
taking personal action to improve their situations by solving problems with the current 
option, protagonists just waited for new, better options to appear.  Such passivity is sad.  
If the stories were good representatives of how people act in real life, our observation 
suggested that many people experience life as being outside their control, which may 
either be true for them or a self-fulfilling prophecy.  This also suggested that there are 
consistent personal characteristics that predict people’s tendencies to make option repairs.  
Administering instruments like locus of control (Rotter, 1954) and self-efficacy 
(Bandura, 1977) would test this.  On the upside, the observation highlights again the 
significance of our research, and the enormous opportunity for improving people’s lots in 
life.  
Inculcating a proactive attitude towards life and its obstacles is important not just 
for benefitting the self, but for decision justification and influence.  Our story panelists 
also complained about passivity in protagonists, and gave the impression that they 
considered such characters to be “whiners.”  Panelists liked protagonists who were 
proactive and did not just accept their fates and downsides of the jobs.  Audiences want 
“closure,” in the words of one panelist, and they do not like protagonists who walk away 
from problems, leaving them unresolved.  Thus, repairing options theoretically should aid 
decision persuasion.  This disliking of “whiners” may explain an interesting finding of 
ours that the “unhappy” bin stories were rated worse overall than stories in either of the 
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“happy Bonnie’s Best”, t(185.7) = -2.56, p = 0.006, and “happy Splendor,” t(203.5) = -
1.96, p = 0.03 bins.  In contrast, there was no difference between the two happy bins in 
their overall assessment, t(185) = 0.63, p = 0.53. 
Thus, even though the decision makers often neglected to include problem solving 
in their stories, the readers of the stories apparently expect them to.  Perhaps people hold 
other decision makers to a higher standard than they do themselves.  Alternatively, 
perhaps people hold protagonists in stories to a higher standard than they do humans in 
real life.  Protagonists in stories are expected to be heroic and to conquer all odds.  A 
good yarn does not have the hero run away with his tail between his legs.  From a 
prescriptive point-of-view, our observations suggested that one way to inspire decision 
makers to make option repairs is to present the story metaphor to them and to ask them to 
think of themselves as heroes in a story, striving resourcefully to solve problems.  
It could be that once people know their stories will be used for decision making, 
they would make the protagonists more true to themselves, admirable, and proactive.  
Our pilot study for Study 1 did forewarn participants about the decision task, but that still 
resulted in many unrealistic stories.  Stronger motivation would likely be needed to 
induce realism—e.g. a real-life major decision.  As for likability, knowing their stories 
will be used for justifying their decisions might induce people to make themselves more 
admirable in their stories.  The ideal way to obtain story stimuli for Study 2 would be to 
frame the story-writing task as a competition, with a real prize to be sent to the winner in 
the future.  The upside to our insight is that with proper motivation, people may be 
capable of writing more persuasive decision justification stories than was apparent from 
Study 1.   
This observation of the advantage of forewarning participants of the purpose of 
the story-writing task also suggested that the story approaches in Study 1 were rated as no 
more helpful than the control approach was because participants did not know the story-
writing’s purpose, and thus the stories turned out to be less relevant to the decision 
problem than they would have been otherwise. 
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To summarize what was done in between Studies 1 and 2, after selecting the most 
decision-persuasive stories generated in Study 1 using panelists, we constructed four 
story pairs, two supporting a choice of Bonnie’s Best and two supporting a choice of 
Splendor.  We crafted short fictional decider autobiographical sketches and decision 
matrices to correspond with the story pairs.  We consolidated and organized the repairs 
generated from Study 1 as well.  The sketches, matrices, sets of repairs, and story pairs 
were used to construct the materials for the five conditions used in Study 2, as described 
in section 7.2.1 below. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Study 2--Decision Audiences 
Whereas Study 1 focused on addressing our first, second, and third sets of 
empirical questions (as listed in section 4.6 above) about various decision approaches as 
decision aids, Study 2 focused on addressing the fourth set of questions about those 
approaches as other-oriented decision persuasion tools.  One part of Study 1 compared 
and contrasted the effects of compensatory scheme, prospective repair, and prospective 
narrative decision approaches on decision makers’ self-persuasion, implementation 
intention, and anticipated other-persuasion.  Study 2 compared and contrasted the effects 
of those same approaches on actual persuasion of decision audience members. 
As discussed previously in section 4.2.1, scholars from a wide range of fields 
have long asserted the persuasive power of narratives.  Some have verified the usefulness 
of prospective narratives for other-oriented decision influence (e.g., Adaval & Wyer, 
1998).  We propose that prospective narratives and prospective repair/problem solving 
are useful for other-oriented decision justification as well.  Even if it turns out that 
decision makers do not like or find useful the various decision approaches we tested, they 
may still want to leverage those decision tools to communicate their choices and persuade 
other people that the choices were good ones.  There have been mixed evidence as to 
whether narratives or statics are more persuasive (Reynolds & Reynolds, 2002), so we 
wanted to see whether the prospective narratives and repair approaches would be more 
persuasive than the traditional compensatory scheme as well.   
Finally, personal characteristics may once again mediate any differences found 
between the persuasion tools with respect to their influence on decision audiences.  All 
the scales we used on decision makers in Study 1 could plausibly be applicable to 
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decision audience participants in Study 2 as well.  Justifying a decision on the basis of 
matrices may work better for audience members who have high subjective numeracy, 
while prospective narratives may work better for audience members with high narrative 
transportability.  Audience members who are high in actively open-minded thinking 
should prefer two-sided over one-sided persuasion strategies, since they are likely to 
think of counterarguments during a persuasion attempt.  Personal characteristics of their 
audience would be useful for decision makers to know.  They may want to choose one 
approach for making decisions, but switch to another approach when justifying those 
decisions, especially to people that differ from themselves (cf Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  
One may even want to combine multiple persuasion strategies when the audience is 
diverse.   
As a reminder, here are the specific empirical questions again: 
Q1: Prescription (Other-Persuasion)—Would justifying decisions on the basis of 
matrices, repairs, or narratives serve other-persuasion purposes? 
Q1a: Which form(s) of presenting decision explanations are (more) effective 
for other-oriented justification purposes—matrices, prospective repairs, 
or prospective narratives?  
Q1b: Are differences in effectiveness for the approaches mediated by certain 
traits of the audiences?  
Q1c:   Is it better to be one-sided or two-sided when repairing/storying options 
for decision self-persuasion, implementation intention, and anticipated 
other-persuasion purposes?  Are there personal characteristics in this? 
As measures of other-persuasion, we planned to test the effects of five decision 
justification conditions on audience participants’ predicted utility of deciders’ choices for 
the deciders, perceived competence of the deciders as decision makers, and their own 
choices between the options offered to the deciders. 
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7.1 Five Justification Conditions 
For this between-subjects design, the five decision justification conditions we 
used were control, tradeoff matrix, one-sided option repair, two-sided option repair, and 
story pair.  The decision matrices, repairs, and story pairs were constructed as described 
in Chapter 6 above.  After trying out various versions of the experiment materials on pilot 
subjects, our finalized control condition had the fictional deciders state that they 
discussed their thoughts with someone who is impartial and can evaluate the option 
objectively.  (This enabled the scenario to have the control deciders spend the same 
amount of time on their process as deciders in other condition did, yet not give audience 
participants specific details on the decision reasoning.) 
Recall that Q4c asked whether one-sided or two-sided repairs and stories work 
better on audience members.  Given the limited number of good stories we had to work 
with, we had to forgo controlling how one-sided or two-sided the stories we used in this 
study were.  Therefore, we did not address the one-sided/two-sided question for the story 
approach.  But we were able to include separate one-sided and two-sided repair 
conditions to address the question for the repair approach. 
7.2 Materials and Procedure 
One hundred sixty-one unpaid and paid participants were recruited for this 
experiment.  Thirty undergraduate students participated for course credit, while 131 
people were recruited via a psychology paid subject pool list, campus flyers, a classified 
ad, and word-of-mouth.   
For the between-subjects design, each audience participant was randomly 
assigned to review one of 20 sets of stimuli—4 “decider” scenarios x 5 conditions.  After 
reading their decision scenarios, the audience participants evaluated the deciders and the 
job offers.  They then completed the same Transportability, Subjective Numeracy, 
Actively Open-Minded Thinking, Need For Cognition, and demographics questionnaires 
from Study 1.   
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7.2.1 “Decider” scenarios 
After reading and accepting the consent form, each audience participant was 
handed a paper packet containing the following:  the general instructions and cover story, 
a character sketch and statement from their assigned “decider,” the job offers, the 
application of the decision approach depending upon the participant’s assigned condition 
(as described in Chapter 6 above), and the decider’s final conclusion.   
The cover story entailed a friend who is having trouble deciding between two job 
offers, and therefore has applied a decision making procedure s/he had heard of in order 
to “break the tie.”  This procedure is, of course, the decision making approach 
corresponding to the particular condition.  See, for instance, this excerpt from the control 
condition: 
Your key task in this study is to evaluate someone’s personal decision. 
 
Imagine that your close friend (who will be role-played by another participant) has been looking 
for a job.  Your friend has received interesting job offers from two large companies, Bonnie's Best 
and Splendor.  The two companies are similar in terms of their size, reputation, stability, and 
prospects for promotion.  Your friend has spent a couple of days interviewing at each of the 
companies' offices and talking to employees there.  Your friend needs to decide which of the two 
offers to accept; that is--which of the two jobs is a better fit for him- or herself.   
 
Unfortunately, each company and job offer has both pros and cons relative to the other company 
and offer.  After thinking about the decision problem for a while, your friend still had trouble 
deciding between the two jobs. 
 
Sometimes when making a difficult and important decision, it helps to discuss one’s thoughts 
about the options with another person who is impartial and can evaluate the options objectively.  
Your friend heard this advice somewhere and used this advised procedure to break the tie 
between the two job offers.   
 
You naturally care about your friend's future and whether the decision was an appropriate one for 
him or her.  You therefore asked your friend to tell you about the jobs and his/her decision.  You 
plan to use this information to evaluate whether the decision was a good one or not. 
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The audience participant was then given an outline previewing the rest of the packet.  
Only the underlined portion differed across conditions.  It was replaced by a short 
description of the decision making approach appropriate to the participant’s assigned 
condition. 
The audience participant then received the short sketch of the decider (as 
described in section 6.4 above), a paragraph from the decider “friend” explaining his or 
her situation, difficulty with the decision, and hence intent to try out the decision 
procedure described earlier.  The two job offers followed.   
For control participants, the above character sketches were all they were given to 
try to evaluate whether the job offers were good matches for their “friend” or not.  (In a 
pilot study where we did not include character sketches, the control participants were 
confused and frustrated—understandably so in hindsight.)  For the rest of the participants, 
the job offers were accompanied by the decision matrix, option(s) repairs, or story pair 
appropriate to the assigned condition.  To recap (see the details in Chapter 6 above): 
• Control condition—the two jobs, one after the other without any further 
comment. 
• Matrix condition—the traditional decision matrix which lists the jobs’ details, 
-2 to 2 rating of each feature, importance rankings from 1 to 7 (with 7 
indicating “most important”), and computed aggregate score for each job. 
• Story condition —the chosen job, followed by a happy story about that job, 
then the rejected job, followed by an unhappy story for that job. 
• Two-sided repair condition—for each option, for each downside, the union of 
all the repairs Study 1 deciders generated, sorted by the issue that the repairs 
purport to ameliorate. 
• One-sided repair condition—identical to the two-sided repair condition, save 
that no repairs are presented for the rejected option.  Instead, for the rejected 
option, the material merely stated that the decider was unable to think of 
feasible repairs for the downsides of the option.    
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Finally, the one-paragraph conclusion announced the “decider’s” final choice—
e.g., “I am thinking of choosing Splendor over Bonnie’s Best”—and justified it by 
referring to the decision procedure s/he applied earlier.  As an illustration, suppose the 
scenario’s “decider” ended up choosing Splendor over Bonnie’s Best.  In the: 
• Control condition—“After spending 20 minutes discussing my thoughts about 
the jobs with one of my favorite GSIs, I concluded that I would prefer 
Splendor to Bonnie’s Best.” 
• Matrix condition—“After spending 20 minutes creating this table and 
applying the numerical scheme to weigh the pros and cons of each job, I 
found that my overall score for Splendor exceeded the score for Bonnie’s 
Best, and concluded that the arguments for Splendor outweigh the arguments 
for Bonnie’s Best.” 
• Story condition—“After spending 20 minutes creating stories of what my life 
might be like if I took each of the two job offers, I concluded that I would be 
happier at Splendor, and unhappier at Bonnie’s Best.” 
• Two-sided repair condition—“ After spending 20 minutes trying to think of 
concrete, specific actions I can to deal with the downsides of the two job 
offers, I concluded that, although I was able to think of actions I can take for 
both jobs, dealing with Splendor’s downsides seems more realistic and 
feasible for me than dealing with Bonnie’s Best’s downsides.  The downsides 
of Splendor appear to be more easily improved than those of Bonnie’s Best.” 
• One-sided repair condition—identical to the two-sided repair condition, 
except with the underlined portion removed. 
The materials for all conditions stated throughout that the “decider” employed the 
decision procedure for 20 minutes.  This was to prevent the audience from making their 
own inferences about the amount of time and effort that the deciders spent making their 
choices.   That way, any differences in dependent variables we observe between the 
conditions would not be due simply to the amount of time and effort perceived to be 
spent on the decision task.   
98 
 
7.2.2 Decision evaluation 
For our dependent variables, we were interested in measuring three constructs 
associated with decision audiences—their prediction of the choice’s utility for the 
deciders, the competence of the deciders and their decisions, and their own opinions of 
the options (to see the extent to which the audience participants were influenced by their 
deciders’ justifications).  First, audience participants reported how happy they thought 
their deciders would be in the chosen job (-5 = highly unhappy, +5 = highly happy).  
Second, they were told to express how the deciders came across as decision makers in 
general and asked to report: 
1. to what degree the deciders seemed to be good decision makers (-5 = worst 
possible, +5 = best possible); 
2. the wisdom of the decisions (-5 = highly unwise, +5 = highly wise); 
Finally, we told audience participants that we were interested in how their own opinions 
about the jobs had been affected by the deciders’ decision processes.  They then rated: 
1. which of the two job offers was superior to the other, in general (-5 = Bonnie’s 
Best is definitely superior to Splendor, +5 = Splendor is definitely superior to 
Bonnie’s Best); 
2. which company it would be better to work for (-5 = definitely Bonnie’s Best, +5 = 
definitely Splendor); 
3. which of the two job offers they would take themselves, and to what degree (1 = 
slightly, 5 = definitely) 
Textboxes after each of the three sets of questions encouraged audience participants to 
elaborate on their responses.   
7.2.3 Effects of deciders’ approaches on audience participants’ own 
decision processes 
We discovered an unexpected benefit of presenting decision approaches to 
audience in the manner we did.  Many audience participants across all the conditions 
noted that they found the materials and approaches innovative and interesting.  In fact, 
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they planned to employ those approaches in their own decision making in the future!  
This raised the idea that illustrating the use of specific decision approaches to people can 
be an efficient way to convey the approaches to them for their own use.  From a 
prescription perspective, our experiment materials may have an alternative use as 
decision making teaching tools.   
To see which approaches were indeed commonly emulated by audience 
participants, we added questions to the debriefing forms asking audience participants to 
check off which decision approaches their assigned “deciders” used and which ones they 
themselves used when asked to make their own choices between the job offers.  These 
variables were examined in the analyses below as well. 
7.3 Quantitative Analyses and Results 
7.3.1 Three decision evaluation dependent variables 
As a reminder, we were interested in the effects of various decision approaches on 
audiences to those approaches.  Specifically, we were interested in their usefulness for 
decision justification, impression management, and decision influence.  We measured 
these by asking audience participants in the “Evaluation” phase about the “deciders’” 
choice utility, competence as decision makers, and their agreement with the “deciders’” 
choices, respectively.   
The two decider competence questions were combined into a single decider 
competence dependent variable, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89.  For each of the last three 
“Evaluation” questions, we took the responses to those questions and multiplied them by 
1 if they favored the deciders’ chosen job, by -1 if they favored the deciders’ rejected job.  
This resulted in corresponding variables that captured the degree of agreement between 
the audience participants’ own preferences and their deciders’ choices.  These three 
variables were combined to form a single audience-decider choice agreement dependent 
variable, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92.    The final three dependent variables are listed in 
Table 7.1. 
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7.3.2 Tested models  
We performed the same procedure to transform variables and analyze the effects of 
the decision approaches on the dependent variables as we did in Study 1 (described in 
section5.2 above).  The dependent variables and scales were obtained from decision 
audience members rather than decision makers.   
There were two additional differences between the two studies’ models that we 
should note.  First, we were unable to include a processing time control variable in this 
experiment like we did in Study 1.  This was because the audience participants had to 
wait to receive the decision scenarios in hardcopy form from the experimenter before 
beginning to review the information.  The experiment software was therefore unable to 
record the amount of time it took audience participants to process the approaches.  
Telling the audience participants across all the conditions that the deciders took 20 
minutes applying their decision procedure was an attempt to reduce differences between 
conditions due to a heuristic that more time and effort spent on a decision process leads to 
better decisions.  Second, the scenarios in this experiment already had the chosen options 
be picked based on the approach applications (i.e., the fictional “deciders” chose 
Splendor/Bonnie’s Best because the matrices, repairs, or stories they produced supported 
that option).  Consequently, the dummy variables for the four treatment approaches 
already represented approach-choice agreement.  Therefore, separate approach-choice 
agreement terms were not needed.   
For the above reasons, the sidedness independent variable and the models we tested 
were either the same or simpler in Study 2 than in Study 1: 
sidedness = (dummymatrix  + dummytwo-sided repair  + dummystory), where 
• 1 = two-sided (matrix, two-sided repair, or story condition) 
• 0 = one-sided (one-sided repair condition) 
• NA = unknown (control condition) 
dependent variable ~ (dummymatrix  + dummyone-sided repair  + dummytwo-sided repair  + 
dummystory) 
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dependent variableaudience ~ Subjective Numeracyaudience × dummymatrix 
dependent variableaudience ~ Narrative Transportabilityaudience × dummystory 
dependent variableaudience ~ AOTaudience × sidedness 
7.3.3 Effects on audience participants’ opinions of the deciders and jobs 
The resultant models are displayed in Table 7.1.  The main effects of the conditions 
on the three dependent variables are plotted in Figure 7.1.   
We first dispense with the one-sided repair approach.  As expected based upon 
audience participants’ comments, the one-sided option repair approach was not at all 
effective compared to the control approach.  If anything, it fared worse.  Indeed, the 
sidedness independent variable had a positive main effect, indicating that the two-sided 
treatment approaches we tested—matrix, two-sided repair, and story—were significantly 
more influential than the one-sided approach.  Given that (a) the one-sided repair 
approach has no advantage over the other approaches, this approach is too risky for us to 
promote as an effective one from a prescription viewpoint, even if it may describe 
people’s actual tendency in real life.  We therefore eliminated one-sided repair as a viable 
competitor for “best decision persuasion approach.” 
Regarding the other approaches, the story approach was the only one that aided 
decision justification and other-oriented influence above and beyond what the control 
approach did.  Only the story condition had significant (and positive) main effects on 
deciders’ future happiness as predicted by audience participants and audience-decider 
choice agreement, relative to the control approach.  As for decider impression 
management, two-sided repair was the winner.  It was the only approach that had a 
significant impact on decider and decision competence as perceived by audience 
participants.  The matrix approach had no significant effect on any of our dependent 
variables of interest.  We found no other effects of personal characteristics on any of the 
dependent variables. 
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Table 7.1.  Effects of Decision Approaches and Personal characteristics on Audiences (Relative to 
Control/Unelaborated Approach) 
 Decision 
justification 
Impression 
management 
Decision 
influence 
Variable Predicted 
happiness 
Decider 
competence 
Agreement 
 B B B 
 
Main effects of approachesb 
Intercepts -.33** -.37*** -.66*** 
Approach    
Matrix .15 .09 .17 
Repair one-sided -.14 -.17 -.001 
Repair two-sided .20 .36* .20 
Story  .33* .23’ .54*** 
 
Personal characteristics effectsc 
Intercepts — -.01 — 
Subjective numeracy (SN) — -.01* — 
Matrix approach — -.61’ — 
SN × Matrix approach — .03’ — 
    
Intercepts    
Narrative transportability (NT) — — — 
Story approach — — — 
NT × Story approach — — — 
    
Intercepts -.47*** -.55*** -.66*** 
Actively open-minded thinking 
(AOT) 
— — — 
Sidednessa .37** .40*** .31* 
AOT × Sidedness — — — 
Notes.  n = 161 unless otherwise indicated.  All dependent variables were log-transformed to make them more normal.  
The subjective numeracy independent variable was quadratic-transformed to make it more normal.  For ease of reading, 
listed intercepts and non-significant terms are grayed out. 
an = 129. bFull model is presented  cBackward elimination was employed to eliminate non-significant terms (denoted by 
–).    
‘p < .10.  *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
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Figure 7.1.  Effects of decision approach on Study 2 audience participants.  Vertical lines depict 
standard errors of the means.  Asterisks indicate the significance of the treatment approaches 
compared to the control approach.  ‘p < .10.  *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
 
7.3.4 Effects of deciders’ approaches on audience participants’ own 
approaches 
Since audience participants were allowed to check off more than one approach 
when reporting which approaches they used to make their own choices between Bonnie’s 
Best and Splendor, we created binary dummy variables representing the use of each 
approach.  We ran binomial regression models of each of these dummy variables on the 
deciders’ approaches.  The only models that turned out significant were those for the 
matrix and two-sided repair approaches.   
As foreseen via audience comments, both one-sided and two-sided repair 
conditions led to the use of two-sided repairs by audience participants (z = 2.15, p = 0.03 
and z = 2.63, p = 0.009, respectively).  This was consistent with the audience 
participants’ comments, which indicated that (a) people tend to like the repair approach, 
yet (b) they do not like approaches that are too biased toward one option over another.  It 
makes sense that people who are exposed to the one-sided repair approach would want to 
use repairs in their own decision making, except in a two-sided manner.   
A more surprising result was that both repair conditions also resulted in lower use 
of the decision matrix approach (z = -2.05, p = 0.04 and z = -2.31, p = 0.02, respectively).  
This may have occurred because the repairs approach focused people’s attention on the 
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downsides of options to the exclusion of the upsides.  Audience participants who saw the 
repairs approaches and emulated them might not have bothered to go a step further and 
weigh the pros as well.  On the other hand, the opposite situation could have occurred.  
Seeing the repairs approach could have induced audience members to focus more on 
upsides than downsides of options, since downsides no longer appeared to be of any real 
concern.  Regardless, we have discovered a possible disadvantage of an approach that 
solely uses option repairs.   
7.4 Discussion 
Study 2’s goal was to address Other-Persuasion question Q4 by comparing and 
contrasting the effectiveness of various approaches for justifying decisions, managing 
other people’s impressions of oneself as a decision maker, and influencing other people’s 
decisions.  We pitted four treatment approaches—the traditional decision matrix, one-
sided option problem solving (“repair”), two-sided option repair, and prospective 
storytelling—and a control approach—consulting a third party—against one another and 
compared their effects on decision audience participants.  The participants read scenarios 
in which a “decider” employed one of the five approaches to choose between two job 
offers.  They then completed questionnaires about the scenarios, personal characteristics, 
and demographics.  See Table 8.1Error! Reference source not found. in the concluding 
chapter for a graphical summary of the studies’ key results.  
7.4.1 Effectiveness of the approaches 
Q4:Other-Persuasion Effects—Would justifying decisions on the basis of 
matrices, repairs, or narratives serve other-persuasion purposes? 
Q4a: Which form(s) of presenting decision explanations are (more) effective 
for other-oriented justification and influence purposes—matrices, 
prospective repairs, or prospective narratives?  
Q4b: Are differences in effectiveness for the approaches mediated by certain 
personal characteristics of the audience members?  
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Q4c: Is it better to be one-sided or two-sided when repairing/storying options 
for other-oriented justification and influence purposes?  Is this mediated 
by certain personal characteristics?  
Unfortunately, we could not control the one-sidedness/two-sidedness of our stories, 
so we did not address the one-sided/two-sided Q4c for the story approach.  As for 
conveying option repairs to audiences, “more” was not necessarily “better.”  Both 
audience debriefing and quantitative analyses showed that the one-side repair approach 
failed miserably, at least for highly transportable audience participants.  It was not due to 
the problem-solving part, but to the one-sidedness being too strong.  Showing so many 
repairs for only one option but none for the other option came off as too biased to high 
transportability audience participants.  Paring down the number of repairs presented may 
make a one-sided decision approach work better on audience members.  In the future, we 
would try presenting a smaller subset of the repairs, so as not to make the one-sided 
approach seem too unbalanced.   
Our finding implied a caveat for Klein’s (1996) finding that expert decision makers 
in time-critical situations, such as firefighters or military personnel, tend to satisfice.  
Only simulating options serially and selecting the first one that is deemed acceptable may 
be adaptive for making quick decisions, but the decisions may not stand up under later 
scrutiny by audience members who are given enough time to come up with 
counterarguments.  For the rest of our discussion, we eliminate the one-sided repair 
approach as a viable competitor.   
For the three dependent variables we were interested in, only storytelling and two-
sided option repair demonstrated significant value over the control approach.  Two-sided 
option repair was the only approach that significantly increased decider competence as 
rated by audience participants.  As long as the approach was not obviously biased 
towards one option over the other (like the one-sided repair approach), demonstrating the 
ability to address problems did impress audience participants as a sign of decision 
competence and wisdom.  This was consistent with story panelists’ comments (as 
discussed in section 6.5.3 above) indicating a dislike of people who run away from 
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problems instead of addressing them.  Therefore, problem solving is useful for 
impression management purposes as we hypothesized. 
We also confirmed that narrative persuasion is effective—and, apparently, 
regardless of audience transportability when in a decision context.  Storytelling was the 
only approach that significantly aided decision justification and influenced audiences’ 
own preferences between the jobs.  So the lawyers were on the mark.  Narrative 
persuasion scholars should be pleased.  Surprisingly, the two-sided repair approach did 
not have the same effects; one would have thought that decision audiences would find 
suggested repairs useful for their own decision making.  Apparently, stories were the only 
mediums that audience participants found compelling.  Audience comments about the 
weaknesses of the other approaches suggest that this might have been because decision 
matrices did not provide elaborated explanations of the deciders’ thoughts, while option 
repairs only focus on option downsides while neglecting to address option upsides. 
Two-sided repair turned out to have an additional advantage over the other 
approaches that we had not anticipated—it inspires emulation by people.  Without any 
prompting on our part, audience participants who saw either of the option repair 
approaches later self-reported as having used two-sided option repairs when they made 
their own choices between the job offers.  This was wonderful news from a approach-
teaching standpoint.  Unfortunately, we do not know whether it was the repair approach 
or just the repairs themselves that people found useful.  We do not know whether people 
would be willing to emulate the approach from scratch, or would they merely use the 
option repairs that are already provided out of convenience.  This would be a worthy 
future study.   
Unfortunately, a downside of the repair approaches was that audience participants 
who saw those approaches later self-reported themselves as having used the decision 
matrix approach less than those who did not.  It would be interesting from a theoretical 
perspective to find out in future studies whether it was because option repair approaches 
focused too much of their users’ attention on the downsides of options at the expense of 
the upsides, or vice versa.  From a practical perspective, however, one should not 
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recommend an option repair approach without also recommending an additional method 
to consider option upsides.  One could recommend the matrix, for instance, to draw 
attention to all the features.  Another possible recommendation is to repair and improve 
all features to the best of one’s ability and feasibility, not just the negatively-valued 
features. 
It is both ironic and disturbing that the approach touted by traditional decision 
theory, the compensatory decision matrix, did not live up to its promise.  Although 
admired by subjects for its comprehensive weighing of pros and cons, as a whole it did 
not predict any of our dependent variables of interest.   
7.4.2 Decision justification, impression management, and influence 
prescriptions 
Our study yielded a number of suggestions for improving people’s decision 
justification, impression management, and other-oriented influence.  In order to justify 
one’s decision or to entice others to choose a particular option, one should tell stories 
projecting what the future would be like should they choose the options at hand.  One 
should tell a story projecting a happy future with one’s preferred option, followed by 
stories projecting unhappy futures with the other options.  Politicians and pundits do this 
all the time.  During 2011, for instance, President Barack Obama argued that stimulus 
bills would increase employment (and hence, lead to a better future for the nation), while 
failing to increase the debt ceiling would lead to economic failure and dire consequences 
for the nation—all while Republicans argued the opposite.  To make oneself look like a 
competent decision maker to other people, one should discuss options repairs—that is, 
steps one can take to address options’ downsides, as suggested by SWOT analysis.   
We did discover that people can be taught to use option repair by modeling.  
Simply exposing them to our fictional deciders’ approaches inspired many audience 
participants to emulate those approaches or plan to use them in their own lives.  It would 
be an interesting study to see whether people would be willing to spend time generating 
additional repairs of their own, or merely ride on the coattails of others’ ideas.   
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The ease of teaching the option repair approach has a dark side as well, however.  
The option repair approach instructs people on how to process only the downsides of 
options, not the upsides.  Some audience participants noted this in their comments on 
deciders who used the repair approaches.  In addition, we found that audience 
participants who saw repair approaches were more likely to self-report themselves as 
using the repairs approach later on when making their own decisions, and less likely to 
self-report themselves as weighing pro and cons.  Future work could check whether this 
decreased usage of pros-and-cons weighing is attributable to a lower focus on pros, a 
lower focus on cons, or both.  It could be that all the talk about cons led audience to focus 
on those at the exclusion of pros.  On the other hand, the option repair approach could 
have imparted the lesson that cons are of no real concern, and therefore only pros are 
worth comparing when choosing between options.  Therefore, the repair approach should 
always be accompanied by another approach that addresses the upsides of options as well 
as the downsides.  As discussed in the previous section, one could first use the matrix 
approach to ensure that all features and dimensions are considered, then strengthen every 
feature to the highest extent possible, before choosing among the resultant reconstructed, 
strengthened options. 
Although stories were shown to have positive benefits in front of decision 
audience members, there is still a practical obstacle to us recommending that approach 
for decision justification, impression management, or influence.  Study 2 was about 
pitting the “best against the best.”  We did this for internal validity reasons—so that we 
know whether or not good stories are better than good repairs or good tradeoff matrices.  
But some external validity was sacrificed.  Even if good stories are persuasive or 
whatever, there is no guarantee that every person can be trained to write good stories. Of 
the 90 stories written by participants in Study 1, only one-third of them passed initial 
muster as decent and realistic stories.  See section 0 for further discussion on this issue. 
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Chapter 8 
 
General Discussion 
This work proposed prospective option repairs and stories as possible competitors 
or complements to the traditionally studied decision matrices for addressing description, 
explanation, and prescription questions associated with multi-attribute decision processes 
and spreading of alternatives phenomena.  We reviewed reasons why the approaches 
should appeal to decision makers, their usefulness for resolving cardinal decision issues, 
decision self- and other-persuasion, and decision implementation.  Our studies focused on 
the persuasion and implementation aspects in particular, as well as the approaches’ 
prevalence, process cost in time and process benefit—i.e., deciders’ enjoyment and 
perceived helpfulness of the approaches.  In order to achieve these aims, we pitted the 
three types of approaches against spontaneous/unknown approaches of deciders on a two-
option decision task.  The repair and story approaches were additionally subdivided into 
one-sided (repair/story only one option) and two-sided (repair/story both options) 
variants.  From decider participants, we obtained the following: 
a) approach prevalence based on decider self-reports 
b) approach completion time 
c) self-reported decision self-persuasion, implementation intention 
d) self-reported process enjoyment, helpfulness, and generation of new ideas 
From decision audience participants, we obtained the following: 
a) decision justification reactions 
b) perceived decider competence as decision makers 
c) audience members’ own opinions of the options  
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We also tested for mediation of the effects of the matrix and story approaches by 
subjective numeracy and narrative transportability, respectively, as well as the effects of 
the two-sided versus the one-sided approach variants by actively open-minded thinking. 
8.1 Approaches’ Prevalence and Performance Levels 
We organize the results from both Studies 1 and 2 in Table 8.1 by broad empirical 
question and type of approach.  The Studies 1 and 2 discussion sections already walked 
through and addressed the results in terms of the broad and specific empirical questions.  
In this section, we review the results in the order of the three major types of decision 
approaches we pitted against one another. 
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Table 8.1.  Summary of Studies’ Results—How Approaches Fared Against Control Approaches With 
Respect To Broad Empirical Questions 
   Type of Approach 
Study Empirical 
question 
Dependent 
variable 
Matrix  Repair  Story One-sided or 
Two-sided? 
Study 1—
Decision 
Makers’ 
Responses 
Q1 Prevalence Percentage 
spontaneously 
used approach 
97%a  ~70%a  ~80%;  One-sided 
Q2 Self-
Persuasion and 
Implementation 
Effects 
Self-persuasion For high 
SN 
deciders 
 Worse if 
repaired only 
BB 
 Better (if 
two-sided) 
 
Anticipated 
persuasion 
—  —  For NT 
deciders 
 
Implementation 
intention 
—  Better (if 
two-sided) 
 —  
Realism SAME  SAME  SAME — 
Q3 Process 
Costs and 
Benefits 
Completion 
time 
Longer ≪ Even longer ≪ Longest — 
Enjoyment Worse — Worse ≫ Worse — 
New ideas —  Better  — — 
Helpfulness —  Worse if 
repaired only 
BB 
 — — 
Adopted —  By deciders 
and By 
audiences 
 — — 
Study 2—
Decision 
Audience’s 
Responses 
Q4  Other-
Persuasion 
Effects 
Justification —  —  Better Two-sided 
Impression 
management 
—  Better (if 
two-sided) 
 — Two-sided 
Influence —  —  Better Two-sided 
Notes.  Except for Q1 and realism, cells indicate whether the approach was significantly better or worse than the 
control approach. The last column indicated whether two-sidedness in repair/storying had greater positive impact than 
one-sidedness on the dependent variable at hand.  ≫ and ≪ indicated whether the approach to the left was 
significantly greater or lesser, respectively, than the approach to the right.  The best-performing and worst-
performing approaches in each row is highlighted in green and blue, respectively.   — Tested, but no significant effect 
found.  “SN” = subjective numeracy.  “NT” = narrative transportability. 
aDid  not check for mediation by personal characteristics.   
8.1.1 Prospective storying 
Prospective storytelling, along with two-sided option repair, had the most number 
of benefits.  It aided all decision persuasion-related aspects we tested—self-persuasion, 
anticipated other-persuasion, justification, and even influence on others’ own decisions 
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between the options.  This finding was consistent with lawyers’ lay theories that 
narratives are persuasive, and helps expand narrative persuasion research into the 
decision arena.  It even went beyond what narrative persuasion research would have 
predicted, as the effects hold regardless of individuals’ narrative transportability, with the 
exception of anticipated other-persuasion.   
 The higher number of benefits of the story approach did come at the expense of 
longer completion time, higher difficulty, and lack of enjoyment by deciders when 
generating stories.  Yet most deciders in the non-story conditions self-reported 
themselves as having used the story approach.  There are two possible explanations for 
this.  It could be that people realize that the extra time and effort to make stories are 
worthwhile in order to obtain the benefits.  There are certainly many decision tasks that 
are minor and not worth spending the effort creating stories and repairs for (e.g., which 
toothpaste to buy).  Thus we only recommend it for difficult and/or vital decisions.   
It could also be that they engage in some simpler form of storying than the ones 
we tested.  Perhaps people only engage in much simpler mental simulations of the future.  
It is plausible that they do not bother with all of the elements that make up good stories—
e.g., characters, dialogues, and problems to solve.  See section 8.5 below for a further 
discussion of these issues and ways to address this issue.   
8.1.2 Prospective option repair 
The (two-sided) option repair approach dominated the other approaches in many 
ways.  It was the one most novel to people (few decider participants self-reported using it 
spontaneously) and seems likely to have the most immediate positive impact.  Fewer 
people spontaneously used the approach compared to the matrix and story approaches.  It 
had as many benefits as stories while taking less time to complete.  Nor did its benefits 
duplicate those of the story approach.  The positive effect of option repair on decision 
implementation intentions we found was consistent with findings from action planning 
and implementation research.  The positive effect on perceived decider competence, 
along with story panelists’ comments, supported the notion that anticipating problems 
and planning ways to solve them is an attribute admired by audiences.  We therefore 
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recommend the option repair approach to deciders who wish to increase their likelihood 
of implementing their chosen options and want to look good as decision makers to other 
people.   
Our studies indicated that people are indeed receptive to the option repair 
approach.   Analyses of self-reports showed that (a) it induced decider participants to 
think of ideas they would not have otherwise and (b) it was emulated by audience 
participants who saw it being used by fictional deciders.  An interesting future study 
would test whether seeing some sample option repairs would prime people to generate 
additional repairs of their own, or merely use the same repairs on their own decision 
making.  Another variant on the study would test whether even seeing sample options 
repairs for one decision domain (e.g., initiating monthly group lunches in order to reduce 
social isolation in a new job) would inspire people to generate fresh repairs in a different 
domain (e.g., initiating monthly  barbeques in order to reduce social isolation in a new 
house and neighborhood).  Such analogical problem solving has been demonstrated in 
cognitive problem solving tasks (Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983). 
8.1.3 Decision matrices 
Ironically, the approach espoused by past decision scholars turned out to have the 
fewest of the persuasion and implementation benefits for which we tested, and those only 
for high subjective numeracy deciders.  The matrix approach positively affected decision 
self-persuasion, but only for people who prefer numbers to words, as elicited by the 
subjective numeracy scale.  Some decider and audience participants noted that decision 
matrices were uncompelling because they did not encourage/demonstrate deep 
thinking/elaboration about the decision problem.  It makes sense that people who tend to 
prefer words to numbers (i.e., are low in subjective numeracy) would care about this 
issue.  The mediating effect of the subjective numeracy scale helps to explain why past 
research found mixed evidence for whether narratives or numbers were more effective as 
persuasion tools.   
One could also argue that people already weigh pros and cons as a part of their 
natural decision making, according to Study 1 self-reports, which is why the matrix 
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treatment group did not show significant difference from the control group.  Instructing 
that group to consider pro and cons formally using numbers did not make the process any 
more compelling in persuasion or implementation ways, except for the members who like 
numbers.  This explanation, however, does not work for explaining the fact that the 
matrix condition did not show significant differences from the control condition for 
decision audience participants either.  Therefore, prescription-wise, we can only 
recommend the decision matrix approach for making decisions, not for justifying or 
influencing them, and even then, only for people who like numbers. 
Decision explanation-wise, we suspect that decision matrices do provide value to 
most people; however, it is the side-by-side organization and comparison of features that 
people value, not the numerical scoring scheme.  This would reconcile our findings that 
(a) most decider participants self-reported themselves as having weighed pros and cons in 
their decision processes and (b) those who were instructed to use the decision matrix 
approach did not receive more persuasion and implementation benefits from it than those 
instructed to use whatever approaches they wished to use.  Many matrix decider 
participants commented that they find the side-by-side comparison useful.  Even Ben 
Franklin proposed a simple method for weighing pros and cons that he himself used to 
make difficult decisions (MacCrimmon, 1973), and it did not require computation   
We hypothesize that side-by-side comparisons by themselves are sufficient to aid 
decision making, and do not require high subjective numeracy to be appreciated.  In 
traditional decision theory and in our studies, the two are conflated.  In order to test this 
properly, we suggest testing side-by-side comparison of pros and cons as an approach 
without the use of numbers.  We could introduce a time constraint to prevent control 
participants from making side-by-side comparisons.  We would present the options in 
extremely length texts with many more dimensions and features to consider, so that it 
would take some time for people to compare the dimensions and features.  We would 
give deciders and audience members only a limited amount of time to view the options, 
such that they would not have time to make side-by-side comparisons.  The side-by-side 
comparison treatment group should then show significantly higher self-persuasion, 
implementation intention, and other-persuasion than the control group. 
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8.1.4 One-sidedness versus two-sidedness 
We found that decision makers tend to be one-sided, even though it turned out 
that two-sidedness was better for implementation and other-persuasion purposes.  Most of 
our decider participants who self-reported themselves as having used either repair or 
story approaches did so for their eventually chosen options; but only half did the same for 
the other option.  Yet the one-sided repair justification approach in Study 2 was panned 
by audience participants for being too obviously biased.  Perhaps people instinctively 
repair or story their favored options as a form of confirmatory hypothesis testing 
(described by Koehler, 1991) in which they elaborate and/or improve upon their favored 
options to make sure they are good enough and then stop the decision process.  Our result 
is consistent with studies (Klein, 1996) showing that even professionals like firefighters 
and military satisfice when making decisions.  Why do people satisfice (H. A. Simon, 
1982)?  Perhaps they do so to save time and effort.  This makes sense for time-critical 
situations such as the ones firefighters and military officers face.  Apparently, regular 
people prefer to take the quick and less effortful route to decision making as well.   
Being one-sided may suffice in time-critical situations.  First, it would not matter 
if two-sidedness is better for increasing implementation intentions, since any decisions 
made would be implemented immediately.  Second, the self and an audience may not 
have time to ponder the decision and second-guess it.  In non-emergency situations where 
the self and an audience does have time to ponder, however, one-sidedness backfires.  
Counterarguments would be more likely to be generated.  Prescriptively, we would 
therefore recommend investing the additional time to do two-sided repairing/storying if 
one hopes to justify one’s decision, impress others as a decision maker, or influence other 
people’ decisions.   
A possible future direction involves honing the one-sided repair approach to see if 
it can yet be effective for other-persuasion purposes.  Perhaps a would-be persuader 
should bring up only a few selected repairs to present, so as to not appear too obviously 
biased toward one option over the others.  Just like we did for the stories, we could hire 
panelists to vet all the repairs and select the most feasible and likely-to-be-successful 
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ones for presentation to audience participants.  Combining the repair approach with other 
justification approaches may reduce any apparent bias towards favored optios as well.  
Another future direction involves testing the one-sided and two-sided strategies against 
one another for long-term outcome benefits (see 8.6 below).   
8.2 Decision Cardinal Issues and Answers to Broad Questions 
Studies 1 and 2 enabled us to test whether or not various decision approaches 
aided the implementation and acceptability cardinal decision issues outlined by Yates 
(2003).  As summarized in Table 8.2, of the three types of decision approaches we tested, 
only the (two-sided) option repair approach resulted in a marked improvement in 
implementation intentions over the control participants’.  This was as we predicted based 
upon past research showing that making concrete and specific plans increases action 
implementation (for a review, see Gollwitzer, 1999).  As for the acceptability issue, both 
option repair and story approaches helped convince audiences that the deciders who used 
those approaches would be happy with their choices, but the traditionally studied decision 
matrix approach did not have a significant effect. 
Table 8.2.  Whether or Not Decision Approaches Aided Resolution of the Implementation and 
Acceptability Cardinal Issues As Tested by Studies 1 and 2. 
  Decision Tools 
Cardinal Issue Study 
Traditional Decision 
Matrix 
Repairs 
(Problem 
Solving) 
Narratives (beyond what 
mental simulation and 
repair already provide) 
Implementation 1—Decision makers No Verified No 
Acceptability 
(Other-Oriented 
Justification) 
2—Decision audiences Proposed by Gardiner 
& Edwards (1975). 
No 
No (save 
impression 
management) 
Verified 
 
To summarize, in response to the broad description question—how do people make 
multi-attribute decisions—we found out that the three approach types we tested—matrix, 
prospective option repair, and prospective storying—were all fairly prevalent among 
decision makers.  Moreover, most people satisfice and only repair or story their 
eventually chosen options.   
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In response to the corresponding explanation question—why people make 
decisions in the way that they do, we found that compensatory schemes can be used by 
high subjective numeracy people in order to increase their confidence in their choices.  
Regardless of their subjective numeracy, most people like to weigh the features of the 
options against one another when making decisions, so decision matrices are helpful even 
when numerical compensatory calculations are not made.  People may use prospective 
option repairs because those speak to the implementability of the chosen options, and 
thus increase implementation intentions.  Repairs also help people look good to others 
when justifying their choices.  People use prospective stories perhaps because such 
stories help them feel confident about their choices, as well as justify those choices to 
others.  It makes sense that people would want to repair and story their candidate options 
before choosing them, in order to ensure that they will feel confident about their 
outcomes.  As explained in Appendix A, any concerns decision makers may have about 
self-persuasion, implementation, and other-persuasion are by no means frivolous, as 
those often do impact long-term outcomes. 
In regards to the broad prescription question—what recommendations can we 
make to improve decision making—we recommend the option repair approach for 
decision makers seeking to maximize their decision implementation and impression 
management, and the story approach for those who value self-persuasion or wish to 
justify their choices or influence those of audiences.  In addition to the persuasion and 
implementation benefits mentioned above, prospective narratives are useful not just for 
justifying one’s choice, but for influencing those of others as well—a principle well-
understood by politicians.  The matrix approach is also recommended for people 
interested in feeling confident about their choices, but the numerical portion of the 
approach is only recommended for people high in subjective numeracy.  See section 8.4 
below for an elaboration of our prescriptions.   
Unfortunately, it turned out that option repair and story approaches do not take 
less time to complete than compensatory schemes.  That means that neither of these 
approaches is the answer to the time-consuming problem with compensatory schemes as 
found by Means (Mean, 1983; Means et al., 1993).  One must look elsewhere if one is in 
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need of some quick-and-easy decision procedures, e.g., gut reactions, heuristics, and non-
compensatory rules.   
8.3 Combining the Approaches 
Our studies’ findings support our notion in section 4.4 that the various decision 
approaches we studied can be complements to one another, not just opponents.  Given 
that each approach has strengths and weaknesses that the other ones do not, no one 
approach is best for all situations.  To hedge one’s bets, the best decision approach that 
works for all situations may very well be to combine two, if not all three, of the 
approaches.  Study 1 self-reports implied that many people intuit this.  Half of our 
decider participants self-reported themselves as having used two or more of the three 
types of approaches.   Combining multiple approaches was especially prevalent in high 
actively open-minded thinking individuals. 
To further understand the motivations behind using multiple approaches, we 
could expand our experiments by pitting the four possible combinations against one 
another—decision matrix plus two-sided repair, decision matrix plus storytelling, 
storytelling plus two-sided repair, and finally, decision matrix plus storytelling plus two-
sided repair.  We could even try specifying the order in which the approaches are 
applied—e.g., decision matrix followed by repairing, followed by storying, followed by 
repairing again (in case storying leads people to think of even more repairs).  The tradeoff 
matrix would provide an organized side-by-side comparison of the options’ details and a 
seemingly logical algorithm.  It would ensure that people addressed both the pros and 
cons of the options.  In the meantime, the repairs and stories would be used to elaborate 
upon and verify the values assigned to option features.  One-sided repair may yet be a 
viable contender if used to reinforce the conclusions of the other approaches.  The 
decider would feel and appear organized, logical, resourceful, and thoughtful.   
Given our finding that option repair and storytelling were the best two of the three 
treatment approaches we tested, we predict that the most effective combination would be 
either those two approaches or all three together.  Since storytelling performed the best 
compared to the other approaches, we would recommend building the combined 
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approach around storytelling.  After all, good stories in general are supposed to include 
conflicts and resourceful problem solving by the protagonist.  We merely suggest that 
such problem conflict resolution should involve option repair—that is, discuss downsides 
of the chosen option and resolve them as part of the story about that option.  We predict 
that adding a decision matrix would only have an effect for high subjective numeracy 
decision makers.  However, having a non-numerical table that allows side-by-side 
comparisons should be useful to decision makers, even if only to help them figure out 
downsides that require repairing.  Instead of creating a numerical decision matrix, it may 
be enough for storytellers to briefly weigh pros and cons of the options, state which 
option they choose, then launch into a story to illustrate the upsides and downsides and 
determine their values to decision beneficiaries.  
The only downside to combining approaches is the amount of time and effort that 
they take, and it is unclear just how much patience decision makers and audience 
members have.  This brings up another recommendation.  Given how time-consuming 
they are, the approaches we studied are suitable for difficult, life-altering decisions, not 
for trivial ones.  The practicality of this research is thus limited to the former situation. 
Our Q1 analysis indicated that people, especially high actively open-minded 
thinking ones, realize the benefits of combining approaches.  On average, deciders self-
reported as having used two of our three treatment approaches. 
8.4 Overall Prescriptions for Decision Makers and Persuaders 
A rough procedure that could perhaps be recommended for decision makers based 
upon our findings and insights is as follows (assuming there are no differences between 
procedures in terms of long-term outcomes): 
(1) If wrestling with an important decision, it is worth spending extra time 
and effort on it–i.e., using more effortful approaches such as repairing or 
storying options. 
(2) Set up a decision matrix to allow side-by-side comparison of the options’ 
features.  Assign numerical feature values and dimension importance 
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weights if and only if you are high in subjective numeracy—that is, you 
tend to prefer numbers to words when considering ideas.  
(3) To maximize long-term outcomes, you should repair the options before 
comparing them.  (The logic behind this was explained in section 4.2.1.)  
Repairing both repairs is recommended in order to maximize the 
likelihood of implementation and to make yourself look good to your 
audience.  Review the generated repairs and eliminate any that seem 
unlikely or unrealistic. 
(4) Try the story approach for its self-persuasion (and justification, if needed) 
benefits.  Incorporate the repairs you generated earlier into the story, i.e., 
conflict resolution episodes.  Strive for realism with respect to yourself 
and real life, as opposed to entertainment. 
(5) Update your values and weights in the decision matrix from Step 1, if 
applicable and compute the overall scores for each option. 
(6) Select the option based on (a) which story had the happiest ending, and/or 
(b) which option had the highest overall score in the decision matrix. 
Would-be decision influencers should definitely use the story approach in order to 
persuade other people to take particular options. 
 We note that even though the numerical portions of the matrix approach may not 
be useful to people low in subjective numeracy, the side-by-side comparison step should 
be done anyway, if only as a preliminary step to the option repair approach.  
8.5 Story, Repair, and Decision Matrix Quality and Story 
Improvement 
Another prescription concern for decision justification and influence purposes has 
to do with story, repair, and decision matrix quality.  For internal validity reasons, we 
wanted in Study 2 to pit “the best against the best” of each approach.  As it turned out, 
stories performed the best of the three types of approaches.  But this was only after we 
used panelists to pick out the best stories written by deciders.  In real life, storytelling 
may not be reliable.  Recall how only a third of the stories written by decider participants 
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even passed our initial muster.  This occurred despite our detailed instructions, iteration 
of the characteristics of good stories, and breakdown of the steps involved in writing the 
stories.  Story quality can vary greatly, whereas the quality of decision matrices plausibly 
varies the least…at least, as far as audience members without independent knowledge can 
verify.  Decision matrices are hard for an audience to question since feature values and 
importance weights are supposed to be personal.  Given training, time, and motivation, 
anyone should be able to come up with at least a few option features, dimensions, and 
repairs that sound plausible.  In contrast, writing or telling a story is an art, and one not 
easily mastered by everyone.  There are many and subtle aptitudes involved—
writing/speaking ability, diction, style, etc.   
Therefore, even if storytelling is technically the superior decision 
justification/influence strategy, in actual practice it may not be successfully employed by 
everyone.  Storytelling is plausibly the hardest approach to train people in.  Future 
research is needed on whether people can be trained to create good decision-persuasive 
stories or not.  There may very well be a ceiling that is determined by individual aptitude.  
It would be useful to develop a scale that assesses people’s preferences and aptitudes for 
writing stories—along the lines of the subjective and objective numeracy scales that 
assess people’s preferences and aptitudes for numbers versus words.  Future work is 
needed to develop and test the effect of a story writing scale on story approach 
prevalence, story process benefits such as enjoyment, and story quality. 
Alternatively, perhaps we can find ways to stimulate, simplify, and shorten the 
story approach while maintaining its decision benefits.  One way would be to forewarn 
people that their stories are to be used to aid their decision making.  That should certainly 
motivate them to make their protagonists more competent and resourceful.  A second way 
may be to focus on just the mental simulation portion of stories.  After all, most deciders 
in the non-story conditions self-reported as having used some form of prospective 
storying without being told to.  Perhaps they use a curtailed, more on-the-point variant 
such as mental simulation.  A third way would be to show people specific examples of 
stories that have been written for a different domain—e.g., choosing schools instead of 
jobs—in addition to giving them general instructions.  After all, many audience 
122 
 
participants self-reported themselves as either emulating or planning to emulate the 
approaches their fictional “deciders” used.  Apparently, people can learn decision 
approaches spontaneously by imitation.  Storytelling is a universal pursuit that has been 
in existence since the dawn of mankind.  Given its importance in decision making and 
influence, perhaps it should be given more attention in basic education than it already 
has. 
8.6 Effects on Long-Term Outcomes 
In Chapter 4, we discussed reasons why prospective option repairs and stories 
should aid long-term outcomes.  First, we argued that repairs and stories can aid the 
resolution of particular cardinal decision issues, which in turn affect long-term outcomes 
and persuasion of the self and others.  Second, decision self-persuasion, implementation, 
and other-persuasion themselves can lead to long-term benefits.  Our concern about the 
realism of repairs and stories was allayed somewhat by decider participants’ self-reports, 
which indicated that as far as the participants could tell, their responses to their assigned 
decision approaches were realistic. 
 On the other hand, there are ways in which decision matrices and numerical 
schemes may be superior to option repair and stories for long-term purposes.  We have 
already discussed why option repair is an insufficient decision approach in and of itself.  
This concern was substantiated in a study on SWOT analysis; surveys of fifty companies 
who used SWOT analysis revealed that they did not bother to follow through on the 
actions recommended by their analyses.  This suggested that the use of option repairs 
may indeed be used by people as convenient vehicles to self-persuasion, and not sincere 
attempts at outcome improvement.   
As for stories, they represent single, specific situations.  They are questionable as 
general prescriptions for application across situations and time.  Tables, in contrast, can 
be composed of generalized conclusions based upon large sample sizes.  One’s valuation 
of an option feature, for instance, might very well be based off of one’s many past 
experiences with that feature.  Stories can also digress too much from the key lessons to 
be illustrated; the key points may be buried within a story among myriad other details.  
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Tables, in contrast, can be filled in with merely the key points to be made.  One can draw 
people’s attention to precisely the points that one wants them to see.  As was discussed in 
section 6.5.1, stories may be effective only for conveying concrete information, whereas 
tables can consist of concrete or abstract information.  Another problem with stories is 
that their power to evoke emotions (for a review, see Crano & Prislin, 2006) can work 
against people’s long-term interests.  Studies have demonstrated the induction of bad 
judgments and choices by emotions (e.g., Sanfey & Hastie, 1998; Ubel, Jepson, & Baron, 
2001). 
 Tables are also more convenient to create and work with than stories.  Story-
writing is a complicated art and can be difficult to master, as we discussed in section 8.5 
above.  Among other things, good stories are supposed to be organized and coherent.  
Maintaining organization and coherence simultaneously is time- and effort-intensive.  A 
table should be organized as well, but it is much faster to rearrange rows and columns of 
a table than it is to rearrange parts of a story while maintaining its coherence.  Finally, 
stories take lots of space or time to present.  Being linear and composed of prose, a story 
can take up ten pages to a table’s one.  A good table would allow one to easily glance at a 
table and apprehend the messages at hand.  The expression “a picture is worth a thousand 
words” would be apt if one considers a table the “picture.”   
Finally, resolution of cardinal decision issues that matter to people is no guarantee 
of long-term outcome maximization.  For example, chocolate cake may be Fred’s favorite 
food (i.e., of high “value” to him), but choosing chocolate cake all the time to eat can be 
deadly.  In sum, there are still reasons why one would want to directly test the realism 
and effects of prospective stories, repairs, and compensatory schemes on long-term 
choice satisfaction and outcome.  To do this, one could conduct longitudinal studies on 
medical decision making.  There have been a variety of studies that focus on the 
performances of various decision aids for treatment selection, using such criteria as 
quality of life, process satisfaction, and disease distress (e.g., Hooker et al., 2011; 
Molenaar et al., 2001).  One could apply the same methodologies and decision tasks to 
compare and contrast the effects of decision matrices, prospective stories, and 
prospective option repairs on quality of life (for a review of possible quality of life 
124 
 
measures, see de Haan, Aaronson, Limburg, Hewer, & Van Crevel, 1993) and our 
dependent variables of interest.  To verify whether the stories and repairs proposed in the 
first stage of the studies were realistic or not, one could ask patients at the later stages 
whether those repairs, story events, and affective reactions actually ended up being 
implemented or occurring.   
 We should also test whether one-sided repair or two-sided repair is better for 
people in the long run.  We suspect that two-sided repair is better for maximizing long-
term outcome purposes.  It is better to repair all options to the best and most realistic 
extent as one can, then choose among those improved versions of the options, as opposed 
to merely promoting one’s favored option in order to spread alternatives.  That is, one 
should first improve the pool of available options before selecting from the pool.  This 
can be done by improving existing options in the pool as one can instead of seeking new 
options that already dominate existing options.  This scheme could backfire, though, 
should the repairs generated for some options be less likely to occur than the repairs for 
other options.  A person who wishes to use a two-sided repair decision strategy should 
thereby be careful to only include repairs that they are confident of implementing. For 
some options, “the bird in the hand” may very well be better than “two in the bush.”   
8.7 General Conclusion 
 We hope this paper has impressed upon readers the value of adding prospective 
stories and option repair/problem solving to decision scholars, makers, and advisors’ 
repertoires.  We discussed their potential contributions to the decision processes, 
implementation, justification, influence, spreading of alternatives, cardinal decision 
issues, and narrative persuasion literature.  Our studies showed that many people do use 
those approaches spontaneously.  We found that the approaches do aid certain cardinal 
decision issues, such as implementation and acceptability, in addition to decision self-
persuasion, impression management, and influence, regardless of personal characteristics.  
In contrast, the decision matrix-and-rules approach studied by past scholars only aided 
self-persuasion, and that only for people who prefer numbers to words.  Finally, we found 
that most people were one-sided rather than two-sided in their spontaneous use of option 
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repairing and storying, despite the fact that two-sidedness was more effective for other-
oriented persuasion.  Our findings suggest that there are persuasion and implementation 
benefits of prospective option repairs and stories that help explain why some people use 
those approaches.  At the same time, there is an enormous opportunity for improving the 
process used by those who do not already use them.  This research thus filled some of the 
gaps left by the traditional approach in describing, explaining, and prescribing decision 
processes in non-dominant situations.  This work has merely uncovered the tip of an 
iceberg, and we hope it will inspire new interest and fruitful lines of research in decision 
and persuasion fields.
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Appendix A:  Persuasion and Implementation Terminology 
and Long-Term Benefits 
A.1  Defining Decision Persuasion and Implementation 
What do we mean by “decision persuasion”?  Social psychology has typically studied persuasion 
in terms of on changing attitudes toward something or someone, as opposed to changing their behaviors.  
Yates (2003) defined a “decision” as “a commitment to a course of action that is intended to produce 
results that are satisfying to (serve the interests, values of) particular people—the intended ‘beneficiaries’ 
of that action.”  When we talk about “decision persuasion,” therefore, we are specifically interested in 
influences on people’s attitudes and behavioral intentions toward certain courses of action.  An example of 
attitude change would be increasing someone’s liking of a politician, whereas decision persuasion would 
involve convincing her to cast a vote for that politician, or convincing another person that she was right to 
cast such a vote.   
 Decision implementation is the phase after commitment to a decision whereby the decider actually 
takes the chosen course of action (J. Frank Yates, 2003).  For example, Sarah may make a decision at one 
point to marry Tom, but she still must implement the decision by signing a marriage license with him, 
holding a wedding, etc.  Implementation is one of the cardinal decision issues delineated by Yates (2003).  
By the “vigor” of implementation, we mean the amount of energy, time, and other resources a person 
devotes to implementing a chosen option, as well as the amount of enthusiasm the person shows for the 
option. 
A.2   Self- versus Other- Forms of Persuasion 
We use the terms “self” and “other” to distinguish between targets of a decision 
persuasion attempt.  We distinguish between three categories of persuasion with respect 
to decision making based on the target of the persuasion attempt and the maker of the 
decision (Table A.1): 
a) Self-persuasion := persuading oneself with respect to one's own decision  
b) Two types of Other-persuasion ≔ persuading others about a decision 
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• other-oriented justification := persuading others with respect to one's own 
decision  
• other-oriented influence := persuading others with respect to their decisions 
Other-oriented justification is essentially the “acceptability” cardinal decision issue 
delineated by Yates (1993).   
Table A.1.  Types of Persuasion by Target and Decider 
  Decision maker 
  Self Others 
Persuasion 
target 
Self-persuasion self-persuasion  
Other-persuasion other-oriented justification other-oriented influence 
 
Note that self-persuasion can involve two kinds of rationale.  People might justify their decisions 
to themselves based on socially acceptable or logical rationales (self-justification), when in reality the 
decision might be based on other unconscious, involuntary, or socially unacceptable drivers.  Such drivers 
may be cognitive—e.g., cognitive biases such as anchoring—or emotional (e.g., fear of death).  For 
instance, a person might be unwilling to jump in the water to save a drowning person due to fear of risk to 
his own life, but justify it to himself and others by saying, “I’m not the best swimmer here; I should stay 
out of the water so as to not interfere with the experts.”  To convince the American public in 2003 that 
going to war with Iraq was a good idea, then-President George W. Bush asserted that U.S. national security 
was directly threatened by Iraq.  Despite uncertainty in the evidence, he linked Iraq to the 9/11 attacks and 
claimed that Saddam Hussein was acquiring or had already acquired nuclear weapons capability.  Without 
such claims, the American public would not have supported going to war with Iraq.  Statements by the 
then-Deputy Secretary of Defense implied that the weapons of mass destruction argument was used not 
because it was the key factor behind the decision to go to war, but because it provided the strongest 
justification to the public (Pfiffner, 2004). 
 Figure A.1 displays the timeline of a generic decision and spreading of alternatives process that 
incorporates self-persuasion, implementation, and other-persuasion.  Suppose the decision problem has 
non-dominance.  Somehow or other the decider latches onto a preferred option (e.g., driven by a gut 
reaction, presentation style, etc.).  However, he experiences dissonance and his confidence in the preferred 
option is as yet insufficient for him to commit to a decision.  He then engages in self-persuasion, "spreading 
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the alternatives" until his confidence is sufficient for him to finalize his decision.  The self-persuasion may 
or may not continue after that.  At some point, assuming the confidence is still sufficient, he implements the 
decision.  At some point, he also engages in justifying his choice to other people (“other-oriented 
justification”). 
 
 
A.3  The Benefits and Appeal of Decision Persuasion and 
Implementation 
To recap, “decision persuasion” can refer to any of the following—self-
persuasion, other-oriented justification, or other-oriented influence.  Henceforth, when 
we say an approach or tactic is “effective,” we mean effective for persuasion purposes, 
not necessarily for long-term outcomes of the decision itself.  However, we are argue that 
self-persuasion can help improve long-term outcomes indirectly even if not directly.  
Self-persuasion leads to ancillary benefits, such as decision paralysis prevention, 
implementation, and other-persuasion, which in turn aid long-term outcomes.  We outline 
the prescriptive and explanatory benefits as follows. 
Decision makers may be driven to self-persuade because: 
other-oriented 
justification phase 
dissonance 
/ conflict 
Time 
Appraisal / Confidence 
option A 
B,C,D,... 
"latch onto" A Implementation DECISION 
self-persuasion phase 
negative 
positive 
Figure A.1.  General timeline of decision processes and spreading of alternatives.   
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a) It makes them feel good about their decisions and their chosen options.  If 
they cannot even persuade themselves that an option is good enough, perhaps 
they should wait for a better option to come along. 
b) It prevents decision paralysis and compulsive reversals.  People who are 
insufficiently self-persuaded about their decisions may continue to spend time 
on the process with diminishing returns.  They may keep waffling back-and-
forth, unable to move on with their lives.  Continual decision reversals and 
implementation plan changes use up a lot of time and energy that can be better 
spend on other pursuits (Svenson, 2003). 
c) It aids implementation.  Self-persuasion motivates them to implement their 
decisions quickly and vigorously.  Perhaps people use self-persuasion as a 
gauge of how quickly and vigorously they should implement their decision.  If 
one is not confident in one’s decision or not fully satisfied with the option, 
one may still want to take that option before it disappears.  However, it may 
be better to implement the option slowly and without too much vigor, in case 
it turns out poorly or a better one comes along.  Suppose that Tom wants to 
own a house.  He has decided that buying a house is better than not buying 
one at all (e.g., renting).  But he is only semi-happy with any of the currently 
available houses.  He chooses the best house among them to prevent it from 
being taken by another buyer.  However, despite his commitment to the seller, 
Tom can drag his feet in implementing the choice (e.g., be slow in applying 
for a loan, set appointments with the seller to be later than necessary).  This is 
so that if a better house should suddenly become available, he can still back 
out of his first commitment. 
d) It aids other-persuasion.  Feeling confident about their decisions makes them 
feel confident about persuading others as well.  Many studies have found that 
confidence is positively correlated with other-persuasion (e.g., Erickson, Lind, 
Johnson, & O'Barr, 1978; Leippe, Manion, & Romanczyk, 1992; McCroskey 
& Mehrley, 1969; Price & Stone, 2004; Wright & Hosman, 1983).  Granted, 
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these studies have been about judgment, not decision making per se.  
However, making judgments is a part of decision making (J. Frank Yates, 
1990), so it makes sense that confidence would play a role in other-persuasion 
for decisions as well.   
Decision makers may be driven to implement their decisions quickly because: 
a) They can stop worrying about the decisions and focus their attention on other 
things 
b) The chosen option may disappear otherwise (e.g., job offers, college acceptances, 
wedding venues) 
Decision makers may be driven to implement their decisions vigorously because: 
a) Decision outcomes can be affected by the amount of time, effort, and other 
resources invested in them.  That is, oftentimes “you get out what you put in.”  
Suppose a student makes a choice to study for her midterm instead of going to a 
party that night.  Then she fails the midterm the next day.  The poor outcome does 
not necessarily mean that she picked the wrong option.  She could have merely 
not implemented her chosen option vigorously enough—e.g., studying for only 30 
minutes when she should have studied for three hours. 
b) It aids other-persuasion.  Displaying enthusiasm in the chosen option aids other-
persuasion.  Displaying enthusiasm is another way to show confidence, and 
confidence is persuasive, as we mentioned before. 
Decision makers may be driven to engage in other-oriented persuasion because: 
a) It makes them look competent and look like good decision makers.  Humans have 
a basic need for impression management, that is, to look good to other people 
(e.g.,Baumeister, 1982; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985).  In 
addition, the opportunities they get can be opened up or closed depending upon 
their perceived competence as decision makers (e.g., re-election as President of 
the United States). 
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b) It aids decision implementation.  Persuading other people that their chosen 
options are good would garner support and resources from them for 
implementation.  For instance, laws made by Congress can be vetoed by the 
President if he does not agree with the decisions.  Judges can also refuse to 
enforce laws with which they disagree. 
As one can see, there are symbiotic relationships between self-persuasion, 
implementation, other-persuasion, and impression management: 
 
Figure A.2.  The relationships among self-persuasion, implementation, other-persuasion, and 
impression management and their effects on long-term outcomes. 
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Appendix B:  Decider “Bonnie’s Best” Story Instructions 
Your task is to compose a coherent and realistic story about yourself--in particular, what your life would be like should you hold a 
particular job. We will provide you with the details of the job. 
As you are probably aware, stories are sequences of interrelated events, dialogues, actions, and personal reactions centered on a 
protagonist, with supporting characters. In your story, therefore, you should address the following questions: What type of person are 
you, the protagonist? With what side characters do you interact? What happens in your story? What do you do? How do you feel? 
What happens in the end? Is the ending a happy one, or a sad one? Although you are free to make up additional details as needed, the 
story should be realistic and consistent with the details we give you as well as your own self and life. 
To help you along, we will take you through the following approach: 
1. Read the scenario. 
2. Spend at least 5 minutes brainstorming about the story that you would write about that scenario. 
3. Answer the prompts asking you to address each of the specific questions above. 
4. Write the story. 
5. Give the story a title that ties everything together coherently. 
6. Review the story with the title and revise as necessary to make them cohere. 
Next to your computer should be a hardcopy of the scenario for your reference; ask the experimenter if there isn't and you need one. 
(Make sure you are looking at the side with the right company name on top.) Feel free to use the provided scratch paper and pen to 
help you out at any point in the process. You can also copy, cut, paste, and revise text between textboxes. 
 
(1) The scenario: Job at Bonnie's Best  
 
(2) Now, spend at least 5 minutes brainstorming about the story that you would 
write about the Bonnie's Best scenario. 
 
 
 
(3) Answer the prompts asking you to address each of the specific questions 
above. You should incorporate all the details from the Bonnie's Best scenario (you 
can copy, paste, and revise as needed). At this point, do not worry about the 
 134 
 
organization or any redundancies in your answers. The goal of these prompts is 
simply to help you generate ideas for your story. 
Background: What type of person are you, the protagonist? What is your background? 
 
Supporting_Characters: Whom do you encounter and interact with? 
 
Events_and_Actions: What do you do and say in the story? What happens to you in the story? What do other people do and say? 
 
Emotions: How do you feel about what happens? 
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Repairs: What obstacles come up in the story, and how do you feel about them? What do you do about them, if anything? 
 
Ending: What happens at the end of the story? Do you have a happy ending or a sad ending? 
 
 
(4) Write the Bonnie's Best story. 
Compose your story in the following textbox. You should incorporate what you wrote in the previous step, and integrate them in a 
coherent manner. You should assume the reader has not seen any of the above information before. Therefore, you should include 
and integrate all of the following in a coherent manner so that that the story would make sense to an outside reader: 
• Details of the Bonnie's Best job 
• Your responses to the prompts in above 
• Any other information about you or your personal life that helps the story make sense 
Since you are the protagonist, the story should be written from the first-person perspective. 
Story BB: The story of life with Bonnie's Best 
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(5) Give the story a title that ties everything together coherently. 
Now you need to give your story a compelling title. A good story generally has a title that (a) captures and conveys the main theme 
and/or lesson of the story and (b) is compelling and engaging. Your title should summarize the job sufficiently so as to serve as a 
reminder of the overall impression of the job you want to convey to readers. 
Title of Bonnie's Best Story: 
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(6) Review the story with the title and revise as necessary to make them cohere. 
With the title in mind, review the story you wrote. Does the story make sense and convey the theme implied by the title, and vice 
versa? Go ahead and revise the story and/or title if necessary until they do. 
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Appendix C:  Story Panel Materials 
Story Judge General Instructions 
We have hired you to be a Story Judge.  In our last experiment, we had asked “decider” subjects 
to write short stories predicting what their lives would be like should they take a certain job from 
a company (called either "Bonnie's Best" or "Splendor").  They then used those stories to decide 
whether to take the job or not.   
In our next experiment, we want to test whether showing these types of stories to audiences 
would help convince them that the deciders made good decisions to take or reject the job offer.  
We need you to pick out the best stories to use for this purpose.  The best stories for our purpose 
would not only have the typical characteristics of good stories, but also be realistic and “job-
persuasive.”  We do not care whether the story writers made mechanical writing errors or not.  
See more details below.   
You will be given several (5-10) different stories to assess.  The subjects were allowed to make 
up additional details as needed, so expect that the details may vary a bit across stories.  For each 
story, you will receive a packet containing the story and questions.  Although we want you to 
give absolute ratings, you can get a sense of the possible range of quality by comparing multiple 
stories.  The process is therefore holistic, and we encourage you to look back and forth between 
all the stories when evaluating them and answering our questions.  So you might want to do 
something like the following when processing the stories: 
a) Read story 1.  In the space on the side, jot down notes and reactions you have throughout 
the story.  Just try to get a sense of how well it meets our needs. 
b) Repeat for all the stories. 
c) For all the stories, answer Question 1, which asks for your immediate overall gut 
reaction. 
d) Preview the rest of the questions. 
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e) Now take each story, and answer the detailed questions.  As you analyze more stories and 
gain more experience, you can modify your responses to the questions on previous stories 
as needed.   
f) Question 17 allows you to write in your own suggestions for what makes a story meet our 
needs or not.  If you look over your notes on a story and notice aspects we didn’t think to 
ask about, suggest them in Q17. 
g) Finally, look over all the stories again and give your final overall assessment (Question 
18). 
 
Feel free to look back and modify your responses to previous questions at any time through the 
process.  You can make notes or write on the sheets.  Use the back of the sheets if you need more 
room for your comments (indicate on the front if you do).  Feel free to ask the experimenter 
questions, too. 
Detailed Instructions Regarding Story Assessment 
Goodness of Stories:  As you are probably aware, stories are sequences of interrelated events, 
dialogues, actions, and personal reactions centered on a protagonist, with supporting characters. 
Good stories address the following questions: What type of person is the protagonist? With what 
side characters do s/he interact? What happens in the story? What do characters do?  How do they 
feel? What happens in the end? Is the ending a happy one, or a sad one?  The best stories are also 
concrete and specific, are coherent, include conflict and conflict resolution, and have descriptive 
and compelling titles. 
Persuasiveness of Stories:  Our main goal is to find the most "job-persuasive" stories .  By 
“job-persuasive,” we mean stories that are good at convincing the reader whether the protagonist 
should have taken the job or not—that is, either that the protagonist definitely should have taken 
the job, or that s/he definitely should have turned down the job.   
Story Realism:  We also want stories that seem like they could occur in someone’s real life, NOT 
fantastical or outlandish ones.  
Regarding Mechanical Errors:  Please do not take into account typos, grammatical errors, 
punctuation errors, incomplete sentences, etc.—as the writers were told to not worry about their 
mechanics.  
 140 
 
Q # Topic Question For each question, circle your response and write in any 
comments below. 
        
Q1a Immediate 
overall 
assessment of 
job-
persuasiveness 
What is your immediate overall 
gut assessment of this story's job-
persuasiveness? 
0 
Clearly should NOT 
have taken the job 
1 2 3 4 
Clearly SHOULD 
have taken the job 
Q1b  Comments: 
 
 
 
        
Q2a Sequence To what extent does this story 
have a well-delineated beginning 
(initial event), middle (crisis or 
turning point), and ending 
(conclusion)? 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Very much so 
Q2b  Comments: 
 
 
 
        
Q3a Protagonist 
Background 
To what extent does the story 
describe the protagonist and 
his/her likes and dislikes? 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Very much so 
Q3b  Comments: 
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Q4a Supporting 
Characters 
To what extent does this story 
include specific, well-fleshed-out 
supporting characters? 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Very much so 
Q4b  Comments: 
 
 
 
 
        
Q5a Actions/Goals To what extent do the story actors 
engage in actions to achieve 
goals? 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Very much so 
Q5b  Comments: 
 
 
 
 
        
Q6a Causality To what extent does this story 
convincingly explain the causes 
behind events and personal 
reactions? 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Very much so 
Q6b  Comments: 
 
 
 
 
        
Q7a Specificity, 
Concreteness, 
To what extent does this story 
give specific, concrete, and vivid 
details that draw you into the 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Vividness story, rather than rely upon 
abstract generalities? 
Not at all Very much so 
Q7b  Comments: 
 
 
 
        
Q8a Emotionality & 
Perspective- 
Taking 
To what extent does this story let 
you know what the actors are 
thinking and feeling? 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Very much so 
Q8b  Comments: 
 
 
 
        
Q9a Conflict 
(Resolution) 
To what extent does the 
protagonist encounter problems 
and solve them resourcefully? 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Very much so 
Q9b  Comments: 
 
 
 
        
Q10a Realism To what extent does this story 
seem believable?  (Like it has a 
chance of actually happening to 
the protagonist in real life?) 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Very much so 
Q10b  Comments: 
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Q11a Coherence To what extent are the contents of 
this story understandable and 
coherent? 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Very much so 
Q11b  Comments: 
 
 
 
 
Q12a1 Ending Valence Is the story's ending happy or 
unhappy? 
-1 
Unhappy 
   1 
Happy 
Q12a2 Ending Clarity To what extent is the ending 
clearly happy/unhappy? 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Ending is clearly 
happy/unhappy 
Q12b  Comments: 
 
 
 
        
 Job Argument The following 2 questions are about the protagonist’s happiness or unhappiness with the job itself, 
NOT the overall story.  A story may disfavor a job (i.e., the protagonist is miserable working the 
job) even if the story ultimately has a happy ending (e.g., the protagonist finds a new job that s/he 
loves)! 
Q13a1 Job Argument 
Valence 
Does the story favor or disfavor 
the job?   
-1 
Should NOT have 
taken the job 
   1 
SHOULD have taken 
the job 
Q13a2 Job Argument 
Strength 
How strongly does the story 
favor/disfavor the job? 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Story clearly 
favors/disfavors job 
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Q13b  Comments: 
 
 
 
 
     
        
 T itle Good stories have titles that (a) help recall the content of the story, (b) convey the key theme or 
lesson of the story, and (c) is compelling and engaging. 
Q14a T itle—Recall To what extent does this story's 
t it le help recall the contents of the 
story? 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Very much so 
Q14b  Comments: 
 
 
        
Q15a T itle—Theme To what extent does this story's 
t it le convey the key theme/lesson 
of the story? 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Very much so 
Q15b  Comments: 
 
 
        
Q16a T itle--
Compelling 
To what extent is this story's t itle 
compelling and engaging? 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Very much so 
Q16b  Comments: 
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Q17a Other Factors? Any other factors we should include that affects how job-persuasive the story is? 
Feel free to write in your own and circle what your response would be using the scale to the right.  
Write in as many as you have. 
  O ther Factor 0: 
 
 
 
 
0 
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 
Very much so 
  O ther Factor 1: 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
  And so on …. 
 
 
 
     
        
 Final Overall 
Assessment of 
Job-
Persuasiveness 
What is your final overall assessment of this story's job-persuasiveness, taking into account your 
responses to all the previous questions?  You may want to look over your responses to the detailed 
questions to see if they jibe with your overall assessment.  If they do not, there may be other factors 
that you subconsciously took into account that we should consider when picking good stories.  If so, 
please add those factors to the list  in the question above. 
Q18a  What is your final overall 
assessment of this story's job-
persuasiveness? 
0 
Clearly should NOT 
have taken the job 
1 2 3 4 
Clearly SHOULD 
have taken the job 
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